Ash-Sharaa accused Israel of disrupting dialogue with Syria and spoke about the fate of Russian bases

Syrian President al-Sharaa made statements in London that immediately touch on several sensitive topics for Israel: negotiations between Jerusalem and Damascus, the future of Russian military presence in Syria, and possible consequences of regional escalation around Iran.

According to him, contacts between the parties were indeed ongoing, both directly and indirectly, but at the moment when positions began to converge, the Israeli side allegedly changed its approach and effectively disrupted further progress of the process.

For the Israeli audience, this statement is important not only as a diplomatic remark by the Syrian leader. It shows that the new Damascus is trying to simultaneously send signals to the West, distance itself from old dependency schemes, and at the same time shift part of the responsibility for the lack of progress onto Israel. In the context of the war with the Iranian axis, instability on the Syrian front, and the ongoing struggle for security architecture in the north, such formulations do not remain just words.

Negotiations with Israel: what exactly did al-Sharaa say

During his speech on April 1, 2026, at Chatham House, al-Sharaa directly accused Israel of “disrupting the negotiation process between the two countries.” He claims that Damascus tried to achieve mutual understanding and maintained communication channels, but at a critical moment, the Israeli side took a tougher and more negative stance.

This framing of the issue looks like an attempt to form an international picture in which Syria allegedly demonstrates readiness for dialogue, while Israel acts as the party blocking de-escalation. For Israelis, the key question here is obvious: can such signals be taken seriously as a basis for dialogue if Syria remains a territory where Iranian proxies, arms routes, and hostile infrastructure have operated for years right at Israel’s northern border?

Why this signal was sounded right now

The timing here is not accidental. Against the backdrop of tensions around Iran and the ongoing reassessment of regional alliances, Damascus is clearly trying to present itself as a more acceptable player to the outside world. In this logic, accusing Israel becomes a convenient tool: it allows the Syrian leadership to present itself as an allegedly open side that wants stabilization but faces distrust.

At the same time, for Israel, the issue has never been reduced to rhetoric. In practice, what matters are not words about mutual understanding, but the real situation on the ground: who controls the border areas, whether arms supply channels remain, what is the role of Iran, Hezbollah, and other structures, and how capable the new Syrian authorities are of guaranteeing the fulfillment of any promises.

Russian bases in Syria: from military presence to “training centers”

Equally indicative was al-Sharaa’s statement about Russian military bases. The Syrian leader ruled out the option of maintaining them in their previous form and stated that an agreement was reached with Moscow to transform these facilities into training centers for the Syrian army.

This is a very important marker. If Damascus is indeed promoting such a line, it is trying to show that the era of the previous model of external military patronage should be partially reassembled. Formally, it is not about a complete break with Moscow, but about translating relations into a less demonstrative and less politically toxic format.

What this means for Israel

For Israel, such a transformation could theoretically have a double effect. On one hand, the reduction of Russia’s full military presence in Syria changes the balance of power and reduces the familiar regional configuration in which Moscow acted as a separate power center. On the other hand, any “transformation” in the Middle East often turns out to be a matter not of content, but of signage.

That is why it is important not what these facilities are called, but who will actually use them, what functions they will retain, and how deeply Russia will remain embedded in the Syrian military system. For Israel’s northern front, this is not an abstract geopolitical plot, but a practical question of military predictability.

In this context, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes: Damascus’s statements about the new role of Russian facilities may look like an attempt to appeal to London and other Western capitals, but for a real assessment, the future configuration of forces in Syria and near Israel’s borders is important, not formulas from the stage.

Strikes on Syria, Iran, and the debate about the future of the Syrian state

Al-Sharaa also touched on the most dangerous topic — the risk that Syria could come under attack amid the US and Israel’s military campaign against Iran. He admitted such a possibility but expressed hope that Damascus would not have to respond to such strikes.

This statement looks very cautious. On one hand, the Syrian leader wants to show that he understands the scale of the regional threat and does not live in isolation from the overall confrontation. On the other hand, he tries not to corner himself into a public commitment to respond to strikes if Syrian territory again becomes part of a major confrontation around Iran.

Why Israel will look not at statements, but at actions

For Israeli society, this part of the speech sounds especially familiar. For many years, Syrian territory has been used as a space for Iranian military presence, logistics, arms transfers, and building infrastructure to pressure Israel. Therefore, any talk about Syria “not wanting escalation” will be tested solely by one criterion: what exactly Damascus does with the Iranian factor at home.

Separately, al-Sharaa tried to reassure the external audience on the internal issue.

He rejected claims that Syria is about to be imposed with a radical Islamic model and stated that state policy will be built only on the basis of a new constitution agreed upon by the Syrian people. This is another signal outward — primarily to Western capitals, which are closely watching whether the new political structure will turn into another form of ideological revanche.

But here too, the decisive factor will be not the declaration, but the content of the future system. For Israel, it is important not only how moderate the Syrian regime will be on paper, but also whether it can become a predictable neighbor without the Iranian shadow, without aggressive infrastructure at the border, and without the old anti-Israel model, even under new words.

Currently, Damascus is trying to speak the language of reboot and diplomatic maneuver. However, in the Israeli perspective, the main conclusion remains the same: in the north, what matters are not statements about peace, but real lines of power, control, and threat. And if al-Sharaa wants to be taken seriously, he will have to prove it not in the Chatham House hall, but in Syria itself.