“Port of Ashdod” stops accepting ships and cargo with signs of connection to Russia or occupied territories of Ukraine

The Port of Ashdod found itself at the center of a story that has long gone beyond ordinary port logistics. Following the scandal with wheat, which Ukraine considers exported from territories occupied by Russia, the port’s management demanded a clear policy from the state: which ships to accept, which to inspect more thoroughly, and which to deny entry.

According to the Israeli publication Globes on May 6, 2026, the chairman of the board of directors of the Ashdod Port Company, Shaul Schneider, sent a letter to the acting head of the National Security Council, Gil Reich. In it, he announced the port’s decision to suspend the acceptance of ships with Russian signs or signs related to routes and cargo that may pose sanction and legal risks.

It’s not about any entry into a Russian port automatically proving a violation. This is important to emphasize right away.

The meaning of the letter is different: after the story with suspicious wheat, the Port of Ashdod does not want to independently resolve issues related to state policy, international law, sanctions, and Israel’s relations with Ukraine.

Why Ashdod turned to the National Security Council

The reason was the story with wheat, allegedly exported from territories of Ukraine under Russian occupation and then imported into Israel. This scandal has already caused tension between Jerusalem and Kyiv, as well as threats of sanctions from Europe.

For the Port of Ashdod, the situation looks dangerous not only politically but also legally.

On one hand, the port, as a state company, is obliged to provide services to those who request them. On the other hand, if a ship or cargo turns out to be part of a scheme trading stolen Ukrainian wheat, not only importers but also the port, its management, and responsible employees could be at risk.

This is what Schneider describes as being “between a rock and a hard place.”

Four criteria mentioned by Globes

In the letter received by Globes, Schneider sets out four criteria, any one of which, in his position, is enough to question a ship’s entry into Ashdod:

• the ship sails under the Russian flag;
• the ship has a Russian name, even if it is registered in another country;
• on its way to Israel, the ship called at a Russian port or a port in Ukraine under Russian occupation;
• the ship carries cargo whose origin may be related to Russia or occupied Ukrainian territories.

Important: these criteria do not mean automatic proof of violation.

This is a risk criterion by which the Port of Ashdod asks the state to provide instructions: whether such a ship can be denied entry, who is responsible for inspection, and how to act to avoid putting the port under criminal claims or personal sanctions.

What exactly the Port of Ashdod is asking for

Schneider acknowledges that the proposed policy may contradict the established legal obligation of the port to “provide port services to all who request them.” But he also points out that accepting such ships could create a risk of criminal prosecution and sanctions from the European Union and Ukraine.

Therefore, the port asks the state not to leave it alone with this problem.

The essence of the appeal is simple: the National Security Council must provide clear instructions. Either allow the port to deny ships with such risk signs or determine the procedure for their acceptance so that the port and its leaders are not threatened with liability in Israel or personal sanctions in Europe.

For Israel, this is a fundamental point. If a state port itself begins to decide which ships are “too risky,” it could affect trade. If the port accepts everything without inspection, it could create an international scandal.

Why the sanction risk became real

Ashdod’s concerns do not seem abstract. A representative of the European Commission has already stated that Brussels is ready to take measures against individuals and legal entities in third countries if they are involved in trading stolen Ukrainian wheat.

At the same time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Kyiv is preparing its own package of sanctions against participants in such schemes.

This changes the tone of the whole story.

Now the question is not only whether a specific batch of grain was stolen. The question is how Israel will check supplies if there are signs of dubious origin around them: port calls, transshipments, opaque documents, chains of intermediaries, and connections with territories under Russian occupation.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views this story as an example of how Russia’s war against Ukraine directly enters the Israeli economy: through ports, grain, importers, insurance risks, sanctions, and prices of basic products.

The scandal started with wheat, but the issue is broader

Formally, the reason was precisely wheat. According to Globes, the scandal flared up after the Russian ship “Avinsk” called at Haifa, where about 44,000 tons of grain were unloaded. The Ukrainian embassy filed a police report, claiming that a significant portion of the cargo was loaded in occupied Ukrainian ports.

Later, another ship with cargo that also raised suspicions was off the coast of Haifa. An Israeli import company refused the cargo, and the ship left Israel without unloading.

But Schneider’s letter effectively raises the issue broader than one batch of wheat.

If the route, documents, or origin of the cargo raise suspicions, who should make the decision — the port, the importer, the ministry, the National Security Council, or a separate regulator? And what evidence is needed to refuse a ship or, conversely, allow unloading?

Without answers to these questions, Israel will find itself in the same trap every time: business will seek cheap cargo, Ukraine will demand inspections, Europe will remind of sanctions, and the port will be the ultimate executor.

Why this is important for Israel’s food security

For Israel, the grain issue is sensitive. About 90% of the wheat consumed in the country is imported. In recent years, Russia supplied a significant portion of this volume, and Ukraine, before the full-scale war, was also one of the important sources of supply.

If Israel sharply tightens the rules without alternatives, it could affect importers and prices.

But if Israel does not create a verification mechanism at all, it risks finding itself in the gray zone of international trade. Especially if it concerns wheat that could have been exported from territories of Ukraine under Russian occupation.

That is why the decision of the Port of Ashdod cannot be seen as technical bureaucracy. It is a signal to the state: the previous regime, when the port simply accepted a ship and unloaded goods, no longer works.

How the origin of the cargo could be concealed

Suspiciously, grain from occupied Ukrainian ports could first be loaded onto small ships, then transshipped at an intermediate port, and only then sent further — including towards Israel.

Such a scheme allows the origin of the goods to be blurred.

Professor Shaul Horev, head of the Institute for Maritime Policy and Strategy, compared this to methods long used by Iran to circumvent restrictions. Only in the Iranian case, it is more often about oil, and here — about wheat.

He explained it this way:

“Let’s look at the Iranians — they act exactly the same way, only instead of wheat they use oil. No wonder the Iranian fleet is called the ‘shadow fleet.’ I assume the same is done in the Black Sea region.”

For the Israeli audience, this comparison is especially understandable. When cargo passes through several ships, ports, and intermediaries, the final document may look clean, even if the real origin of the goods raises questions.

Why the state port does not want to take the risk on itself

Horev considers Ashdod’s step logical precisely because the port has state status. According to him, “it is important that this is a state institution. They cannot act irresponsibly.”

And here arises the main conflict.

The Port of Ashdod can demand rules. But it does not control the entire market. Private companies, suppliers, intermediaries, and importers will still look for cheaper routes and sources of supply.

Horev doubts that the National Security Council can completely solve the problem with one letter or one instruction. According to him, the NSC cannot directly influence all players in the commercial sector because business mechanisms will always seek their benefit, and suppliers — the cheapest way to transport goods.

This means that Israel needs not a one-time reaction to the scandal, but a system.

What Israel must decide now

The Port of Ashdod is effectively telling the state: set the rules before the next scandal becomes an international crisis.

It is necessary to understand what documents to require from the ship, how to check the origin of the cargo, who is responsible for the supply chain, how to act when there is suspicion of connection with occupied Ukrainian territories, and whether a ship can be denied without violating the port’s obligation to serve clients.

For Ukraine, this is a matter of protecting a stolen resource and countering the Russian system of plundering occupied territories.

For Israel, it is a matter of reputation, sanction risks, food security, and relations with Kyiv.

For the Port of Ashdod, it is a matter of personal and institutional responsibility.

That is why the headline of this story should not sound as if the port “bans everything Russian” or “accuses every ship in advance.” The correct meaning is different: Ashdod demands clear rules from the state for ships and cargo around which there are signs of risk after the scandal with suspicious wheat.

Until such rules exist, each new voyage may again place Israel between trade benefits, international law, and the political cost of silence.