The US and Israel’s war against Iran has divided the West more than expected

The US and Israel’s war against Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, became not only a Middle Eastern crisis but also a serious test for relations between Washington and Europe.

The conflict heightened tensions between the European Union and the administration of US President Donald Trump, undermined trust in American security guarantees, and once again prompted European capitals to discuss strategic autonomy.

For Israel, this story is also important. It is not only about Iran as a direct enemy of the Jewish state but also about how the war against Tehran changes the balance of power between the US, Europe, Ukraine, and the entire Western camp.

Europe initially remained silent but quickly felt the cost of the war.

In the first days after the war began, most European leaders avoided openly criticizing the actions of the US and Israel. Some governments in the EU hoped that a short military campaign would weaken Iran — one of Russia’s main partners — and at the same time help improve relations with the Trump administration after previous conflicts.

For Europe, this seemed like an uncomfortable but understandable calculation.

If Tehran is weakened, Russia loses an important military and technological partner. If Washington sees European loyalty, relations with the White House can be partially restored. Especially after months of pressure from Trump on other sensitive issues, including Greenland.

But this logic quickly began to crack.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez opposed the war from the start. Italy later refused to allow the use of its military bases for operations against Iran. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte supported actions against Tehran.

Most European countries did not participate directly in offensive operations. But some effectively assisted the American military through their infrastructure. The Ramstein base in Germany became particularly significant, serving as an important coordination center for US operations in the Middle East.

The British RAF Fairford base also came into focus: according to the original material, American bombers involved in the campaign against Iran took off from there.

For European allies, the problem was not only the operation itself. Far more dangerous was the lack of broad preliminary consultations within NATO. This was another signal that the transatlantic partnership no longer works as it used to.

Iran’s response hit markets, Ukraine, and trust in the US.

After the US and Israel strikes, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz — one of the world’s key routes for transporting oil and natural gas.

For Europe, this immediately became not a military theory but an economic reality. Disruption of shipping affected global markets, heightened concerns about energy prices, and once again showed how much the Middle East is connected to the daily lives of European countries.

As the conflict dragged on, it became clear: war does not necessarily weaken all of the West’s opponents. In some aspects, it, on the contrary, creates new opportunities for them.

The rise in oil prices increased Russia’s revenues from energy exports. For Ukraine, this is a worrying signal because the Russian military machine directly depends on money, technology, sanctions evasion, and external partners.

This is where the Israeli audience should see the broader context. Iran is an enemy of Israel. But Iran is also a partner of Russia, which is waging war against Ukraine and using Iranian drones in attacks on Ukrainian cities. Therefore, any major conflict around Tehran inevitably affects not only the Middle East but also the Ukrainian front.

In the midst of this picture, Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers the war against Iran not as a separate episode but as part of a large chain: Israel, Ukraine, the US, Europe, energy, weapons, air defense, and trust between allies are already much more closely linked than they were a few years ago.

A separate problem has become the capabilities of the American defense-industrial complex.

As weapons were expended, delivery times for weapons to allies increased. The original material specifically mentions the March announcement of a multi-year delay in the delivery of Patriot air defense systems to Switzerland. For Europe, this became a painful example: even wealthy and stable US partners can no longer be sure they will receive critically important systems on time.

Against this backdrop, fears have intensified that support for Ukraine may be further reduced. Especially after the previous limitation of American aid under Trump.

Europe is once again talking about independent defense.

The war against Iran exacerbated the conflict between the White House and European allies. Trump criticized European countries for refusing to participate in offensive actions against Tehran and threatened to reduce the American presence in NATO.

For Europe, this became a moment of unpleasant clarity.

If the US can start a major operation without sufficient consultations, demand support, and then threaten allies for caution, then the previous security model no longer seems reliable. Many European politicians and analysts have concluded that after the Middle Eastern conflict ends, relations with Washington will not return to their previous state.

The discussion about Europe’s strategic autonomy has turned from an old bureaucratic formula into a practical question.

European countries are increasingly discussing the need to independently protect their interests, invest more in defense, and participate more actively in stabilizing the situation in the Middle East. Among the proposals is the creation of a new format for regional security negotiations involving not only European states but also Gulf countries, Iran, and important Asian partners, including India, Japan, and South Korea.

This does not mean that Europe is ready to replace the US tomorrow.

But the trend is clear: trust in American guarantees has weakened. Successful Iranian attacks on Gulf states, despite the American military presence in the region, have reinforced the feeling that even US bases are no longer an absolute protection.

For Israel, the conclusion is also not simple.

On the one hand, the US remains Israel’s key strategic ally. Without American support, the current security architecture in the Middle East is unimaginable. On the other hand, the war showed that even US allies are beginning to doubt the stability of the American line if it depends on the political will of a specific administration.

What this means for Israel.

Israel cannot perceive the rift between Europe and Washington as a distant diplomatic problem.

If the Western camp is less coordinated, Iran gains more room to maneuver. If Europe doubts the US, the overall strategy of pressure on Tehran becomes more complicated. If the American defense industry is overloaded, questions arise about the speed of deliveries of air defense systems, missiles, ammunition, and critical technologies.

And if support for Ukraine is reduced, Russia — Iran’s partner and one of the key players in the new anti-Western axis — benefits.

Therefore, the US and Israel’s war against Iran became not only a military episode. It showed that the Western security system is entering a period of deep restructuring.

For Israel, in this situation, it is important not only to maintain the alliance with the US but also to work more closely with Europe, Ukraine, and regional states. Practical ties are needed in air defense, drone combat, cyber protection, sanctions, energy security, and tracking technology supplies to enemies.

The main question now is not who formally supported or did not support the operation against Iran.

The main question is whether the West can act as a unified system when a network of interconnected threats is already working against it: Iran, Russia, proxy groups, energy blackmail, attacks on maritime routes, and pressure on Ukraine.

For Israel, this is not an academic discussion. It is a matter of national security, the stability of alliances, and the ability to foresee where the next Middle Eastern crisis might strike not only Tel Aviv or Haifa but also Kyiv, Warsaw, Berlin, London, and Washington.