Ukraine assessed the capabilities of Iranian missiles Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar

The Israeli defense publication IsraelDefense drew attention to the unusual work of Ukrainian military scientists: specialists, without access to the missiles themselves, created digital models of the Iranian Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar, calculated their aerodynamic characteristics, speed, altitude, and possible flight range.

The publication appeared in Israel on July 21, 2026, amid ongoing reports of military cooperation between Iran and Russia. However, the most interesting aspect was not only the work of the Ukrainian researchers but also the results of the modeling: the potential range of both missiles under optimal conditions turned out to be higher than the characteristics usually indicated by Iran.

At the same time, IsraelDefense made an important technical error in indicating speed and presented an open scientific article as a recently emerged “internal study,” although the work of the Ukrainian authors was published much earlier.

Ukrainian research noticed in Israel

The IsraelDefense article is titled “Ukrainian Research Conducts Advanced Modeling of Iranian Missiles.” Its author, Ami Rokes Domba, writes that Ukrainian specialists conducted an in-depth analysis of Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar against the backdrop of unconfirmed reports of their possible sale to Russia for use against Ukraine.

The primary source was the work “Assessment of Flight Parameters of Short-Range Ballistic Missiles Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar,” prepared by Anatoly Dudush, Pavel Kushch, Dmitry Melenti, and Alexander Kalita.

It was published in the journal “Science and Technology of the Air Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” No. 4(53) for 2023. The scientific article was approved for publication on February 23, 2024, so IsraelDefense’s definition of “recently published” seems inaccurate: the Israeli publication in July 2026 returned to a study created more than two years ago.

The work was also not classified or strictly internal. It is published in open access and contains calculation methods, comparative tables, digital models, and trajectory graphs.

How missiles were modeled without access to their samples

Ukrainian researchers assumed that the full technical characteristics of Iranian missiles were unavailable. Therefore, the geometry of Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar was reconstructed from scaled photographs and published information.

Specialists approximately determined:

• the length and diameter of the body;
• the shape of the nose section;
• the cross-sectional area;
• the size of the stabilizers;
• the mass of the body, fuel, and warhead;
• the estimated duration of engine operation.

Then the digital models were studied using the SOLIDWORKS Flow Simulation software package. It allowed for the assessment of air resistance and determination of how the drag coefficient changes as the missile accelerates to supersonic and hypersonic speeds.

The next stage was the mathematical modeling of motion. The authors used a description of ballistic flight based on Kepler’s equations and built optimal trajectories for missiles with different warhead masses. The study shows not only the possible range but also the change in speed throughout the flight.

The main practical goal was to understand how existing and prospective air defense and missile defense systems can detect, track, and intercept such targets.

What results did Ukrainian scientists achieve

The usually stated range of Fateh-110 is about 300 kilometers, and Zolfaghar is about 700 kilometers. Ukrainian modeling showed that under certain initial conditions, potential indicators could be higher.

For Fateh-110, the authors calculated two options.

With a warhead mass of 450 kilograms, the potential range was 355 kilometers. Increasing the warhead mass to 650 kilograms reduced the range to 290 kilometers, and the calculated maximum speed decreased from 1770 to 1600 meters per second.

For Zolfaghar with a detachable warhead mass of 579 kilograms, the model showed a potential range of about 890 kilometers and a maximum speed of approximately 2730 meters per second.

IsraelDefense additionally provides the altitude at which the engine stops working:

• Fateh-110 — approximately 15–20 kilometers;
• Zolfaghar — about 25–30 kilometers.

These indicators are important for missile defense. The higher the speed and the more complex the trajectory profile, the less time the radar has to detect the target, classify it, transmit data, and launch an interceptor missile.

IsraelDefense error: kilometers per hour instead of kilometers per second

In the Hebrew material, the speed of Fateh-110 is indicated as 1.7 קמ״ש, and Zolfaghar as 2.7 קמ״ש.

The abbreviation קמ״ש in Hebrew means kilometers per hour. It turns out that the missile allegedly completes acceleration at the speed of a pedestrian, which is physically impossible.

The original Ukrainian table uses meters per second:

• Fateh-110 — up to 1770 m/s, or approximately 1.77 km/s;
• Zolfaghar — up to 2730 m/s, or approximately 2.73 km/s.

Most likely, when preparing the article, IsraelDefense confused the designations of kilometers per hour and kilometers per second. The real difference is huge: 1.7 km/s is over 6000 km/h, and 2.7 km/s is almost 10,000 km/h.

For a specialized defense publication, such an error is noticeable, but it does not change the main content of the Ukrainian work.

Does this mean that Zolfaghar actually flies 890 kilometers

Not necessarily.

Ukrainian scientists calculated the potential range under optimal ballistic trajectory and selected initial parameters. The result of 890 kilometers cannot be automatically considered a confirmed combat characteristic of a serial missile.

The model was built based on open materials. The researchers did not have:

• factory documentation;
• a physical sample of the missile;
• exact fuel characteristics;
• telemetry of real launches;
• complete information about the control system;
• data on programmable maneuvers in the final section.

Therefore, the calculations show what the missile could potentially be capable of under given conditions. This is a serious engineering assessment, but not the result of a test launch.

It is especially difficult to model Zolfaghar. This missile has a detachable warhead and, according to open descriptions, can perform an anti-missile maneuver and dive at the target. The separation of the warhead reduces the object that the missile defense system must detect and hit, and the change in trajectory complicates the prediction of the meeting point with the interceptor missile. The Ukrainian comparative table indicates a claimed circular probable deviation for Zolfaghar within 50–70 meters.

What does Russia have to do with it and why is it important to Israel

Ukraine’s interest in Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar did not arise by chance. Even during the preparation of the study, Ukrainian and Western structures warned that Iran might transfer these missiles to Russia.

In February 2024, Reuters, citing six sources, reported that Tehran allegedly supplied Moscow with about 400 ballistic missiles, including the Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar systems. However, the Iranian Ministry of Defense and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps did not confirm the information, and Ukrainian military at that time did not record the use of such missiles by Russian troops.

Already in August 2024, other Reuters sources stated that the transfer of long-range Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar did not occur then. Ukraine also did not report the discovery of their debris after Russian attacks.

Confirmation appeared regarding another system — Fath-360, also known as Project 360. This is a more compact missile with a range of about 120 kilometers.

The US Department of the Treasury officially reported that Russia received the first batch of Project 360 in early September 2024, and Russian military personnel had previously been trained by Iranian specialists.

According to data published in January 2026, Iran transferred more than 350 Fath-360 missiles to Russia, but by that time Ukraine had not yet recorded their use. Thus, the confirmed delivery of Fath-360 is not proof of the transfer of the longer-range Fateh-110 or Zolfaghar.

NANews — Israel News notes: for Israel, this story has direct significance. Iranian missile technologies simultaneously threaten Ukraine, Israel, and other states within the range of Tehran’s arsenal.

Over the years of full-scale war, Ukraine has accumulated unique experience in studying Russian, Iranian, and North Korean means of destruction. Israel, in turn, possesses one of the most advanced multi-level missile defense systems, including Arrow, David’s Sling, and Patriot complexes.

The exchange of technical data on target characteristics, real trajectories, detection, and interception results could be beneficial for both countries. Ukraine receives practical data directly during Russian attacks, while Israel has been creating systems for decades against threats from Iran and its allies.

Ballistic missiles require the most scarce missile defense resources

Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar represent a much more complex target for Ukraine than Shahed.

Drones fly slower and can be destroyed by mobile fire groups, anti-aircraft artillery, and various missile systems. A ballistic missile moves several times faster, attacks from above, and leaves significantly less time to react.

Experts interviewed by Reuters noted that to reliably intercept such targets, Ukraine needs the most modern upper-level systems — primarily Patriot and SAMP/T. The mass use of ballistic missiles can overload even a prepared air defense system and force it to expend extremely expensive and scarce interceptor missiles.

The threat becomes even more serious if Russia gains the ability to combine ballistic missiles with cruise missiles, Shahed, and decoys. Such a combined strike creates several simultaneous tasks: slow drones need to be destroyed at low altitudes, cruise missiles need to be tracked on complex routes, and ballistic targets need to be intercepted within minutes.

That is why the work of Ukrainian scientists is not an abstract academic study. It helps to build threat models in advance, assess possible impact zones, and prepare radars and air defense systems for the appearance of new targets.

What the Ukrainian work actually showed

The IsraelDefense publication creates the impression that Ukraine only recently revealed the secret characteristics of Iranian missiles. In reality, Ukrainian military researchers openly published an engineering model built on available data back in 2023–2024.

Its value lies not in the fact that the authors learned the exact secret characteristics of Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar. They showed how, even without physical access to the weapon, its geometry can be approximately reconstructed, aerodynamics calculated, and a range of possible characteristics determined.

NANews — Israel News considers another aspect especially important: Ukrainian specialists were preparing for the possible appearance of Iranian missiles in Russia even before the official confirmation of ballistic weapon deliveries from Iran.

The calculated 355 kilometers for Fateh-110 and 890 kilometers for Zolfaghar cannot be perceived as definitively proven combat characteristics. But they show that the capabilities of Iranian weapons may differ from publicly stated figures, and missile defense systems should be calculated not on the manufacturer’s advertised characteristics but on the most dangerous realistic scenario.

The Israeli publication made a mistake in the units of speed and exaggerated the novelty of the study. But its main conclusion remains valid: even during a difficult war, Ukraine retains scientific and engineering personnel capable of solving complex problems of aerodynamics, missile ballistics, and missile defense.

For Ukraine, it is a matter of protecting cities from Russian attacks. For Israel, it is another indication that the Ukrainian experience in studying Iranian weapons deserves not only attention but also closer professional cooperation.