- September 24, 2025
- 2:33 pm
- Ukraine
Main Thesis. In modern conflict, victory goes not to those with more divisions, but to those who can quickly turn ideas into working solutions on the battlefield — from drones and electronic warfare to autonomous platforms and logistics without large targets. This is precisely what Valeriy Zaluzhny asserts in a new article (Ukr.) on ZN.UA dated September 24, 2025: innovations are the foundation of a “strategy of sustainable resistance,” making war operationally meaningless for Russia.
In modern conflict, victory goes to those who can quickly turn ideas into serial solutions. Valeriy Zaluzhny proposes a simple but tough strategy: make war operationally meaningless for the aggressor — through technological initiative, comprehensive defense, and continuous adaptation.
Classic methods — massing forces, “wall to wall,” heavy equipment in columns — are losing effectiveness. Why? Because drones, electronic warfare, network-centricity, and the long reach of long-range means put an end to any large gatherings.
What’s Behind This: Not “Gadgets,” but an Implementation Industry
The new norm is not a single successful UAV, but a fueled “conveyor belt”: idea → testing → military operation → refinement → series. Without this, “innovation” remains a presentation.
How War Has Changed: From the Front Line to a “Cloud of Threats” Over the Rear
The front is no longer pure geometry. It is blurred by sensors: FPV drone cameras, passive radio monitoring, commercial optics — all weave a network where a target accumulates risks the moment it leaves the box.
In Brief:
- The “observe-strike” cycle has become shorter than the column movement cycle.
- Electronic warfare has turned from a “niche” tool into the everyday weather of war.
- The rear is no longer safe — long-range UAVs and sea/land robo-platforms expand the geography of threats.
Why Massing Forces Is Increasingly Suicidal
A visible grouping is a grouping that gets hit. And the heavier the “fist,” the more painful the precise strikes. Hence Zaluzhny’s bet: small autonomous groups, mobility, stealth, constant change of pace.
Three Technological Nodes That Decide the Outcome in Practice
1) Drones: From Consumable to System
FPV strikers, “quads” for reconnaissance, long-range “kamikazes,” and ground/surface platforms have created an economy of attrition. A couple of inexpensive FPVs work as insurance against breakthroughs; a swarm of long-range UAVs acts as a “tax on the rear.”
Conclusion: both strike UAVs and anti-drone defense need to be increased — not only electronic warfare but also kinetic means (guns, nets, interceptors).
2) Electronic Warfare and Resistance to Interference
Yesterday’s “feature” is today’s background. Any means of communication and guidance must survive in a dirty ether: multi-band, adaptive protocols, channel redundancy, quick firmware updates.
3) Autonomy and “Software Dominance”
The key is in software and algorithms: target recognition, anti-spoofing, navigation without GPS, distributed swarm control. Hard hardware without fast software iteration is a museum, not an advantage.
Why Zaluzhny’s Strategy Is Not About Wonder Weapons, but About a “Seamless Chain”
National Program and “Node Owners”
To prevent innovations from getting bogged down, each node must have “owners”: who provides sensors, who integrates data, who is responsible for electronic warfare, who drives the series. Not “in meetings,” but in KPIs.
People: Engineers and Operators
The shortage is not only in hardware but also in people who change firmware “by combat feedback” and teach troops to live in new tactics. This is not just mobilization — it’s reassembling engineering culture for war.
Components: A Narrow Bottleneck
Microelectronics, optics, engines, batteries. Supply policy is part of the strategy. While chains are fragile, any “victory” on the stand risks not becoming a battalion set.
Israeli Perspective: NAnews Reader Will See Familiar Logic
Multi-Level Defense as “Home Israeli Style”
For decades, Israel has built a multi-layered system: sensors → integration → interception → counterstrike. Ukraine is moving towards a similar architecture — at an accelerated pace and with an emphasis on cheap mass UAVs.
Co-Production Instead of “Firefighting Supplies”
Allies are gradually moving from one-time packages to joint production. This benefits everyone: Ukraine — sustainability, partners — practical developments “from the reality range.” For Israel, this approach is a familiar “defense factory,” for Ukraine — new industrialization.
How to Measure Progress: Which Metrics Are More Important Than Beautiful Press Releases
Cycle Speed
How long does it take from idea to series? Not “quarters,” but weeks. If the cycle is long — it’s a warning sign.
Scalability
How many products reached the battalions? Seriality makes power cheap, and deterrence sustainable.
Survivability in a “Dirty” Environment
How does the system behave under interference and attack? If it “crumbles,” it means it was optimized for the range, not the front.
Risks and Antidotes: Where the Strategy Might Stall
Institutional Inertia.
If procurements are long and tests are paper-based — innovation “falls asleep.” The remedy is short decision loops, military operation as the norm, not the exception.
“Endless Electronic Warfare Race.”
Any find today is an exam tomorrow. “Eternal update” must be accepted as a standard: channel duplication, modularity, quick firmware.
Component Dependence.
Besides import substitution, “portfolio” works: three (preferably four) sources, stock on critical nodes, localization where it aligns with the economy.
What This Gives in Politics: Turning War into a Bad Deal for the Kremlin
Zaluzhny translates military thought into political results: when attack is always expensive and risky, war ceases to be a lever of pressure. Then Ukraine’s diplomatic weight grows — not as a “petitioner,” but as a pillar of European security.
And here his current role is indicative: ambassador to the United Kingdom and representative at the IMO. This is not “retirement,” but a change of front: an architect of cooperations that turn battlefield initiative into long-term sustainability.
Frequently Asked Questions
FAQ
Why so many levels of protection if there are long-range strikes?
Because the enemy adapts. Layering is insurance against surprises and a way not to pay twice.
Why are concentrated offensives rare?
The density of reconnaissance and precision makes mass maneuvers vulnerable. The “roadmap” is small groups, stealth, and pace.
Where is Ukraine’s weak link?
Components and procurement cycle. The solution is co-production, supplier portfolio, short decision loops.
Conclusion for Ukraine and Allies
War has become a competition of adaptation speed. Zaluzhny proposes a strategy where each subsequent update is new armor. If the conveyor of ideas and series works, the aggressor pays for actions in advance, and their “war lever” breaks by itself.
Reference: Valeriy Zaluzhny
Valeriy Fedorovych Zaluzhny is a Ukrainian military and diplomat, born on July 8, 1973. Career in the Armed Forces of Ukraine: command positions from brigade to operational level. July 27, 2021 — February 8, 2024: Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. His leadership period saw the disruption of Russia’s “blitz plans,” rapid management reforms, massive deployment of drones, and tactics based on network-centricity and electronic warfare.
Since 2024 — Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, later — Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
In public analytical materials, he consistently promotes the idea of technological initiative and scalable innovations as the key to victory in the positional phase of the war. Beyond rhetoric — emphasis on institutional mechanisms: defense-tech program, “node owners,” human competencies, sustainable component supplies, and co-production with allies.
