HAMAS: “Palestinians want to see Russia as a mediator for Gaza, but Israel is hindering this”

HAMAS is once again trying to position Russia as a mediator in Gaza. But for Israel, Moscow does not appear to be a neutral party: Russia hosts HAMAS representatives, maintains ties with Iran, and uses the Middle East crisis for its own political game.

HAMAS wants Russia in Gaza negotiations: why Israel does not accept such a role for Moscow

HAMAS stated that Israel is preventing Russia’s participation in negotiations on the Gaza Strip. This was reported by the deputy head of the HAMAS political bureau, Mousa Abu Marzouk, in an interview with the Russian agency RIA Novosti. His words came a few days after a HAMAS delegation visited Moscow, where representatives of the movement held talks at the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The main detail of this story is the wording. It is not Israel that officially announced a new position on Russia, but rather HAMAS claims that the Israeli side does not accept Moscow as a mediator. Therefore, it is correct to say: HAMAS stated that Israel blocks Russia’s participation, rather than simply: Israel rejected Russia.

According to Mousa Abu Marzouk, the Palestinian side would like to see Russia among the mediators in the Gaza conflict. He stated that HAMAS has “consistently advocated” for such a role for Moscow, but Israel, according to him, “consistently rejects” this proposal. The essence of his argument is that “any mediator must be accepted by both sides,” and Israel’s disagreement does not allow Russia to “play a more active role.” Reports of Abu Marzouk’s statement were published on June 15, 2026, citing RIA Novosti.

This phrase is important not only as another comment from a HAMAS representative. It shows a broader political game: HAMAS is trying to legitimize Russia as a participant in negotiations, and Moscow is trying to regain its status as a Middle East mediator. For Israel, such a role for Russia seems problematic due to Moscow’s contacts with HAMAS, Russia’s cooperation with Iran, and the overall anti-Western line of Russian foreign policy.

What happened in Moscow on June 10, 2026

On June 10, 2026, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Borisenko met in Moscow with HAMAS Deputy Political Bureau Chief Mousa Abu Marzouk. An official statement about this meeting was published by the Russian Foreign Ministry. The Russian side stated that the situation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone was discussed, with an emphasis on the need for a sustainable ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

According to Anadolu, Borisenko and Abu Marzouk discussed a sustainable ceasefire, the resumption of uninterrupted humanitarian aid supplies, the restoration of Gaza’s destroyed civilian infrastructure, the situation “on the West Bank of the Jordan River,” and the issue of “intra-Palestinian unity.” Separately, the Russian side again spoke about a “comprehensive settlement” based on “the creation of an independent Palestinian state.”

Israeli media clarified the composition of the HAMAS delegation. It was led by Mousa Abu Marzouk. Also participating in the negotiations were Political Bureau member Maher Salah, HAMAS representative in Russia Iyad Abu Zaher, and Secretary of the International Relations Department Muhammad al-Ayla. The media directly called HAMAS a terrorist group and emphasized that the negotiations took place in Moscow with the participation of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Borisenko.

It was after this meeting that a new information line emerged: HAMAS wants Russia as a mediator, but Israel, according to Abu Marzouk, does not agree.

What exactly did Mousa Abu Marzouk say

Abu Marzouk stated that Palestinians are interested in Russia’s participation in Gaza negotiations. His key point: a mediator cannot be imposed by one side; they must be accepted by all participants in the process.

In a comment provided to RIA Novosti, he said:

“Any mediator must be accepted by both sides. No one can impose a mediator unilaterally.”

Abu Marzouk further argued that it is Israel’s disagreement that prevents a more active role for Russia in the Palestinian issue.

For HAMAS, this wording is advantageous. It shifts the conversation from the realm of terror, hostages, and Israel’s security to a diplomatic plane: who has the right to be a mediator, who participates in negotiations, who recognizes the Palestinian side as a political entity. This is a convenient way for HAMAS to present itself not as a terrorist organization that attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, but as a participant in the international process.

For Russia, this is also advantageous.

Moscow gets the opportunity to talk not about the war against Ukraine, not about dependence on Iran, and not about its own international isolation, but about “peacekeeping” in the Middle East. Thus, Russian diplomacy tries to show that major international conflicts supposedly cannot be resolved without it.

Why Israel is not interested in Russia as a mediator

There is no official Israeli statement specifically regarding Abu Marzouk’s words in the found sources. This is an important detail. But the political logic of Israeli caution is understandable.

A mediator must inspire trust. Russia does not have such trust from Israel. Moscow hosts HAMAS representatives at an official level, maintains close ties with Iran, sharply criticizes Israel on international platforms, and uses the war in Gaza as part of its own anti-Western agenda.

For Israel, Russia’s participation in negotiations could mean not strengthening the process, but strengthening the political legitimization of HAMAS. Moscow does not hide that it considers HAMAS as part of the “Palestinian political picture,” not as a terrorist organization. In Russian rhetoric, words about “Palestinian unity,” “Palestinian rights,” “statehood,” and “settlement” are often heard, but much less attention is paid to the issue of HAMAS’s responsibility for the October 7 attack, hostage-taking, and the threat to Israel’s security.

That is why such diplomacy seems dangerous to Israel. In it, HAMAS gets a political platform, Russia gets the image of a mediator, and Israeli security risks becoming a secondary topic.

NAnews — Israel News emphasizes: in this story, it is important to separate fact from propaganda presentation. Fact — the HAMAS meeting with the Russian Foreign Ministry on June 10, 2026, indeed took place. Fact — Mousa Abu Marzouk indeed stated that HAMAS wants Russia’s participation. But the assertion that Israel “blocks” Russia is the position of a HAMAS representative, not a confirmed official statement from Israel.

What Russia and HAMAS discussed

The Russian side presented the meeting in traditional diplomatic packaging: “ceasefire, humanitarian aid, Gaza reconstruction, West Bank, intra-Palestinian unity, Palestinian state.”

In such a set of topics, almost everything sounds humanitarian and politically neutral. But behind this lies the question: whom exactly is Moscow trying to bring onto the international stage?

After October 7, 2023, HAMAS remains for Israel not just a political movement, but a terrorist organization responsible for the mass killing of civilians, kidnapping people, and a war that led to severe consequences for the entire region. Therefore, any meetings of HAMAS representatives in the capitals of major states are not only diplomacy. It is also a question of legitimization.

When a HAMAS representative comes to Moscow and meets with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, the “movement” receives a signal: it is being talked to at the state level. When the same representative then says that Russia should be a mediator, it is already part of a political campaign. HAMAS shows its supporters and external players: it is not isolated, it has channels, it can negotiate not only through Egypt, Qatar, or Turkey, but also through Moscow.

Why Russia is interested in this role

For Russia, the Middle East topic has long been a way to demonstrate influence. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow found itself in deeper confrontation with the West. Therefore, every international crisis where Russia can appear as a “necessary mediator” is used to strengthen its own status.

The Gaza Strip is convenient for Moscow in this logic for several reasons.

• Firstly, the conflict allows Russia to criticize the US and its allies.
• Secondly, contacts with HAMAS help Moscow communicate with part of the Arab and Muslim world.
• Thirdly, Russian diplomacy can portray itself as an alternative to American influence.
• Fourthly, the Gaza issue distracts attention from Russia’s war against Ukraine.

For Israelis with Ukrainian roots, this is especially noticeable. The same Russia that is waging an aggressive war against Ukraine, destroying Ukrainian cities and cooperating with regimes hostile to the West, tries to present itself as a peacemaker in the Middle East. But mediation requires trust. Diplomatic receptions and statements for state agencies are not enough.

What HAMAS gains

HAMAS gains several advantages from the Russian line.

First — political legitimization. If terrorists are received in Moscow, it is easier to present them as a negotiating party rather than a terrorist structure.

Second — expansion of the diplomatic field. The more mediators, the more opportunities to delay the process, maneuver between demands, and seek more favorable conditions.

Third — informational effect. Abu Marzouk’s statement allows HAMAS to shift part of the responsibility onto Israel: the Palestinian side wants to expand mediation, but Israel allegedly does not allow it.

Fourth — Russian media platform. RIA Novosti and other Russian resources give HAMAS the opportunity to promote its position in Russian and through networks associated with the Russian information space.

That is why Abu Marzouk’s wording is not accidental. It is aimed not only at the “Palestinian audience.” It is addressed to Russia, the Arab world, Israel’s opponents, and those who want to see Moscow as an alternative center of diplomacy.

What is missing in HAMAS’s statement

In Abu Marzouk’s statement and the Russian presentation, key issues for Israel are almost absent.

• There is no clear answer on how the security of Israeli citizens should be ensured.
• There is no answer on what will happen to HAMAS’s military infrastructure in Gaza.
• There is no answer on who is responsible for October 7, 2023.
• There is no answer on how to guarantee that the Gaza Strip will not again become a platform for attacks on Israel.
• There is no answer on how the issue of hostages and guarantees after the ceasefire will be resolved.

Instead, the focus shifts to “mediators,” “humanitarian aid,” “reconstruction,” and “Palestinian unity.” All these topics are important, but without the issue of Israel’s security, they become an incomplete picture.

For Israel, negotiations on Gaza cannot be just a conversation about diplomatic balance. It is a matter of life, security, hostages, southern communities, the army, the border, and the future of the region.

Why the wording “Russia as a mediator” is dangerous

At first glance, the participation of another mediator may seem beneficial.

The more channels, the more chances for an agreement. But in reality, a mediator does not just convey messages. They influence the language of negotiations, the framework of discussion, the international perception of the parties, and who is considered a legitimate participant in the process.

If the “mediator” is a country that hosts HAMAS at an official level, cooperates with Iran, and is in sharp confrontation with the West, for Israel, this is not a neutral channel. It is a risk that negotiations will be used against Israeli interests.

Russia may talk about a ceasefire but not focus on dismantling HAMAS’s military power. Russia may talk about humanitarian aid but not speak harshly enough about hostages. Russia may talk about a Palestinian state but not guarantee Israel’s security. This is the problem.

NAnews — Israel News considers it important to emphasize: Moscow is trying to play the role of mediator not out of humanitarian purity, but out of political interest. HAMAS is trying to use Moscow not only for negotiations but also to escape isolation. And Israel, judging by the logic of recent years, is not ready to transfer part of the process to a state that simultaneously develops ties with its opponents.

What this means for Israel

Mousa Abu Marzouk’s statement is not just news about Russia. It is a signal that HAMAS continues to seek external support. After the war, the destruction of Gaza, and international pressure, the movement is trying to maintain a political presence. For this, it needs mediators, platforms, statements, meetings, and photos in the offices of foreign ministries.

Russia is convenient in this scheme. It does not demand from HAMAS what Israel demands.

It is not the main guarantor of Israeli security.

It does not bear direct responsibility to Israeli society.

But it can give HAMAS political air.

For Israel, the question is different. Any settlement on Gaza must meet three basic requirements: the security of Israeli citizens, and the prevention of the restoration of HAMAS’s military power. If the mediator does not put these issues at the center, their role becomes not a help, but a problem.

Conclusion

The story with Mousa Abu Marzouk’s statement shows the struggle not only for negotiations but also for international legitimacy. HAMAS wants to see Russia as a mediator because Moscow gives it a political platform. Russia wants to participate in negotiations because it restores its image as a global player. Israel is not interested in such mediation because Moscow does not appear to be a neutral party.

The fact of the meeting in Moscow on June 10, 2026, is confirmed. The fact of Abu Marzouk’s statement on June 15, 2026, is also confirmed. But the assertion that Israel “blocks” Russia remains precisely the version of HAMAS. This must be clearly understood so as not to accept the political presentation of a terrorist organization as an established diplomatic fact.

For Israel, the main question is not whether Russia wants to sit at the negotiating table. The main question is whether a mediator can be trusted who hosts HAMAS, cooperates with Iran, and uses the war in Gaza as part of its own struggle for influence.

The answer to this question for Israel seems obvious.