Ukraine’s Nuclear Argument: Why the Israeli Perspective is Growing Louder

The idea that Ukraine once again needs nuclear weapons was considered taboo just a few years ago. Today, it is increasingly being discussed not on fringe platforms, but in expert circles — including in Israel. Israel Defense Forces officer and military analyst Igal Levin articulates this position without diplomatic euphemisms: it is not about aggression, but about survival.

For decades, Ukraine was imposed with a dangerous illusion. The renunciation of real military power could supposedly be compensated with “security guarantees.” In 1994, the Budapest Memorandum became such a symbol. It promised sovereignty in exchange for nuclear disarmament. In 2014, it became clear that this document does not work. By 2022, it became obvious: the price of strategic naivety is measured not in political losses, but in human lives.

The Israeli perspective here is devoid of sentimentality. Levin states directly: it is time to stop viewing Ukraine’s future through the rose-colored glasses of Western diplomacy. The only long-term factor capable of stopping the destruction of the country is its own nuclear deterrent potential.

The main counterargument that has been voiced for years is “American protection.” But if you set aside the slogans, the picture looks different. The White House does not intend to engage in a direct war with Russia. Washington will supply weapons, share intelligence, impose sanctions. But it will not risk New York or Chicago for Kyiv or Kharkiv.

For the USA, Ukraine is an important interest.
For Vladimir Putin, it is an existential obsession.

In this asymmetry of will, Russia will always have an advantage in escalation as long as it maintains a nuclear monopoly in the region. This is not ideology, but the cold logic of strategic deterrence.

There is another factor that is rarely spoken about aloud. Democracies are inherently unstable in the long term. Even if one administration vows to support Ukraine “as long as it takes,” no one can guarantee the same line in five or ten years. American politics changes, isolationist voices grow stronger, attention easily shifts to Asia or internal crises.

The Kremlin thinks differently. There, plans are made for decades. Putin or his successor can simply wait until the patience of the West runs out.

Levin formulates this extremely harshly: when a state does not have the independent ability to defend itself, it ceases to be sovereign. It becomes a hostage to someone else’s goodwill.

In this logic, a Ukrainian nuclear arsenal is not a weapon of war, but a tool for its prevention. It creates a symmetry of fear. If Moscow understands that a new invasion means a direct threat to its own existence, the capture of Kyiv ceases to be an “operation” and turns into a strategic deadlock.

The world will undoubtedly be outraged by the “proliferation of nuclear weapons.” But, as Levin emphasizes, it is the West that has cornered Ukraine. Depriving the country of real protection, it has lost the moral right to condemn its search for the only working insurance.

Peace does not come through summits in Brussels and is not born from empty statements in Washington. Peace is possible only when Russia realizes that crossing the border has an irreversible cost for all parties.

This is why the discussion about Ukraine’s nuclear deterrence is ceasing to be theoretical and is becoming part of real geopolitics — closely monitored by NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency.