War 2026: Ukraine and Russia at the Limit of Resources — Foreign Affairs Analysis

On February 24, Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine will cross the threshold of the fifth year. The conflict increasingly resembles an exhausting endurance competition rather than a maneuvering campaign. Who will adapt faster? Who has more reserves — human, technological, economic? And who will withstand the pressure longer?

This logic of the war’s development in 2026 is analyzed by American military expert Michael Kofman in an article for Foreign Affairs February 16, 2026. The researcher from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace examines the strategies of Moscow and Kyiv without emotional assessments — as a confrontation of resources and management decisions.

Strategies of the sides: a bet on attrition

Ukraine: make the war too expensive

According to Kofman, Kyiv is building its strategy around the idea of making the war as costly as possible for the Kremlin. It’s not just about the front line. Ukraine simultaneously seeks to limit its own territorial losses, increase Russian losses to a level that will be difficult to compensate, and hit economic vulnerabilities — primarily in energy.

The logic is simple: if the financial and military cost becomes unacceptable, Moscow will have to adjust its negotiating positions.

In this context, strikes on infrastructure, operations against the Russian “shadow fleet,” and actions in the Black Sea acquire special significance. The maritime and air theaters in 2025 became platforms for demonstrating new forms of pressure.

Russia: pressure on the front and reliance on fatigue

Moscow acts differently. The focus is on constant frontline pressure, gradual “gnawing” through defenses with small assault groups, and strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. The Kremlin hoped that military pressure would undermine the resilience of the defense, and diplomatic fatigue would weaken Western support for Kyiv.

However, according to Kofman, none of these bets have brought about a strategic breakthrough. Progress remains slow and extremely costly. By the end of 2025, irreversible losses began to exceed the monthly recruitment of new recruits.

This does not mean that Moscow is running out of resources. But if the current level of losses is maintained, the intensity of the offensive in 2026 may be reduced, or the number of active directions may be decreased.

Front without breakthrough: offensive without victory

Russian army: advancement without strategic result

Russian troops continue to exert pressure along the entire line of contact. Tactical adaptations — the use of small groups, bypass maneuvers, gradual depletion of defenses — yield local territorial results.

However, there is no strategic breakthrough.

The cost of each kilometer remains high. The political goal — to force Kyiv to capitulate or change course — is not getting closer. Territorial gains do not transform into diplomatic advantage.

Ukraine: defense without defeat

On the Ukrainian side, the situation is also far from triumphant. Counteroffensive episodes, including operations in the Kupiansk area, demonstrate tactical flexibility and active use of technology.

Unmanned systems partially compensate for the lack of personnel. But the drone war does not eliminate the need for people. Units get tired. Rotation in difficult sections of the front is complicated. It is harder to replenish UAV specialists — their training requires time and resources.

Moreover, management challenges remain: forming new units amid a shortage of officers and equipment, as well as a strict policy of holding positions, which sometimes creates risks of encirclement.

As emphasized by NAnovosti — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, in 2026, Kyiv’s key task will be not only to hold the front line but also to stabilize the army’s personnel resources, without which even technological superiority does not provide a sustainable effect.

2026: where a breakthrough is possible

Kofman points out that a breakthrough is possible only if Ukraine can expand control beyond the immediate front line and regain an advantage in the field of long-range drone strikes. Currently, Russia dominates at a distance of over 30 kilometers, creating asymmetry.

An additional factor remains the dependence on Western support — intelligence, technology, weapons. Simultaneously, there is a need to increase economic pressure on Moscow.

On the Russian side, political calculations for the weakening of the US and Europe have not yet materialized. The format of assistance has been adapted, with European countries taking on a larger share of the financing.

The war is entering a phase where even small changes can trigger a chain reaction. Restrictions on access to satellite communications are already affecting tactical management and the use of drones.

The main question remains the same: what will prove more resilient — the Russian offensive or the Ukrainian defense.

According to Kofman, Ukraine is tired but not broken. And the Kremlin still faces a structural problem — the mismatch between military capabilities and political goals.

2026 does not promise a quick end to the conflict. Rather, it will be a test of whose resources — material, technological, and moral — will prove more enduring.