The Kremlin in a new reality: why Putin is losing weight — and what it changes for Israel

In international politics, it is rare for a moment to occur when the “old rules” break before our eyes and even those who lived by them as a guide yesterday acknowledge it: the Kremlin essentially faces a new problem — Putin’s words are no longer believed not only by opponents but also by those who used to consider Moscow a support or at least a useful partner.

The story is not about a “diplomatic failure” or another round of sanctions. It is about the fact that Russia’s influence in the eyes of external players begins to look like a product with an expiring shelf life — especially against the backdrop of several regimes and alliances on which Moscow relied, in the region and the world, falling apart.

Moscow’s allies are weakening — and the Kremlin’s promises are cheapening

One of the key theses: when Russia’s partners — Venezuela, Syria, Iran — lose stability or enter a crisis, any “guarantees” and promises from Moscow sound less convincing. In such a context, even the rhetoric familiar to the Kremlin begins to work against it: the louder the statements, the stronger the reality check.

A telling episode, mentioned in the same context as a symptom: the US detained a tanker off the coast of Venezuela linked to oil supplies, sailing under the Russian flag. For Moscow, this is unpleasant precisely because it demonstrates: the Trump administration is ready to act harshly and publicly, not pretending to fear “red lines.”

At the same time, according to descriptions, Putin himself tries to speak as carefully as possible on painful topics — both about Iran, where large-scale protests are taking place, and about Venezuela. In one episode, he limited himself to calling on the US to “observe international law.” This restrained tone is interpreted as an attempt not to blow up relations with Trump where it is more important for Moscow to maintain a channel than to demonstrate character.

Trump and Putin: the same habit of untruth, but different price of error

An important detail: both Trump and Putin regularly use untruth as a tool. But the difference is that for Russia lately, lies are becoming too easily verifiable — and too quickly publicly refuted. This hits the “aura” of the Kremlin more than any ideological criticism.

The most striking example is the story of the alleged attack by Ukrainian drones on Putin’s residence in the Valdai area. The Russian side claimed a large-scale attack and the interception of dozens of drones. However, American structures and media reported that there was no evidence of such an attack.

And on January 4, 2026, Trump publicly stated that he does not believe in the very fact of the strike on the residence. For the Kremlin, this looks especially painful: in such situations, Moscow usually counts on at least a cautious “we are checking the information.” Here — a demonstrative “not buying it.”

“If you show weakness — you will be punished”

Putin does not attack Trump because he hopes for a “symmetrical understanding” of Moscow’s interests. But too emotional a reaction will show vulnerability, and demonstrating vulnerability in such a game always costs dearly. The formula sounds harsh: the strong are perceived as strong, the weak are punished.

And here another layer appears: Washington becomes more pragmatic and “about money and deals,” not about democracy and values. This changes the usual configuration to which Moscow has adapted over the years: the Kremlin knew how to play against the “value-based West,” but understands worse how to bargain with such a cynical and unpredictable player who is also not shy about publicly nullifying Russian theses.

Why Moscow remains with “terrible and ineffective” partners

Russia increasingly chooses allies that can be called “terrible and ineffective” because “no one else wants to be friends with Russia.” This is no longer diplomatic banter but a diagnosis of how the space of choice is narrowing.

Against this background, the internal fatigue of Russians from the war and the feeling that the myth of “invincibility” is eroding becomes a foreign policy factor: the longer the war drags on, the greater the risk of economic and social decline — and therefore, the fewer resources the Kremlin has to buy the loyalty of allies and maintain the status of a “center of power.”

What this means for Israel: relations with Russia, but already through the Trump factor

In this story, Russia looks not like a “partner by the rules,” but as a source of instability: promises are easily changed, stakes rise, and the price of error is shifted to others. For Israel, this is not a reason to throw a tantrum, but a reason to reprogram the contact model — and do it in such a way that Washington (and Trump personally) does not get the impression that Jerusalem is playing a “double game.”

Maintain minimal channels, but stop treating Moscow as a support

Contacts are useful for tactics: the Syrian contour, civil issues, emergency situations. But relying on Russia as a guarantor is a bad bet. In this logic, “you can talk, but you can’t count on it” turns into a strict security rule.

The weaker and more nervous the Kremlin, the more often it compensates for this with demonstrations and sudden moves. It is important for Israel that such “surprises” do not become part of its daily security.

All agreements — only through procedures, without “in words”

If Moscow’s word loses value, then any working scheme should be as “ironclad” as possible: fixed points of contact, protocols, execution control, clear red lines.

Personal promises and “gentlemen’s agreements” with the Putin system are a zone where Israel will always be the one to blame if something goes wrong.

Under Trump — demonstratively reduce sanctions and technological risks

The Trump factor is key here: if the White House already treats Russia worse and is ready to act sharply, Israel cannot look like a platform for bypassing pressure on Moscow.

Practically, this means:
shorter leash on financial routes and dual-use goods schemes, stricter compliance, fewer “gray” intermediaries, fewer opaque logistics stories that later come back as questions from Washington.

Separate humanitarian and political — and do it coldly

It is possible to help resolve consular issues and protect its citizens. But it is important not to turn this into a public “normalization” of the Kremlin.

Russia actively uses any symbols as proof of “we are recognized.” Israel does not need this: every gesture can easily become someone else’s picture for Moscow’s internal propaganda.

Iranian track: the closer Russia is to Iran, the less room for “neutrality”

Iran is a direct opponent of Israel, and its connection with Moscow makes any softness towards the Kremlin toxic not only reputationally but also practically.

If Russia is more deeply tied to Iran, then Israel’s neutral stance will look like self-deception: threats converge at one point, and “we are separate” stops working.

With Trump — do not argue about worldview, but sell security logic

It is beneficial for Israel to formulate the line so that it coincides with Trump’s style: “we reduce risks and close loopholes because it benefits us and our allies.”

That is, not “we are so right,” but “we do this because it reduces Iran’s influence, stabilizes the region, and removes unnecessary problems for the US.”

Transition to multilateral supports instead of “special relations” with the Kremlin

Russia’s personalized politics is an eternal trap: today one signal, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a new legend. It is more beneficial for Israel to strengthen ties with the US and understandable partners, and keep the Russian channel as auxiliary, not systemic.

And most importantly: the more anti-Russian Trump is, the less Israel needs to “balance” — and the more it needs to manage the distance. Calmly, pragmatically, but without illusions about Moscow and Putin personally.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency