A month of war against Iran will not save Russia: what Israel should see in this story – opinion

The end of March 2026 brought several unpleasant conclusions for everyone who was counting on a quick and clean war scenario against Iran. A month of hostilities did not automatically topple the regime, did not give Washington a quick political victory, and did not turn Moscow into the main beneficiary of the crisis, although the rise in oil prices did indeed give it a temporary window for profit. This is how the picture is described by Ukrainian Orientalist Igor Semivolos in a large interview (Ukr.), published on March 28, 2026.

For the Israeli audience, the Iranian front as such is not the only important aspect here.

More important is this: the war has shown that the Middle East, Ukraine, the oil market, American elections, and Russian interests no longer exist in separate folders. It is now one system of pressure, one chain of risks, and one security architecture that is changing right now.

Why the bet on a quick collapse of Iran did not work

The calculation was on internal collapse, not a long campaign

According to the logic outlined by Semivolos, the initial calculation was not just on strikes against military infrastructure.

The bet was on a more complex effect: to exacerbate the economic crisis within Iran, bring the situation to problems with payments to security forces, and then achieve erosion of loyalty at the lower levels of the system. In this model, about 60 days without normal payments could begin to undermine discipline among the rank and file, and later among some officers. But the war began before such a scenario could mature.

An additional bet, according to the expert’s assessment, was on a strategic shock after the elimination of Ali Khamenei.

It was assumed that the removal of the supreme leader would create the very political fracture after which the regime would begin to crumble. This also did not happen. Iran, as it is now clear, was preparing for a big war in advance — after the previous major round in 2025 — and managed to build internal safeguards. Therefore, within a week it became clear: the scenario on which the US and Israel were counting would not materialize, and there was either no clear plan ‘B’, or it turned out to be raw.

Iranians did not rise up not because they loved the regime

This is one of the most important points, which is often simplified in Israel and beyond. Mass discontent with the regime has not disappeared.

According to Semivolos, the protest potential in Iran was enormous even in winter, and after Khamenei’s death, many opponents of the authorities did not hide their relief. But between hatred of the regime and the willingness to take to the streets under bombs — there is a chasm.

When a full-scale war begins, people do not turn to the romance of uprising, but to a very basic fear: dying from an airstrike, getting caught in the crossfire of the ‘Basij’ or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, disappearing under emergency conditions. That is why the non-violent scenario of regime change in such conditions almost disappears. In practice, this means an unpleasant fork: either the regime survives and then tightens the screws even more, or it needs to be overthrown in a long and extremely difficult operation, for which Trump, apparently, has neither the time nor the political patience.

Why this war became a problem not only for Tehran

Trump got into a conflict that poorly aligns with his own policy

The interview presents a harsh but logical thought: Trump’s main opponent in this story is not only Iran, but time.

If the war drags on, it begins to work against his political calendar. Selling a quick victorious plot becomes increasingly difficult, and a long campaign with an unclear ending always hits a leader who came under the slogans of ending foreign wars and limiting American intervention.

Semivolos separately emphasizes another problem: it’s not that the US lacks a strong school of Middle Eastern expertise. It exists and is one of the best in the world.

The problem is the gap between this expertise and Trump himself. If the president does not trust institutions and relies on a narrow circle of confidants, the state machine loses the ability to properly assess risks. Then it suddenly turns out that things that should have been predicted in advance — strikes on Gulf countries, pressure around the Strait of Hormuz, market nervousness — begin to be presented as unexpected turns, although for serious analytics these are not ‘black swans’, but quite understandable scenarios.

For Israel, the lesson here is also direct, not academic

Israel is used to viewing the Iranian threat as a matter of physical security — and this is natural.

But this month showed something else.

Even with technological superiority, Israel cannot win such a war alone against a country with a different scale of resources, population, and military production. And Iran, as the expert emphasizes, has been building precisely the retaliatory power that we see today in drone and missile programs for decades.

Here a broader Middle Eastern plot emerges. Gulf countries begin to think not only about money, oil, and the American umbrella, but also about redistributing risks among different players. Because if Washington first allows sharp destabilization and then effectively presents a bill for further protection, it is no longer perceived as a calm system of alliances, but as pressure.

And it is precisely at such a moment that it is important for Israel to see the whole picture, not just its own front. In the middle of this changing configuration, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency not coincidentally fix the Ukrainian contour: it has already become part of Middle Eastern security, not an external appendage to it.

What changes for Ukraine, Israel, and Russia

Ukraine ceases to be only a recipient of aid

One of the strongest thoughts of the interview is that Ukraine in this war unexpectedly for many turns not only into a party that asks for support but also into a donor of security.

It is primarily about the experience of repelling Iranian attacks, practical knowledge of how to work against ‘Shaheds’, how to build a comprehensive system of infrastructure and rear protection, how to combine technology, tactics, and human skill. That is why, according to Semivolos, Ukraine remains among the main international topics even against the backdrop of the Middle Eastern war, and Gulf countries begin to see Kyiv not only as a victim of Russian aggression but also as a source of practical military knowledge.

For Israel, this should also sound serious.

Because the Ukrainian experience of fighting Iranian drones and missile threats is no longer a regional exotic, but a strategic commodity. Ukraine enters the security markets of the Persian Gulf countries not through the back door, but openly, with the reputation of a country that has really experienced what many in the region are only beginning to experience now. And even if there are no instant giant contracts, the most important thing changes — the perception of Ukraine in the Arab world. And this then always returns with money, deals, and political weight.

Russia will earn on oil, but will not get salvation

The most media thesis of recent weeks sounded like this: Moscow wins from the war because oil becomes more expensive.

Partially this is true.

But only partially.

Semivolos directly says: a month of such a conflict will not save the Russian budget. Yes, higher prices give the Kremlin additional income and space for diplomatic maneuvers. But if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, the market will begin to calm down, the speculative premium will decrease, and then the search for alternative supply routes will intensify.

Then the short-term benefit for Russia will remain precisely short-term.

The key point is even harsher. Russia’s problem is not reduced to a shortage of a couple of tens of billions or to one unsuccessful quarter. Processes of stagnation are taking place within the Russian economy itself, which are not cured by simply injecting money from expensive oil. Therefore, to say that the current war has become some kind of miraculous ‘black swan’ for Moscow, which changes the entire balance in the Russian-Ukrainian war, the expert does not propose.

This is not a gift of fate for the Kremlin, but a known, time-limited risk — and at the same time a reminder for Ukraine that Russian export capacities need to continue to be hit if the task is to prevent Moscow from converting the Middle East crisis into a long-term financial resource.

At the same time, the Russian-Iranian connection itself, strangely enough, also does not look monolithic.

Moscow and Tehran were allies out of convenience, for arms interests, for Syria, and for a common confrontation with the West. But within Iran, the memory of Russian policy is not a warm myth at all. They remember imperial wars, Soviet invasions, and attempts to play on their own territory. Therefore, the alliance exists, but it is cold, calculating, and without genuine trust. And such alliances live exactly until the moment when one of the parties remains useful.

In the dry residue, the picture looks like this.

Iran did not collapse in a month. Trump did not get a simple victory. Israel found itself in a war where one technological bet is not enough. Ukraine unexpectedly rose in status and begins to sell security to the region, not just ask for it. Russia indeed takes part of the oil profit, but does not get out of its own budgetary deadlock.

And this is perhaps the main conclusion of the end of March 2026: the Middle East is changing rapidly, but not in favor of those who think with too short a horizon.