38.7% = Israel found itself in the middle zone of Ukrainians’ sympathies: far from the leaders of trust, but also outside the camp of negativity

In March 2026, Ukraine saw Israel not as a country leading in sympathies and not as an unconditional outsider, but as a state with a controversial, unstable, and noticeably weakened image. This conclusion follows from a joint study by Active Group and Experts Club, where sociologists examined Ukrainians’ attitudes towards 50 countries among Ukraine’s largest trading partners. The survey was conducted using a self-completion questionnaire in an online panel, with 800 respondents participating, and the declared margin of error does not exceed 3.5%. The study was presented in early April 2026 at a press conference at “Interfax-Ukraine“.

For Israel, this result is unpleasant primarily because it ended up in the middle zone of perception. It is no longer the status of a country to which Ukrainian society automatically feels warmth. But it is also not a failure at the level of China or Hungary, which received much harsher assessments in the study. Israel in Ukrainian perception today is more of a country with limited sympathy, a high level of doubt, and a growing share of irritation.

What is this survey and why is it important

The study was presented in April 2026 at a press conference at “Interfax-Ukraine”. Its authors attempted to connect two planes: Ukraine’s real foreign trade and the emotional attitude of society towards partner countries. The founder of Experts Club, Maksym Urakin, directly formulated the framework of the study: modern international economics is no longer just about import and export figures, but also about trust, reputation, political proximity, humanitarian presence, and a sense of partnership at the societal level.

This is especially important during wartime.

Sociologists particularly emphasize that Ukrainian public opinion today is sensitive to the foreign policy context, the informational background, personal experience of interaction with citizens of other countries, and the perception of whether a particular state helps Ukraine achieve peace, stability, and recovery. That is why a country’s trade weight and sympathy towards it can diverge significantly.

Israel is almost perfectly indicative for such an analysis.

It is not among Ukraine’s top trading giants in the top ten of this study, but it remains a noticeable and recognizable country, whose attitude is shaped not only by economics but also by politics, war, media background, and the expectations of Ukrainian society. According to the study based on statistics from the State Customs Service of Ukraine, Israel ranks 29th in total trade turnover with Ukraine, amounting to $714.7 million; imports from Israel slightly exceed Ukrainian exports, so the bilateral balance is moderately negative for Ukraine.

Where exactly is Israel in the sympathy ranking

In March 2026, positive attitudes towards Israel amounted to 38.7%. Of these, 12.6% of respondents chose the option “completely positive,” and another 26.1% “mostly positive.” A neutral position was taken by 38.2% of respondents, which is a lot. Negative attitudes totaled 19.8%, including 14.7% “mostly negative” and 5.1% “completely negative.” Another 3.3% found it difficult to answer.

The most alarming part for Israel is not only the numbers themselves but their dynamics. In August 2025, positive attitudes towards Israel were noticeably higher at 44.7%, and negative attitudes were lower, only 13.7%. By March 2026, positivity decreased by 6 percentage points, and negativity increased by 6.1 points. This is no longer statistical noise but a tangible deterioration in the country’s reputational position in Ukrainian society.

When comparing Israel with the leaders of sympathies, the gap looks very large.

In the study, the highest levels of positive attitudes were received by Germany — 77.4%, Lithuania — 75%, France — 74%, the United Kingdom — 74%, Sweden — 72.5%, Japan — 71.8%, Italy — 70%, and the Czech Republic — 67%. Even without additional interpretations, it is clear that Israel, with its 38.7%, is not just below the leaders but almost twice as low as the first group of countries that Ukrainians perceive as the closest and most reliable.

Even countries in the so-called “medium-positive” circle look better.

The article separately mentions Poland and Turkey: 56% of respondents have a positive attitude towards Poland with 14.7% negative ratings, and 55% towards Turkey with 5.6% negative. This means that Israel lags not only behind Germany or the UK but also behind those countries around which there are also complex discussions, contradictions, and pragmatic approaches.

At the same time, Israel is indeed not in the camp of countries with an openly bad reputation.

China received only 23% positive ratings against 42% negative, Hungary — 18.6% positive against 52% negative. The USA, although still above Israel, also shows not a brilliant result: 44.1% positive against 24.7% negative. Against this background, Israel is not an anti-record but rather a middle, shaky zone where there is neither stable love nor complete rejection.

Who leads in positivity and who falls into the negative

The leaders of trust in the study are mainly countries that in Ukrainian perception are associated with clear support, political proximity, and European solidarity.

Germany, Lithuania, France, the UK, Sweden, Japan, Italy, and the Czech Republic make up the top part of the ranking. At the bottom are those whose policies cause irritation, distrust, or a sense of cynicism: China and Hungary are named by the authors as the most striking examples of poor emotional perception despite their significant role in Ukraine’s international relations.

Israel in this construct does not fall down, but it does not rise up either. This is its current problem: the country is too noticeable to dissolve into neutrality, but not clear enough to Ukrainian society to enter the circle of emotionally close partners. It is appropriate to say directly here: for the audience closely monitored by NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, this is one of the most unpleasant signals of the study. It’s not about hostility towards Israel, but about losing a clear positive image.

Why Israel has declined and what it should reconsider

The authors of the study do not provide a separate long list of reasons specifically for Israel, but they give a general framework from which the conclusion is quite clear. Sociologists and participants in the presentation emphasize that attitudes towards countries are formed through political context, social media, cultural stereotypes, personal experience, and a sense of strategic partnership.

A large share of neutral responses, according to sociologists, usually indicates a lack of personal experience or a lack of a clear public image of the country.

In relation to Israel, it looks like this: almost 38.2% neutral ratings mean that a huge part of Ukrainians does not have a stable, clearly formed position.

But at the same time, the negative segment is growing.

And this already indicates that the informational background around Israel in Ukrainian society has become more contradictory, less unambiguous, and less favorable than before. This is exactly what Open4Business writes about, noting that Israel is shifting into a group of countries with a more polarized image.

There is also another important logic that Urakin directly points to.

If society sees a powerful flow of imports from a particular country but does not see a symmetrical flow of investments, technologies, localization of production, humanitarian participation, educational programs, or real involvement in recovery, a sense of imbalance arises. This is no longer just economics, but emotional politics of perception. And although this thought is formulated in the study in general terms, it is almost literally applicable to Israel.

What Israel should reconsider if it does not want to be entrenched in the Ukrainian consciousness as a “middle” country without a reserve of trust?

Firstly, the language of presence. The authors of the study directly say that foreign representations should speak to Ukrainian society not with abstract diplomatic language, but with the language of concrete benefits: jobs, investments, humanitarian projects, logistics, medicine, education, recovery. For Israel, this means that general words about friendship are not enough. Clear, visible, measurable stories of presence are needed.

Secondly, regional visibility. The study separately states that diplomatic missions should work more actively not only in Kyiv but also in the regions. This is an important signal. If a country wants a real reputational effect, it must be noticeable not only in capital offices and at the level of statements but also in universities, hospitals, energy, processing, technological clusters, and local humanitarian initiatives.

Thirdly, the link “trade plus participation.” The turnover of $714.7 million does not automatically turn into sympathy. Moreover, the small negative balance for Ukraine makes the question especially important: what does Ukrainian society get from these relations besides trade. Israel should think not only about bilateral trade exchange but also about how its participation looks in Ukrainian everyday reality — in recovery, technological partnership, medical programs, educational opportunities, and local investments.

And finally, Israel should reconsider its public image strategy in Ukraine.

Because now the numbers speak not of hatred, but of the blurring of sympathy.

And this is more dangerous than it seems.

A country perceived sharply negatively is at least understandable. A country that ends up in the middle zone risks falling out of the circle of emotionally significant partners. For a state that claims special relations with Ukraine and relies on long-term trust, this is already a serious signal.

The result of the study for Israel sounds harsh but accurate: it has not become a “bad country” for Ukrainians, but it has also ceased to be obviously “its own.”

The March 2026 survey shows Israel as a state in the middle — far from the leaders of trust, below most countries with a consistently positive image, but still outside the camp of outright negativity. And if this dynamic is not reversed, the next wave of measurements may be even less comfortable for Israel.