- May 30, 2026
- 6:11 pm
- Ukraine
Millions of Ukrainians may not return: what the toughest forecast shows
If the war in Ukraine continues in an active phase, by the end of 2029, 5.16 million Ukrainian refugees may remain in Europe. This is almost 99% of the current number of those who have already left and found themselves outside the country.
Even a milder scenario does not look reassuring. In a compromise and fragile peace, according to estimates, 56% of Ukrainians who are currently abroad may not return home.
The material is based on the text (Ukr.) by Mykhailo Dubinyansky “Ukrainians without Ukraine” from May 30, 2026.
The most optimistic scenario — Ukraine’s unconditional victory and the liberation of all occupied territories — also does not mean the automatic return of people. Even in such a development, about 32% of refugees may remain outside the country. And it is this figure that perhaps speaks of the problem the most.
Because the question is no longer just about safety.
Ukraine may win the war, regain territories, restore state institutions, receive international support — but still face the fact that a significant part of its citizens have already learned to live without Ukraine.
Why this is important for Israel
For the Israeli audience, this topic is especially understandable. Israel has lived for decades with questions of repatriation, diaspora, identity, security, and the choice between the historical homeland and a comfortable life in another country.
The Ukrainian situation is, of course, different. But the nerve is similar: the state needs people no less than people need the state.
And here begins the most difficult conversation.
The big war divided Ukrainians not only into military and civilians, those who left and those who stayed. It has much more sharply shown the old divide: there are people for whom life without Ukraine is almost impossible, and there are those who can integrate into another life and not lose themselves.
For some, Ukraine is a career, status, language, professional environment, social role, and familiar order. For others, it is a place of birth, but not the only platform for the future.
Who is truly attached to Ukraine, and who can choose another life
A typical official, security officer, or representative of the political class almost always depends on the Ukrainian system. Ukraine gives him power, influence, access to administrative decisions, sometimes to corrupt rent.
Outside Ukraine, all this disappears.
In Europe, such a person does not automatically become an important figure. No one will offer him the same hierarchy, the same access to resources, and the same status. Therefore, for him, Ukraine is not an abstract homeland, but the basis of personal position.
The story of a successful IT specialist looks completely different.
If a person has a sought-after profession, English language skills, remote employment, international clients, and a clear skill, he can live in Poland, Germany, Spain, the Czech Republic, Israel, or Canada — and remain successful. For him, Ukraine is important emotionally, culturally, and family-wise. But not always economically vital.
The same logic applies to working professions.
A builder, welder, plumber, electrician, driver, repairman, caregiver, cook — all these people can be in demand abroad. Often their work there is paid higher than at home. And when a person sees that his hands in another country provide more security for his family, the question of patriotism becomes more complicated.
Love for Ukraine does not disappear.
But a rational choice appears.
Intellectuals, the elderly, and youth: everyone has a different price for emigration
For the humanitarian intelligentsia, emigration often turns out to be painful. A writer, teacher, journalist, cultural figure, public activist, or national award laureate may be deeply embedded in the Ukrainian context.
His name means something at home.
Abroad, this significance sharply decreases.
Linguistic, cultural, and social barriers do not allow simply transferring the previous status to a new country. A person who was a noticeable figure in the Ukrainian public sphere may become almost invisible in Europe.
For the elderly, moving often turns into not a chance, but a psychological test. They have lived their lives in one cultural code, among familiar rules, familiar streets, language, neighbors, doctors, cemeteries, family memory.
It is difficult for them to start from scratch.
Youth sees it differently. For young Ukrainians, emigration may not be a tragedy, but a start. University, work, a new profession, another language, another market, other social connections — all this is perceived as an opportunity, not just a loss.
That is why the conversation about depopulation cannot be conducted with slogans alone.
It is not enough to say: “you must love the Motherland.” The state will have to answer a more practical question: why should a person who can successfully live without Ukraine choose Ukraine?
The main mistake: fighting not for those who can leave, but for those who will not leave anyway
Ukraine needs people. It needs taxpayers, working hands, young families, entrepreneurs, specialists, engineers, builders, doctors, teachers, drivers, soldiers, students, future parents.
But the paradox is that the public agenda is more often formed by those groups that themselves depend most on Ukraine.
The political class loses career prospects without the Ukrainian state.
The humanitarian environment risks losing status.
National activists without the Ukrainian theme may lose their usual public significance.
These people often sincerely want to build a strong, worthy, independent country. But they often make it convenient primarily for themselves and for those who think in similar categories.
But the interests of the “ordinary person,” who does not live by ideology every day and simply wants security, understandable rules, income, a school for children, and a normal attitude from the state, are relegated to the background.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in this context is important to consider not only as an Israeli platform for news about Ukraine, but also as a space where Ukrainian, Jewish, and Israeli audiences can see the same problem from different sides: the state does not retain people with calls alone if it does not provide them with a clear future.
Why pressure on those who left may work against Ukraine itself
In the Ukrainian public field, ideas are regularly voiced to punish those who left during the war. To limit rights. To condemn morally. To make them second-class citizens. Sometimes there are even proposals to deprive such people of citizenship.
On an emotional level, this may seem fair.
People who stayed under shelling, serve, work in the rear, pay taxes, and bear the burden of war often perceive those who left as those who chose an easier path. This is humanly understandable.
But from the perspective of the future state, such logic can be dangerous.
If a person has already managed to settle in Europe, found a job, moved children, received social protection, learned the language, and saw a perspective, the threat of punishment will not necessarily make him return. It may only finally sever the emotional connection with Ukraine.
A state that needs people should think not only about the moral assessment of past choices but also about the practical price of future decisions.
Who needs to be returned?
And most importantly — how?
Not with humiliation. Not with threats. Not with public hate. But with conditions in which returning seems reasonable.
Ukraine needs arguments, not just claims
If a person can live without Ukraine, you cannot talk to him only in the language of duty.
Rational reasons are needed.
Work. Security. Fair courts. Normal medicine. A clear tax system. The ability to start a business without humiliating contact with an official. Schools where children do not lose their future. Respect for those who returned, not suspicion of those who left.
This does not sound as grandiose as slogans about love for the Motherland.
But it is precisely such things that decide where a family will live after the war.
Ukraine cannot afford the luxury of building a country only for those who will not leave anyway. Post-war recovery will require people who know how to work, create, build, pay taxes, raise children, and link personal success with the Ukrainian future.
If they are not returned, recovery will become much more difficult.
And if the state treats them as traitors or temporarily lost debtors, it will itself push them to a final break.
Unpleasant truth: the worse Ukrainians are abroad, the more beneficial it is for Kyiv
There is another harsh and unpleasant layer to this topic.
If Ukrainians abroad find it harder — if they are less supported, less welcomed, restricted in rights, tired of their presence, creating everyday and bureaucratic obstacles — some people may indeed start thinking about returning.
For the state, this is cynically beneficial.
The fewer opportunities for self-realization outside Ukraine, the fewer Ukrainians will be able to live “without Ukraine.” The worse they are abroad, the higher the chance that they will return home not because Ukraine has become attractive, but because other options have closed.
But such a strategy is morally dangerous and politically weak.
It does not build trust.
It does not make Ukraine stronger as a project for the future. It simply relies on the external world becoming cold enough for Ukrainians that their native country once again seems like the only option.
For Israel, this logic is also recognizable but painful. The history of Jewish communities in the Middle East and North Africa in the 20th century showed how pressure, discrimination, and fear can sharply change migration flows and strengthen a young state. But turning someone else’s humiliation into a state resource is always a troubling path.
Ukraine needs a different scenario.
Not “let it become bad for them there.”
But “let it become good enough at home for returning to make sense.”
What will really solve the depopulation issue
Ukrainian depopulation is not just statistics and not just demography. It is a question of trust between the citizen and the state.
A person does not return to an abstract Motherland. He returns to a specific reality: to laws, salaries, schools, doctors, taxes, security, societal attitudes, opportunities for children, and respect for his own choice.
If Ukraine wants to bring back millions, it will have to compete not only with the memory of home but also with the quality of life in the countries where Ukrainians have already moved.
This is tough competition.
But there is no other.
Patriotism can keep some people. Family, language, land, ancestors’ graves, a sense of duty — too. However, for millions of Ukrainians after 2022, the question is already posed differently: where can one live, work, raise children, and not feel like a hostage to circumstances?
The answer to this question will determine how many Ukrainians remain Ukrainians without Ukraine — and how many will still decide to link their future with returning.