The war has reached the Russian hinterland: 56 “regions” have gone into budget deficit – The Jewish Autonomous Region is in the most difficult position in terms of relative deficit

In Russia, it is becoming increasingly noticeable what the Kremlin has long tried to hide behind military rhetoric, television mobilization, and reports of “stability.” The war against Ukraine is becoming not only a frontline and foreign policy issue but also an internal financial blow to Russian regions.

According to data cited by Russian business publications with reference to the operational report of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation for January–March 2026, in the first quarter of this year, 56 “regions” recorded a budget deficit. For comparison: in the first quarter of 2025, there were 46 such regions, and in the first quarter of 2022, before the consequences of the full-scale war began to quickly spread throughout the system, there were only 6.

Occupied territories are also included in Russian statistics.

It is especially important to understand that the figure 56 out of 89 “subjects” is given in the logic of Russian official reporting. Moscow includes not only internationally recognized regions of the Russian Federation in this system but also temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

In Russian budget statistics, they are listed under occupational names: the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”, the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic”, the so-called “Zaporizhzhia Oblast”, and the so-called “Kherson Oblast”. Separately, Russian reporting accounts for the occupied Crimea and Sevastopol.

According to open data for the first quarter of 2026, among these territories, the largest deficit was indicated for the so-called “DPR” — about 17.4 billion rubles. The so-called “LPR” had a deficit of about 9.4 billion rubles, the so-called “Kherson Oblast” — about 4.8 billion rubles. For occupied Sevastopol, there was also a deficit — approximately 0.7 billion rubles, while for occupied Crimea, Russian data showed a surplus.

That is, even in its own reporting, Moscow effectively shows: the occupied territories are not becoming a “successful annexation” but an additional financial burden. The war requires not only expenses on the front but also the constant maintenance of captured territories, which the Kremlin tries to integrate into the Russian budget system.

This is not just an accounting line in a report.

When a regional budget goes into deficit, it means that local authorities have less room for ordinary civilian expenses: road repairs, hospital modernization, school support, utility infrastructure, transportation, social programs, and local projects that directly determine the quality of life.

Why the Jewish Autonomous Oblast became an important detail of this story

The Jewish Autonomous Oblast deserves special attention. At the end of the first quarter of 2026, it found itself in the most difficult position in terms of relative deficit: the deficit amounted to about 50.5% of its own tax and non-tax revenues.

This is not the largest deficit in rubles. Large industrial regions may have a bigger financial hole in absolute numbers. But for the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the problem looks especially painful because its own revenue base is significantly weaker. When such a region goes into deficit by half of its own revenues, it means dependence on external support, debts, and constant redistribution of money from above.

For the Israeli and Jewish audience, there is another important meaning here. The Jewish Autonomous Oblast is not just one of the Far Eastern regions of Russia. It is a Soviet project of Jewish autonomy centered in Birobidzhan, which was once presented as an alternative to the national Jewish home. Today, the Jewish population there is less than one percent, but the name of the region still carries historical and symbolic weight.

That is why the inclusion of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast among the most problematic regions looks especially indicative. Moscow has maintained this territory as a political symbol for decades, but the real budget figures show not the strength of the symbol but the weakness of the regional system. Behind the loud historical name stands a sparsely populated and financially vulnerable region, which now also pays for the war started by the Kremlin against Ukraine.

This does not make the budget crisis a “Jewish problem.” No. It is a Russian state problem. But for the reader in Israel, it is important to see the contrast: a region that in Soviet history was called Jewish autonomy is today among the territories most vulnerable to the financial consequences of the war.

What the figure of 56 regions shows

The main fact of this story is not the deficit itself, but the speed of its spread.

In four years of war, the number of Russian regions that record a budget deficit in the first quarter has increased almost tenfold. In 2022, it was about a few territories. In 2026, it is already about the majority of regions if you look at the Russian system without the political facade and official statements about the “strength of the economy.”

According to Russian publications citing the Accounts Chamber, the total deficit of regions that went into deficit approached 294 billion rubles. At the same time, formally consolidated regional budgets still maintained a surplus, but it sharply decreased compared to previous years.

This is what is important to understand. The system has not yet collapsed, but the margin of safety is rapidly decreasing. The problem no longer looks like a local failure in one or two weak regions. It is becoming a general trend.

Especially difficult situations, according to published data, have developed in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Vologda Oblast, and Republic of Komi. In these regions, the deficit is especially noticeable in relation to their own tax and non-tax revenues.

For the Israeli reader, there is a separate detail here. The Jewish Autonomous Oblast has long remained more of a historical-political symbol of the Soviet project than a real center of Jewish life. But the very fact that it found itself among the regions with the most difficult budget situation shows: the crisis does not choose only large industrial centers or only poor peripheries. It spreads across the entire map of Russia.

Why regions go into deficit

The reason is not reduced to one line.

The Russian economy is simultaneously experiencing several pressures.

• Firstly, the war requires huge expenses on the army, weapons production, security apparatus, logistics, payments to the military, mobilized, and families of the deceased.
• Secondly, the federal center increasingly redistributes resources towards military and related directions.
• Thirdly, regions receive additional obligations. They have to participate in payments, support recruitment campaigns, cover the social consequences of mobilization, finance separate infrastructure and “patronage” projects in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

At the same time, the revenue part of regional budgets is also becoming less stable. Russian business sources point to a decrease in profit tax revenues, especially in regions related to extraction, metallurgy, export, and industry. Sanctions, changes in logistics, dependence on military orders, and the skew of the economy towards the defense sector create a situation where some industries receive money, while the civilian economy gradually loses balance.

Thus arises a typical military trap: the state can still show growth in certain indicators due to defense spending, but the quality of this growth becomes dangerous. Money goes into the production of war, not into the development of normal civilian life.

NANovosti — Israel News considers this topic not as internal Russian accounting but as part of a broader picture. Russia continues to be a factor in the war against Ukraine, in relations with Iran, in energy, in international security. Therefore, the question of how long the Russian system can finance the war without destroying internal mechanisms is important for Israel.

What the Russian hinterland pays for

An ordinary resident of a Russian region rarely sees the budget deficit directly. They do not receive a letter with the wording: “your hospital will not be modernized because of the war.” But the consequences appear differently.

First, road repairs are postponed.

Then local development programs are reduced.

Then the hospital receives less money for equipment, the school for repairs, the municipality for utility infrastructure. Somewhere public transport is no longer updated. Somewhere the region’s debt grows. Somewhere authorities begin to save on what does not give an immediate political effect but determines people’s lives in a year, three, or five years.

This is how the war enters everyday life.

Not only through obituaries, mobilization, and propaganda. It enters through broken roads, queues in clinics, closed programs, worn-out housing and utilities, deteriorating education, and the slow destruction of what should have served peaceful life.

For the Kremlin, the war remains a matter of imperial prestige and control. For the residents of the regions, it gradually becomes a matter of water quality, doctor availability, school condition, and the ability to travel on a normal road.

Why this is important for Ukraine and Israel

For Ukraine, this data shows that the war is indeed depleting the Russian system, even if it is not happening as quickly as desired. Moscow can continue military pressure, increase weapons production, and hold the front, but the cost of this course is increasingly being transferred inside the country.

For Israel, this picture also matters.

Russia is not isolated from the Middle East. It is connected with Iran, maintains influence in the region, participates in international diplomatic games, and tries to use conflicts around Israel as part of its anti-Western policy. Therefore, Russia’s financial stability is not only a Ukrainian topic. It is a question of how many resources Moscow can invest in alliances, pressure, propaganda, military support of partners, and destabilization of neighboring regions.

But there is an important nuance here. The budget problems of the regions do not mean that Russia will stop the war tomorrow. Authoritarian systems are often able to redistribute pain downwards for a long time: from the center to the regions, from elites to the population, from the military budget to civilian programs.

In other words, the Kremlin can continue the war while simultaneously worsening the lives of its own citizens. For such a system, this is not a contradiction but a working model.

What will happen next

If the trend continues, Russian regions will face a choice between debts, spending cuts, and complete dependence on the federal center. And the federal center, in turn, will increasingly choose between war and civilian development.

For now, the priority is obvious.

Money goes where it helps to continue the war, maintain the security apparatus, and demonstrate external “power.” And civilian infrastructure remains in the background. This may not look like a sharp collapse, but such processes often create deep degradation — slow, not always noticeable in the first year, but difficult to recover from.

NANovosti — Israel News will follow this topic because Russia’s economic exhaustion is directly related to the war against Ukraine and the balance of power in regions important for Israel’s security.

The main conclusion is simple: the war that the Kremlin sells to Russians as a struggle for greatness increasingly returns to them in the form of a budget deficit. Not in television slogans, but in the real expenses of regions, in reduced programs, in worn-out infrastructure, and in the everyday life of the Russian hinterland.

And the longer this war continues, the harder it will be to hide its true cost.