Who really keeps the Ukrainian sky closed: why Israel flies, but Ukraine does not yet

When Ukraine talks about the return of civilian flights, the question almost always sounds the same: why are airports still closed if planes in Israel continue to fly even during periods of missile threats?

For millions of Ukrainians, this is not an abstract topic. For the fourth year, the road abroad often begins not with an airport, but with a train, bus, night crossing of the border, and transfer in Poland, Moldova, Romania, Hungary, or Slovakia. For the Israeli audience, this question is also understandable: Israel has lived with threats for many years, but at the same time maintains aviation connections with the world, albeit with interruptions during escalations.

That is why it is worth carefully reading the analysis by Volodymyr Kreidenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament and deputy head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Transport and Infrastructure, published on June 26, 2026, on Interfax-Ukraine. This is not just an aviation topic, but an answer to a question that concerns security, trust, war, the insurance market, and the future of Ukrainian mobility.

But a direct comparison between Israel and Ukraine oversimplifies reality. Airspace is opened not by the desire to ‘return planes,’ but by proven route safety, airline agreement, the position of international regulators, and insurers’ willingness to take on military risks.

Why opening the sky on paper is easier than returning planes

Ukraine’s airspace was closed on February 24, 2022, due to a direct threat to civil aviation. In the context of a full-scale Russian invasion, this was not a formal decision or overcautiousness, but in fact, the only possible step.

Missile attacks, drones, strikes on critical infrastructure, the operation of air defense systems, and constant route uncertainty created a situation where it was impossible to guarantee stable safe corridors for civilian aircraft.

It is important to understand: the sky is not opened or closed by one official, one ministry, or one international organization. It is a chain of decisions involving national aviation authorities, military structures, international regulators, air navigation services, airlines, and the insurance market.

It is often mistakenly said that flights are ‘prohibited by ICAO.’ In fact, the International Civil Aviation Organization sets global standards and provides recommendations but does not directly manage the airspace of a specific country. The responsibility for its sky primarily lies with the state.

Technically, restrictions are formalized through NOTAMs — operational aviation notifications indicating closed zones, altitudes, routes, and flight conditions. But even if Ukraine formally opens part of its airspace, this does not mean that planes will immediately appear on the schedule.

An airline may independently decide that the risk is too high.

An international regulator may recommend that carriers avoid the route.

Insurance companies may refuse to cover flights in a conflict zone.

Without military risk insurance, no major international carrier will place a plane worth hundreds of millions of dollars on a route where there is a risk of missile, drone, or other combat threats. Therefore, legally opening the sky is much easier than returning real flights.

Why Ukraine became a special case for Europe

For 21st-century Europe, the complete closure of the sky over such a large country for years has become an unprecedented situation. This is not a local incident and not a temporary restriction due to one dangerous area.

Ukraine faced a threat that spreads far beyond the front line. Missiles and drones can fly to different regions, change direction, attack infrastructure in the center, west, south, and east of the country.

For civil aviation, this is critical. An aircraft must be safe not only on the runway but also during takeoff, ascent, en route, landing approach, and exit from Ukrainian airspace.

Therefore, the simple formula ‘open one airport’ does not solve the problem. An airport may be intact, the terminal may be ready, the staff may maintain qualifications, but the safety of the flight is measured by the entire route, not just the condition of the building and runway.

Why Israel flies, but the Ukrainian model will be different

The Israeli example constantly appears in the Ukrainian discussion. The logic is clear: if Ben Gurion Airport continues to operate during threats, why can’t Ukraine open at least Lviv or several special routes?

The answer is that the Israeli system relies on conditions that cannot simply be transferred to Ukraine.

Israel is a compact country. This allows for concentrated protection around key facilities, including Ben Gurion Airport, central transport infrastructure, and strategic zones.

Moreover, Israel has been building a multi-layered air and missile defense system for decades. Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, and other elements work in specific geography, under a specific type of threat, and under a rapid response model.

But even Israel does not have an absolute guarantee of normal aviation operation during serious escalation. Flights are delayed, planes may go into holding patterns, some routes are canceled, and foreign airlines often suspend flights themselves, without waiting for an official ban from the Israeli government.

This is where the main conclusion for readers of NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency is important: strong air defense reduces the threat but does not cancel the decisions of airlines and insurers. For civil aviation, it is not enough to declare that the airport is protected. It is necessary to prove that each flight can proceed safely from start to finish.

What Israel, Iran, MH17, and PS752 showed

Recent periods of direct military escalation in the Middle East have shown that even prepared systems have limits. During threats, the airspace of individual countries in the region was completely or partially closed, airlines canceled flights, changed routes, and bypassed dangerous zones through third countries.

For Ukraine, this experience is important not as a ready-made model, but as a warning: even powerful defense does not mean that international carriers and the insurance market automatically recognize the risk as acceptable.

There are also tragic lessons that have changed global aviation.

The crash of flight MH17 over Donbas, where 298 people died, destroyed the previous illusion that a civilian plane can be safely flown near a conflict zone if the right altitude or route is chosen.

The crash of flight PS752 in Iran showed another threat: in conditions of military tension and high readiness of air defense systems, a civilian plane can be mistakenly taken for a target.

After these tragedies, the aviation industry has become much stricter about conflict zones. Today, it is not enough to prove that the airport is physically intact. It is necessary to prove the safety of the route, procedures, communication, identification, coordination with the military, and readiness to be responsible for every stage of the flight.

What needs to happen for Ukraine to return civil aviation

Theoretically, Ukraine can open part of the sky even before the end of the war. But only if several conditions are met simultaneously.

First — multi-level protection of a specific airport and the entire flight route. This is not only about the runway but about the takeoff corridor, ascent, exit to the border, landing approach, and backup scenarios.

Second — special air routes where the time the plane spends in a potentially dangerous zone will be minimal.

Third — international coordination with EASA, neighboring states, air navigation services, airlines, and the insurance market.

Fourth — insurers’ readiness to cover flights over Ukraine. Without this, regular commercial flights are impossible, even if the state formally opens the route.

Ukraine has already taken an organizational step in this direction. A working group has been created under the Ministry of Community and Territorial Development to prepare for the restoration of airport operations. It includes representatives of the State Emergency Service, State Restoration, Air Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, State Aviation Service, key airports, including Boryspil, Kyiv, and Lviv, as well as Ukraerorukh.

On paper, this format should become a platform for interdepartmental coordination and preparation of practical solutions. But here arises an important question: if the working group is created to prepare for the opening of the sky, society should see at least minimal results of its work.

These can be regular meetings, public conclusions, safety scenarios, a roadmap, stages of approvals, or at least a clear explanation of what has already been done and what is still blocking the launch. When such information is almost absent, the working group looks not like a tool for real movement, but like a formal structure that exists on paper but does not provide an answer to society.

Lviv and Mukachevo: readiness is there, but it is not enough

Lviv International Airport named after Danylo Halytskyi today looks like one of the most likely candidates for the first stage of restoring civilian flights.

The airport remains undamaged and technically ready for operation. Before the full-scale war, about a thousand employees worked there, now about 300 people remain. This is enough to maintain infrastructure, retain certifications, and prepare for a quick restart.

The airport management has prepared a step-by-step plan that includes the return of part of the staff, checks, training, and restoration of necessary procedures. According to the airport, three to five airlines previously expressed readiness to start flights within two to four weeks after the official opening of the airspace and passing safety procedures.

This is an important signal, but not a guarantee of launch.

Lviv may indeed become one of the first Ukrainian airports where civilian flights are restored. However, even here, the main thing is not the speed of opening, but the proven safety of each specific route.

In parallel, Ukraine is developing new aviation infrastructure. In Mukachevo, in Transcarpathia, a new airport is being built on the site of the former city airfield. The project area is 228 hectares, the runway length should be about 2.7–2.8 kilometers. This will allow receiving class C aircraft, including Boeing 737 and Airbus A320.

The project cost is estimated at about 4 billion hryvnias, completion is planned for 2027.

Transcarpathia borders several EU countries, so the airport in Mukachevo can become an important part of Ukraine’s transport integration with the EU. For business, tourism, humanitarian logistics, and international mobility, this is a promising direction.

But the construction of a new airport itself does not open the sky. It is an investment in the future — for the moment when safety allows the return of civilian flights.

What the return of flights might look like

The most likely scenario is phased.

First, individual airports with the best safety and logistics conditions may open. The first flights are likely to be not mass tourist ones, but special: diplomatic, humanitarian, business, or limited regular routes.

Then gradually, major international carriers may return. But only if they see a stable situation, clear rules, working safety protocols, and acceptable insurance coverage.

And only after that is it possible to return to the usual commercial model: airline competition, regular routes, passenger traffic growth, and familiar mobility.

None of these stages can be accelerated by an administrative decision alone. In aviation, the market believes not in statements, but in procedures, guarantees, insurance, statistics, and safety reputation.

The experience of Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Syria confirms this. During NATO’s operation against Yugoslavia in 1999, civil aviation practically stopped. In Iraq and Syria, the restoration of flights after conflicts was partial, slow, and dependent on international trust.

An airport may formally operate, but if international carriers do not fly there and if insurers do not cover risks, there is no full return of aviation.

Ukraine cannot simply copy the Israeli, Iraqi, Syrian, or any other model. But it can use this experience for its own scenario — cautious, phased, and verifiable.

The return of planes to Ukrainian skies will be a strong signal to the world. It will mean not only an improvement in the security situation but also the country’s return to full participation in the global mobility, economy, and diplomacy system.

However, that is why the decision cannot be hasty. The trust of passengers, airlines, and insurers is built over a long time and lost instantly. One disaster can close the sky more effectively than any official ban.

The main conclusion is that Ukrainian skies are kept closed not by one official, not by one regulator, and not by one international organization. They are kept closed by a combination of military risks, safety requirements, insurance restrictions, carrier responsibility, and the need to prove that each flight can be performed safely.

In aviation, there is no concept of ‘almost safe.’

There is safe — or unsafe.

And until Ukraine can cross this boundary with sufficient margin, the pause in civilian flights will remain not only a forced restriction but also a responsible decision for the people who will one day board a plane from a Ukrainian airport again.