“We are watering the desert”: who in the EU said this, how much money Ukraine really needs, and why there is again debate about Russian billions

“It feels like we are watering the desert.” The phrase turned out to be so convenient for headlines that it almost immediately began to live separately from the story in which it was said.

Author: Alexander Khmelnitsky

In fact, this is not the position of the European Union, not a statement by the European Commission, and not the words of any European leaders. The French Le Monde on September 30, 2026, quoted a remark by an unnamed European diplomat, “irritated” by yet another discussion of Ukraine’s financial needs. But the irritation itself was not invented by journalists: in Brussels, they are indeed trying to figure out where to get money for the next year when previous agreements turned out to be insufficient.

And here begins the confusion with the numbers. Because €69 billion, €90 billion, $52.6 billion, $32.6 billion, and almost €225 billion ended up nearby. If you simply add them up in one text, it creates the impression that Kyiv has already been given one gigantic sum and has come for another.

This is not the case.

€69 billion is not a new request on top of €90 billion

On September 29, the Ukraine Donor Platform meeting was held in Brussels. For the Israeli reader, the name says little: it is a platform where Ukraine, the G7 countries, the European Union, international financial organizations, and other partners bring together the country’s future needs and who is ready to finance which part. It is not a single cash register or a fund from which Kyiv receives money in one payment.

Ukraine’s Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko said in Brussels that for 2027, Ukraine needs to find about €69 billion: approximately €40 billion for military expenses and €29 billion for the functioning of the state. This is the amount that made the headlines.

But Le Monde makes an important clarification: in this calculation, the promised bilateral aid and the European loan of €90 billion for 2026–2027 are already included. So the arithmetic “Europe gave €90 billion, Ukraine asked for another €69 billion” simply does not work here.

The official Ukrainian Ministry of Finance explains the situation more simply.

For 2027, Ukraine will need $52.6 billion in external financing. Of this, approximately $20 billion are expected sources already exist. About $32.6 billion remain uncovered.

This last figure is the real problem that Marchenko brought to the partners.

Not €69 billion in cash. Not a new check on top of €90 billion. But about $32.6 billion, for which there is no confirmed source yet.

So where did the European €90 billion go

Nowhere. They exist, but there is a nuance here too.

In April, the EU Council finally agreed on the Ukraine Support Loan of €90 billion, calculated for 2026 and 2027. Of this amount, approximately €60 billion is intended for defense purchases, and €30 billion for budget support and state operations. For 2026, access to a maximum of €45 billion is provided.

This is a loan that the EU itself attracts on capital markets under the security of the European budget. The money was not lying in advance on some Ukrainian account, and €90 billion cannot be perceived as an amount already spent by Kyiv.

There is another detail. The military part of this loan is not money for pensions, teachers’ salaries, or repairing a power plant after a Russian strike. It is primarily intended for the purchase of weapons and investments in the defense industry. The budget part is significantly smaller.

Therefore, two things can be true at the same time: the EU agreed on a huge package of €90 billion — and Ukraine still has a financial gap.

From the outside, it looks strange. Inside the budget — not so much.

Why the gap has grown again

The problem did not only appear in 2027. Kyiv is trying to close the shortfall already in the current year’s budget.

Reuters reported on September 30 about a funding deficit for military expenses of about $27 billion in 2026. The Ukrainian government expects to find about $7 billion through internal redistribution and reduction of some expenses, and approximately $20 billion will have to be sought from outside. Ukraine’s total war-related expenses in 2026 are estimated at about $155 billion, and this amount includes not only Kyiv’s budget expenses but also part of the weapons coming from allies.

There is a simple reason why calculations constantly have to be redone: the war does not follow the budget approved a year ago.

Russian strikes require new expenses for air defense, energy, and infrastructure repair. The war consumes ammunition and equipment faster than it could be accurately calculated in advance. The economy simultaneously loses part of production and exports.

So the lack of money did not arise because someone suddenly found another expense line for €30 billion. Several lines moved up simultaneously.

In this sense, the phrase of the European diplomat about the “desert” speaks more about political fatigue from a task that constantly has a new price.

But these are still the words of one diplomat, not a decision by the European Union to stop supporting Ukraine. Le Monde designates it exactly this way — an anonymous diplomat, not a representative of an EU institution.

Almost €225 billion in aid cannot be read literally either

At this point, another figure usually appears: “Europe has already given Ukraine almost €225 billion.”

The official amount is indeed close — the European Commission currently estimates the total support for Ukraine and Ukrainians from the EU at €224.5 billion. But this does not mean €224.5 billion transferred to the Ukrainian government.

Inside are completely different funds: €110.3 billion in funds and guarantees through the EU budget, €77.9 billion in military aid, up to €17 billion in expenses of Union countries on Ukrainians within the EU, €15.5 billion in other support from member countries, and €3.8 billion received from income from frozen Russian assets.

For Israel, this clarification is useful. When in the Israeli public debate the cost of war or aid to an ally is mentioned, purchases of weapons, budget expenses, maintenance of evacuees, and loans can stand side by side — although economically these are completely different things. The same happened with the European figure for Ukraine: it cannot be read as the size of a direct transfer to Kyiv.

NAnews has already analyzed a similar problem using the example of Ukraine’s state debt: preferential European loans, ordinary market borrowings, and obligations repaid from income from Russian assets formally increase the debt but create different burdens for the budget. Our detailed analysis is here: “Russian propaganda counted Ukraine $4.81 billion in payments: what does not match the data of the Ministry of Finance and the IMF”.

That is why bare sums here rather hinder if not explained what is inside.

And what about reforms — is Europe really holding back money?

Yes, part of the payments is tied to reforms. No, this does not mean that Ukraine has stopped implementing them.

On September 24, the EU Council approved another payment to Ukraine of almost €3 billion under the Ukraine Facility. The basis was the implementation of another ten planned reform stages. By this time, Ukraine had completed 84 out of 95 stages that were supposed to be completed by this time, which is about 88%.

This is an important amendment to another overly simple version of this story: “Europe is tired because Kyiv is not reforming anything.”

There are questions about the reforms. In July, the EU added new conditions, including measures on the rule of law and anti-corruption policy. Payments do depend on the implementation of specific stages.

But 84 completed points out of 95 is not zero.

Here, rather, a fairly strict contractual logic operates: if you take the planned step, the next part of the money opens; if delayed, part of the funding hangs. For a state with tens of billions of external financing directly built into the budget, several delayed decisions can suddenly become not a bureaucratic but a cash problem.

“Who else should pay?” — this is where the real dispute begins

This is where the story becomes unpleasant for Brussels.

€90 billion the EU has already taken on. Old programs continue in parallel. But if after this for 2027 there is still $32.6 billion without a confirmed source, European governments quite naturally begin to ask: where are the other partners?

This does not necessarily mean “We will no longer give to Ukraine.” The question is different — why should the next gap be closed again mainly by the EU.

And politically, it appears at a very inconvenient moment. Europe is discussing the next multi-year Union budget, where Ukraine also claims a large separate resource. At the same time, a number of countries want to reduce the overall size of this budget. Le Monde calls this background one of the reasons why the new discussion about tens of billions is now met harder than previous ones.

Against this background, one anonymous phrase about the “desert” sounds completely different.

Not as an announcement of a European turn against Ukraine. Rather as an irritated remark by someone who sees the table for the next year — and in it, several tens of billions do not match again.

And therefore Russian money comes up again

In Europe, about €210 billion in assets of the Central Bank of Russia remain frozen. About €185 billion of them are in Belgian Euroclear.

For the Israeli reader, Euroclear is easier to imagine not as a bank with a huge Russian safe, but as one of the key European clearing and depository centers: through such structures, securities are stored and serviced. Therefore, it is primarily about financial assets blocked by sanctions, not about €185 billion in cash in Brussels.

The EU is already using income generated by frozen Russian assets. In the official total amount of European aid to Ukraine, such money is now €3.8 billion.

But the bulk of the assets remains untouched.

Belgium opposes their direct use or confiscation due to possible legal and financial consequences. The Belgian Foreign Minister confirmed this position again in early September, while the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and a number of other states called for a return to discussion.

It’s all very complicated. In September, the Belgian Council of State separately ruled that the country’s treasury did not have sufficient authority for one of the decisions on frozen assets of a Russian bank. The decision itself did not unfreeze Russian funds but once again showed why Belgian authorities are so nervous about the legal structure around Euroclear.

NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency wrote in detail last year about the European attempt to build a mechanism by which Russian assets would help finance Ukraine without their direct confiscation. This material is here: “The EU has developed a plan to finance Ukraine using frozen Russian assets”.

Now the old dispute returns not theoretically.

There is a specific amount — $32.6 billion. And there are specific €210 billion of Russian state assets, which the EU has not yet decided to use in full.

While Europe counts money, Russia is also rewriting the budget

There is another background without which the conversation about European “fatigue” looks incomplete.

Russia is simultaneously increasing its own war expenses. Reuters, having studied Russian budget documents, reported that Russia’s defense spending in 2027 is planned to be raised to about 17.1 trillion rubles — about $202.6 billion, which is 27% higher than the initially laid level.

Comparing this figure directly with Ukraine’s $52.6 billion in external financing is impossible. These are completely different indicators: in one case, Russia’s defense budget, in the other — external money needed by Ukraine in addition to its own income.

But together they explain one unpleasant thing.

Moscow is budgeting as if military expenses will remain huge in 2027. Kyiv is also counting money for 2027. The European Union too.

The conversation is no longer about how to cover several emergency months.

What’s next

As of September 29, no new package that would close Ukraine’s 2027 needs with one decision has been announced. The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance lists among the expected sources the EU, Japan, the IMF, and the World Bank, but of the necessary $52.6 billion, confirmed or expected sources currently cover about $20 billion.

This means the remaining amount will be collected in parts. Somewhere a loan. Somewhere an acceleration of already promised payments. Somewhere additional contributions from states. Somewhere the implementation of reforms on which the next tranche depends.

And again — Russian assets.

Because the harder it is for a European government to go to its taxpayer for the next billion, the louder the question will sound: why should another year of war be financed by new European debt if about €210 billion of the Central Bank of Russia remains frozen in the same Europe.

The EU does not yet have an answer to it.

And Ukraine does not yet have $32.6 billion for 2027.