Buffer zone as a screen: which territories Putin is trying to take from Ukraine

Russian rhetoric about ‘border security’ once again looks like an attempt to cover up the Kremlin’s old goal — not to end the war, but to expand the occupation in Ukraine.

Material from July 5, 2026, by the American Institute for the Study of War: analysts believe that Moscow seeks not only military ‘security’ but also further occupation of Ukrainian territories beyond the already captured areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

‘Buffer zone’ as a new pretext for an old war

On July 3, 2026, Putin held a meeting with Russian military commanders and once again spoke about creating a so-called ‘buffer zone’ along the Russian border.

Formally, Moscow explains this as protecting the border regions of the Russian Federation. According to the Russian command, Russian troops should advance in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions to push the threat away from Russian territory. But there is a main contradiction in this formula: it is not about defending Russia, but about advancing the Russian army deeper into Ukraine.

Sumy and Kharkiv regions — not a random choice

These are the regions the Kremlin is trying to present as a ‘security belt.’ In practice, such logic means expanding the war in northeastern Ukraine and attempting to secure Russia’s right to attack new areas under a convenient informational slogan.

ISW previously assessed the so-called ‘buffer zone’ as a vague and practically unattainable goal for Russian troops as long as an independent Ukraine capable of fighting exists. This is an important detail: Moscow does not specify the boundaries of this zone because the very idea allows for constantly moving the line of demands further.

For the Israeli audience, this sounds familiar. When an aggressor declares foreign territory a ‘zone of its security,’ it does not offer a peace plan. It creates a language with which to justify another escalation.

What the Kremlin really wants

The main conclusion of analysts is simple: it’s not just about the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Kremlin continues to view Ukrainian statehood as a problem it wants to break with military, political, and informational pressure.

Statements about the ‘buffer zone’ did not appear in a vacuum. They were voiced against the backdrop of new talks by Moscow about advancing in Donbas and statements by the Russian Ministry of Defense about the alleged capture of Kostyantynivka in the Donetsk region. Reuters reported that Russia claimed the capture of Kostyantynivka on July 3, 2026, but Ukraine did not confirm this and publicly denied the loss of the city the next day.

Why Donbas is no longer the limit

If the Kremlin talks about the Sumy and Kharkiv regions, it means its appetite is not limited to already occupied areas. The Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain part of the Russian military goal, but northeastern Ukraine is becoming the next area of pressure.

This is the danger of the current rhetoric. Moscow does not abandon old goals but changes the packaging. Previously, there were words about ‘demilitarization’ and ‘denazification.’ Now they more often talk about ‘security,’ ‘sanitary zone,’ and ‘border protection.’ The meaning remains the same: Ukraine must cede territories, and the West must get used to the idea that Russian advancement is supposedly a normal part of the negotiation process.

That is why NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers such statements not as an ordinary frontline episode but as a signal for all Ukraine’s allies, including Israel. If aggression receives a diplomatic discount under the guise of a ‘buffer,’ tomorrow such logic can be applied in any other region.

Why this is important for Israel and the West

The Kremlin uses Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory as an informational pretext for continuing the war. This technique allows Moscow to talk not about its own invasion but about a ‘forced reaction.’ But the Russian war against Ukraine did not start because of strikes on the border regions of the Russian Federation, but because of the Kremlin’s decision to destroy Ukraine’s independence.

Informational war against support for Kyiv

Putin simultaneously criticizes Western aid to Ukraine. This is not a separate topic but part of the same strategy. The stronger the thesis about the ‘impossibility of Ukraine’s victory’ sounds, the easier it is for Moscow to pressure Kyiv’s partners and convince them of the need for concessions.

For Israel, there are several levels of risk here. The first is the safety of Jewish communities and citizens in Ukraine who live under Russian strikes. The second is the international precedent: if the seizure of territories can be justified by words about a ‘buffer zone,’ then the very system of borders and allied obligations becomes weaker. The third is Russian influence in the Middle East, where Moscow has long played against the Western security architecture and seeks pressure points on Israel.

What should be clear now

The Kremlin does not demonstrate readiness to end the war. It shows readiness to continue it with a different language, in different directions, and with new explanations for the external audience.

Therefore, the question ‘which territories does Putin want to capture’ cannot be reduced to the map of one section of the front. Today, the focus is on the Sumy and Kharkiv regions, the Donetsk region, and a broader plan for political control over Ukraine. Tomorrow, the list may be expanded if Moscow sees weakness, fatigue, or a desire by the West to turn a blind eye to another step.

The conclusion for Israel and its Russian-speaking audience is harsh but necessary: the Russian ‘buffer zone’ is not a defensive concept but a political screen for continuing the aggressive war. And the sooner this is called by its name, the less space will remain for Kremlin manipulation.