Can Tehran try to reach Ukrainian territory?

When discussing the Iranian threat in Israel, the conversation usually revolves around missiles on Israeli territory, attacks on American bases, and pressure on Gulf countries. But against the backdrop of Ukraine’s new role in the Middle East, another question has arisen: can Tehran try to reach Ukrainian territory as well. This conversation was prompted by Israeli military commentator David Sharp, who, commenting to Ukrainian media, focused not so much on Iran’s political will as on its real technical capabilities.

For the Israeli audience, this topic does not seem abstract. In March 2026, Ukraine began to more actively offer countries in the region its experience in combating Iranian drones and missiles, and Kyiv has already advanced towards security agreements with the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. This is not a symbolic gesture. It is a direct integration of Ukrainian military experience into the Middle Eastern system of deterring Iran.

What exactly did David Sharp say and where is the line between possibility and probability

Technically, Iran can reach

The essence of Sharp’s assessment is simple: when analyzing Iran, one cannot reassure oneself with the logic of “it’s not beneficial for them.” According to him, one should primarily proceed from capabilities. In a publication by 24 Channel, he directly states that Iran is capable of reaching Ukraine with missiles, citing an episode with a launch at the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean as an example. Reuters separately clarified: Iran did indeed launch two ballistic missiles at the US and UK base on Diego Garcia, but they did not reach their targets. The very fact of such a launch is important in itself: it shows that Tehran is ready to demonstrate range and expand the geography of the threat.

This, however, does not mean that Ukraine is already at the top of Iran’s list. And here begins the most important part. There is still a big distance between “can strike” and “intends to strike.” Especially in a war where each missile is not just a weapon, but a scarce political and military resource.

Tehran’s logic now pushes it towards other targets

According to Sharp, if Iran wants to make a demonstrative strike beyond the immediate front, it has targets it considers more priority than Ukraine. In the 24 Channel material, he names, in particular, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania — that is, countries associated with NATO infrastructure and American military presence. In this logic, Tehran is more likely to seek an impactful signal against those it considers more direct participants in supporting the US, rather than spending rare missiles on the Ukrainian direction.

This reasoning sounds familiar to Israel. Iran often acts not along the line of “who is weaker,” but along the line of “what signal is needed now.” Therefore, the very idea of a strike on Ukraine does not seem fantastic, but it is too early to turn it into the main scenario. Even after heavy losses and the reduction of some launch capabilities, Iran retains part of its missile potential and continues to fire at neighbors, which means the issue is not closed — it just does not currently stand at the top of Tehran’s list.

Why Ukraine appeared on Iran’s radar at all

Kyiv is no longer just an observer from the sidelines

Since March 2026, Ukraine has significantly strengthened its diplomatic and defense work in Arab countries facing Iranian strikes. Reuters reported that Kyiv is advancing agreements with Gulf states on drone technologies, missile defense, and experience exchange. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiga directly stated that it is the countries suffering from Iranian attacks that show interest in Ukrainian developments in intercepting drones and missiles.

Here, Ukraine begins to irritate Tehran not rhetorically, but practically. Not because Kyiv suddenly became the regime’s key enemy, but because Ukrainian specialists are exporting the experience of war against the Iranian-Russian alliance further — to a region where Iran is used to exerting pressure through fear, distance, and asymmetry.

It is in this context that Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers the question of a hypothetical strike on Ukraine not as an exotic scare story, but as part of a broader shift. Ukraine is gradually turning for Iran from a distant European theater, where Russia fights with foreign hands, into a country that also helps Middle Eastern partners learn to break Iranian drone and missile pressure. And this is already a completely different level of irritation.

But irritation is not yet an order to launch

There is another unpleasant but important detail. Even if Iran deems it necessary to punish someone “as an example,” the choice of target will depend not only on emotions but also on military utility, propaganda effect, and the level of risk of a direct response. Here, Ukraine is, paradoxically, both noticeable and not a priority. On one hand, Kyiv clearly hinders Iranian interests in the region. On the other hand, a strike on the territory of a country already living under daily Russian attacks will not produce the psychological shock that a strike on a state on NATO’s eastern flank might cause. This is a conclusion from the overall picture, not a direct quote, but it fits well into the hierarchy of targets Sharp spoke about.

What this means for Israel and Ukraine

There should be no illusions here

The main conclusion for the Israeli reader is quite harsh. If Iran can reach, then such a possibility should be considered real, even if it does not currently seem the most likely. Israel has already paid dearly for complacency built on the thought that the enemy “will not do the illogical.” Sharp warns precisely about this: the question is about capabilities, not our perception of Tehran’s rationality.

For Ukraine, the conclusion is different but no less important. The more noticeably it helps allies in the Middle East, the higher its political weight in the region — and the higher the chance that Tehran will begin to consider Kyiv not only as a victim of Russian-Iranian cooperation but also as an independent adversary. This is bad news in the short term, but strategically it also means something else: Ukraine is finally emerging from the role of a country that only defends itself and begins to influence the external contours of deterring Iran.

So far, the most sober formula sounds like this: an Iranian strike on Ukraine is possible in principle, but at the current stage, it does not seem to Tehran as the main option. It is much more important not to argue whether this will happen tomorrow, but to understand that the very posing of such a question already shows a new alignment. Ukraine has become more noticeable to Iran. And for Israel, this is another reminder that the Middle Eastern war has long ceased to be only Middle Eastern.