The Kremlin has turned stolen Ukrainian grain into a weapon of influence — and Israel is already caught up in this scheme

Russia is building not just a shadow trading scheme around stolen Ukrainian grain, but an entire food influence system. After the full-scale invasion, Moscow began using the captured harvest from occupied territories as a cheap resource for dumping, political pressure, and displacing Ukraine from traditional markets in Africa, the Middle East, and other Global South countries.

For Israel, this topic has ceased to be a distant Ukrainian problem. The stories with the Abinsk and Panormitis ships showed that the Ukrainian grain stolen by Russia could also enter the Israeli direction, creating not only commercial but also diplomatic risk.

How grain became part of the war against Ukraine

Russia’s war against Ukraine has long gone beyond the front line. The Kremlin is hitting Ukrainian energy, ports, logistics, economy, and at the same time trying to take Ukraine’s place in the global agricultural markets.

One of the symbols of this struggle is the death of Oleksiy Vadaturskyi, the founder of the Nibulon company. On the night of July 31, 2022, a Russian S-300 missile hit his house in Mykolaiv. Along with him, a large project of direct deliveries of Ukrainian grain to Egypt was effectively buried: with its own fleet, terminals on the Nile, and a route from the Ukrainian farmer to the end buyer without unnecessary intermediaries.

It was not just a business plan. It was an attempt by Ukraine to establish itself in key food markets directly.

After the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia temporarily blocked Ukrainian agricultural exports. The world quickly saw how important Ukrainian grain is for global food security. Later, the grain corridor was opened, but export volumes were already under pressure from the war, destroyed infrastructure, risks to shipping, and attacks on ports.

At the same time, agricultural exports remain one of Ukraine’s main sources of foreign currency income. Therefore, the fight for grain is not only a matter of bread but also a matter of Ukraine’s ability to finance its own resistance.

Why countries buy cheap grain from Russia

In the Global South markets, Russia acts roughly but effectively. It uses old Soviet ties, political contacts, propaganda, weak institutions in certain countries, and the main argument — price.

According to the data provided in the original material, in 2024, Russia accounted for about 35% of all wheat imports to Africa — more than $5 billion. Before the full-scale invasion, its share did not exceed a quarter. Ukraine’s share in this segment is about 13%.

The difference is important not only economically.

In African and Middle Eastern countries, the price of bread is often linked to internal stability. If bread becomes more expensive, social tension rises. Therefore, governments and importers primarily look at the price, and only then at the origin of the grain, sanction risks, and political consequences.

Russia takes advantage of this calculation.

Stolen Ukrainian grain allows the Kremlin to offer a discount — according to RBC-Ukraine sources, it could be $30–40 per ton compared to legal Ukrainian or European grain. For a large batch, this is no longer a symbolic discount, but an argument that can change the buyer’s decision.

The secret of such ‘cheapness’ is simple: the occupier does not bear the normal costs of the producer.

In the captured territories, grain can simply be taken from elevators, confiscated from farmers, or forced to be handed over for almost nothing. Russia does not pay normal rent for land shares, does not service Ukrainian farmers’ loans for equipment, does not invest in civilized production. Its expenses are logistics to the ports of Crimea or the Sea of Azov, ship freight, and the work of the shadow scheme.

In essence, it is about the economy of looting.

The Israeli trace: why the story with Panormitis became a warning signal

For the Israeli audience, the episode with the Abinsk and Panormitis ships is especially important.

At the end of April, two ships arrived in the Israeli direction. Abinsk is under strict US sanctions, and Panormitis, as stated in the material, was recorded loading in occupied Sevastopol. Thanks to publicity, diplomatic pressure, and the risk of secondary sanctions, unloading in Israel was avoided.

But the very fact of such ships appearing off the Israeli coast showed: the problem is already nearby.

Israel is a country that imports a significant portion of food and feed crops. Therefore, the question of grain origin is not abstract for it. If a product related to occupied Ukrainian territories enters the market, it creates several levels of risk: legal, reputational, diplomatic, and moral.

News —Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers such plots specifically in the Israeli context: when Russia’s war against Ukraine through logistics, ports, and grain contracts begins to affect the local market, business, government structures, and Israel’s relations with Ukraine.

The Haaretz investigation mentioned in the material indicates that such deliveries in recent years may not have been isolated. Since 2023, according to this data, at least two ships with stolen grain have arrived in Israel, and at least one of them was unloaded.

This does not mean that the entire Israeli market is consciously participating in Russia’s schemes. But it means that without strict verification of the origin of the cargo, documents, routes, and ships, the country may find itself drawn into someone else’s military economy.

How stolen grain is masked

The main mechanism of legalization is documents.

Grain is exported from temporarily occupied territories through the ports of Crimea and the Sea of Azov, including Sevastopol and Mariupol. Then the origin of the cargo is changed in the documents. Bills of lading may indicate Russian ports like Novorossiysk or Temryuk, and the supplier becomes a Russian company with a formally ‘correct’ certificate.

In practice, this means one thing: the Ukrainian harvest is turned on paper into a Russian product.

According to Ukrainian Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the scheme may look like this: grain is loaded in closed ports of occupied Mariupol or Sevastopol, initial documents show Russian ports, and after the ship goes to sea, declarations are changed. The final destination of the route may become ports in Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Syria, or other countries.

There is also a more complex option — mixing stolen Ukrainian grain with Russian. Then the chemical profile of the batch is blurred, and proving the origin becomes more difficult.

This is not chaotic smuggling, but a systematic infrastructure.

Why Ukraine is increasing pressure

Ukraine is gradually moving from diplomatic protests to more practical actions. Kyiv provides importing countries with data on ships, routes, cargo origins, and companies involved in the schemes.

In parallel, sanctions, ship arrests, insurance policy cancellations, deprivation of the right to sail under foreign flags, and criminal proceedings against participants in the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ are being discussed.

The example with Sweden and the Caffa bulk carrier shows that it may already be not only about warnings but also about real legal consequences, including the confiscation of the ship. The story with Panormitis in Israel also became a signal to the market: if the cargo is related to stolen Ukrainian grain, the risks can become public and practical.

For business, this is a fundamental point.

Previously, such deliveries could look like a ‘cheap contract.’ Now they increasingly resemble a possible entry into a sanctions conflict, criminal investigations, ship blockade, and loss of business reputation.

The Global South and food blackmail

The problem is broader than individual ships.

Russia is trying to turn food into the same tool of influence that gas and oil have been for decades. Through grain, you can make money, buy political silence, influence votes in international organizations, and create dependence of entire regions on Russian supplies.

Africa and the Middle East are especially vulnerable in this sense.

Even countries that publicly support Ukraine are sometimes forced to buy Russian agricultural products because there are simply no free volumes at such a price. Ukraine cannot single-handedly meet the needs of large markets, especially in conditions of war, port strikes, and limited logistics.

Therefore, the question is no longer just about catching Russia in unfair trade.

Ukraine needs to build its own trade diplomacy: help businesses enter markets, open new directions, accompany contracts through embassies, work with origin verification, insurance, ports, and legal mechanisms. In 2025, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 19 new markets for Ukrainian agricultural products were opened. In 2026, Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, and Vietnam were added, and more than 300 directions are in work.

This is no longer just export. This is a struggle for Ukraine’s place in the global food system.

What will happen next

In the fall, the situation may become even more acute. The material separately notes the risk of disruptions in fertilizer supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. If African and Asian farmers face a shortage of agrochemicals, their own harvests may decrease, and the demand for imported wheat will increase.

At such a moment, the price will again become the main argument.

The Kremlin will likely try to use this window of opportunity: offer cheap grain to those on the brink of a food crisis, and again mask the origin of batches through documents, mixing, and shadow logistics.

For Ukraine, this means that the grain war is entering a new phase.

For Israel, it means that controlling the origin of food cargoes becomes a matter not only of trade but also of foreign policy. In conditions where Russia uses stolen Ukrainian bread as a tool of pressure, the market almost has no neutral position: either the origin of the cargo is strictly checked, or the country risks becoming part of someone else’s scheme.