Civil aviation during war is always caught between two realities: the country’s need to maintain connections with the world and the obligation not to risk passengers’ lives. But global experience shows: there is no single rule. Some countries close their skies immediately after the start of hostilities, while others continue airport operations even during missile attacks if they consider the threats manageable.
For the Israeli audience, this topic is particularly understandable. Israel has lived under air threat conditions for years, yet Ben Gurion Airport often remains the country’s operational gateway. Ukraine, after February 24, 2022, took a different path and completely closed its airspace to civilian flights. At first glance, the difference seems strange, but in practice, it is explained by the scale of the war, geography, defense systems, insurance, and airlines’ willingness to take risks.
Who actually decides whether to close the sky
A common misconception is that the decision to close airspace is made by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In reality, the main responsibility lies with the state that controls its own sky.
It is the national aviation authorities that issue NOTAM notifications. Through them, restrictions, partial bans, or complete closures of airspace for civilian flights are introduced. Such decisions are made not only for political reasons but primarily based on the assessment of threats to aircraft, crews, and passengers.
At the same time, the state decision is not the only factor. EASA, FAA, and other regulators publish their positions. Insurance companies act separately: if they refuse to cover flights over dangerous territory, the airline effectively loses the ability to fly there, even if the airport is formally open.
There is another level — the decision of the carriers themselves. An international airline may cancel flights to a country or region if it considers the risk too high for its responsibility, reputation, and insurance obligations.
Ukraine: complete closure after February 24, 2022
Ukraine completely closed its airspace to civil aviation on the day of the full-scale Russian invasion — February 24, 2022. For 21st-century Europe, this was an unprecedented decision: a large country with a developed network of airports effectively disappeared from the civil aviation map.
The reason was direct and severe. Russia began striking across Ukraine using cruise and ballistic missiles, combat aviation, drones, and electronic warfare means. In such a situation, it was impossible to guarantee that a civilian aircraft would not end up in the strike zone or become a victim of an air defense system error.
Even if individual airports could technically receive aircraft, the insurance problem would become almost insurmountable. International insurers quickly refused to cover flights over Ukraine. Without such coverage, regular flights of major airlines are impossible.
For Israel, this is an important comparison because Ukraine faces not local shelling of one area but a threat across the entire country. Missiles and drones can fly from different directions, and the country itself is much larger than Israel in terms of area.
Israeli model: airport operations with controlled risk
Israel shows a different approach. Despite rocket attacks from Hamas, Hezbollah, or Iran, Ben Gurion International Airport often continues operations.
When an air raid alert is announced or an immediate threat arises, flights may be temporarily suspended. Aircraft are moved to holding areas, departures are delayed, or redirected to alternate airfields. After the threat subsides, airport operations often resume quickly — sometimes within tens of minutes.
This mode is possible not because there is no risk. It exists because Israel has a compact territory, dense air traffic management, and a multi-layered missile defense system. It includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow-2, and Arrow-3.
But even the Israeli model does not provide full protection from market decisions. During escalations, many foreign airlines independently cancel flights to Israel or suspend flights for several days and weeks. For passengers, this looks like chaos, but for carriers, it is a standard reaction to increased threat.
In such topics, it is especially important to explain not only the fact of flight cancellations but also the logic of decisions because for Israeli residents, aviation is not an abstract industry but a matter of connecting with families, business, treatment, study, and evacuation routes. That is why NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency examines such stories through a practical Israeli lens: what is happening, why it affects people, and what risks lie behind dry aviation formulations.
Israel and Iran: when not just one airport closes, but an entire region
During direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran, the situation became much more complicated. The closure or restriction of flights affected not only Israel but also Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and part of the airspace of the Persian Gulf countries.
For international aviation, this immediately turns into a regional problem. Routes between Europe and Asia have to be restructured, planes fly further south or north, flight times increase, and fuel, crew, and maintenance costs rise.
Many flights begin to bypass the dangerous zone through Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Central Asia. For passengers, this may mean delays, cancellations, transfers through another country, or noticeable ticket price increases. For the airline, it is a matter of safety, insurance, and operational costs.
Other wars: Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria, and lessons from disasters
The experience of Yugoslavia shows that during a large-scale military operation, civil aviation can be almost completely stopped. In 1999, when NATO conducted an operation against Yugoslavia, the country’s airspace was effectively closed due to intensive strikes on military infrastructure.
Civil flights were halted for almost three months. International air traffic disappeared until the end of the active phase of hostilities because separating military and civilian risks in such an environment was practically impossible.
Iraq and Syria: partial recovery does not mean full safety
Iraq also repeatedly closed its airspace during the Gulf War and subsequent military campaigns. After the end of active hostilities, flights gradually returned and not everywhere. In some areas, traffic could resume, while in others, restrictions or no-fly zones controlled by international forces remained.
Syria became an even more complex example. Despite years of civil war, Damascus International Airport continued to operate for a significant part of the time. But after strikes on the airport infrastructure, it repeatedly temporarily ceased operations, and airlines canceled flights or changed routes.
This experience shows: a formally operating airport does not yet mean a normal aviation environment. Not only the runway and controllers are important, but also the predictability of threats, carrier trust, insurance, and international security guarantees.
MH17 and PS752: tragedies that changed attitudes towards flights over war zones
Two disasters have particularly strongly influenced global aviation.
In July 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over Donbass. All 298 people on board died. After this tragedy, airlines and regulators became much stricter in assessing risks even where hostilities are not throughout the country but in a specific region.
In January 2020, Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752 was shot down. The aircraft was hit by an Iranian air defense system after missile strikes on American bases. 176 people died.
Both tragedies showed that the main danger in a conflict zone is not only an intentional attack. A civilian aircraft can become a victim of a mistake, misidentification, chaos in the management system, or insufficient coordination between military and civilian services.
Can Ukraine open the sky before the end of the war
Theoretically, Ukraine can consider partially opening certain airports before the full end of the war. This requires protected air corridors, strong air defense coverage, international guarantees, insurers’ readiness, and airlines’ consent.
But there remains a fundamental difference between the Ukrainian and Israeli situations. Israel is a compact country with a very dense defense system and short response times. Ukraine is one of the largest countries in Europe, where the threat can arise in different regions and from different directions.
Moreover, Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure continue not as episodic shelling but as a systematic military practice. This makes any guarantees for civil aviation extremely difficult.
Until international insurance companies are ready to cover flights over Ukraine, and carriers see an acceptable level of safety, the full restoration of regular flights will remain unlikely. Even a technically ready airport does not solve the issue by itself.
The main conclusion is simple: civil aviation during war does not live by a single universal rule. Israel can maintain airport operations with a controlled level of threat and strong missile defense. Ukraine closed the sky due to the scale of Russian aggression, high unpredictability of attacks, and the inability to guarantee passenger safety.
Global experience from Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria, Israel, and Ukraine shows that the decision always depends on a combination of factors: military situation, geography, air defense, insurance, carrier trust, and risk assessment. After the end of the active phase of the war, civil aviation can recover quickly, but only when safety ceases to be a political promise and becomes a real working system.