Ukrainian ‘anti-drone ingenuity’ against Iranian swarms: what Israel can learn from it

If a major war with Iran ever moves from words to real salvos, there may not be ‘single targets’ in the sky, but hundreds of cheap kamikaze drones simultaneously. This is not science fiction or a movie: this is exactly what the modern logic of a mass strike looks like — many small, low-flying, noisy, but stubborn devices that are difficult to track and even harder to close with one ‘perfect’ solution.

Ukraine has been living inside this problem for several years. And the main thing in its experience is not a ‘magic system’, but a set of layers: different sensors, different fire groups, quick decisions on the ground, plus discipline in how to turn detection means on and off. All this is assembled for a war of attrition, where every miss is a destroyed house, a dark district, a broken substation.

How Ukraine learned to see drones where ‘big’ radars are vulnerable

Network instead of one ‘eye’

One of the most practical ideas is not to rely on one large radar that gives a beautiful picture but becomes a target. Ukraine built a distributed scheme: many small detection means that turn on briefly, provide a fragment of information, and transmit it to the general system.

This creates a ‘mosaic’ of the sky. And if one element is knocked out, the network does not go completely blind.

The logic is simple: better ten incomplete signals from different points than one perfect — and lost.

Cameras, observers, and civilian signals

In the Ukrainian model, not only the military contour is important. Visual posts, cameras, mobile groups, and sometimes civilian reports about sound and route work. It looks ‘low-tech’, but against drones flying low and often bypassing main routes, the human factor sometimes closes the gap where electronics are powerless.

And here Ukraine gains what is often lacking in peacetime: the habit of acting quickly, without bureaucracy, because there is no time.

Acoustics as a return to 19th-century solutions

The most discussed part is acoustic detection. Iranian ‘Shaheds’ have a characteristic engine sound that can be caught by microphones at a distance. Then comes mathematics: comparison by arrival time, intensity, frequency, and the direction, speed, and sometimes even approximate model are obtained.

It sounds retro, but that’s where the strength lies: such sensors do not ‘shine’ in the airwaves, they are harder to suppress with classical means, and they provide an additional layer of warning.

In the Israeli context, this experience is often discussed as a ‘backup’ module, not as a replacement for our radars and intelligence.

Interception: why Ukrainian methods look crude but yield results

The ground decides more than aviation

Ukraine cannot constantly risk aircraft where enemy air defense systems are operating nearby and where any sortie is a bet on survival. Therefore, the lion’s share of interceptions is done from the ground: MANPADS, mobile calculations, short ‘activations’ of batteries, fire echelons along the route.

It is this ‘massiveness’ that sometimes gives that very percentage of successful interceptions: when a drone passes through several threat belts, the chance that it will reach the target decreases.

Amid all the talk about technology, it’s important to remember the meaning: drone defense is always a system, not a single gadget. This thought has to be regularly chewed over in the news agenda when discussing what exactly Israel can take from the Ukrainian experience: NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has repeatedly returned to the fact that there will be no ‘magic button’ — there will only be a competent defense architecture.

‘Tachankas’ with machine guns and regional fire groups

For an outside observer, it’s hard to accept the idea that machine gun crews on pickups will work against a drone at a speed of about 200 km/h. Alone — yes, almost hopeless.

But in a mode of mass duty, when dozens of teams gather in one zone and create a density of fire, the effect appears. This is a cheap layer that does not replace air defense but picks up what slipped through.

For Ukraine, with its size and front length, such solutions are critical: you can’t put an ‘expensive battery’ on every section.

Improvised aerial interception

Sometimes helicopters and even light aircraft adapted for drone hunting are used. It’s risky and looks like a forced measure, but this is how war squeezes unexpected skills out of armies.

A separate line is the interception of drones by other drones: collision, net, small charge. Ukraine is actively developing this segment because in terms of cost, it is closer to the economy of the ‘Shahed’ itself, rather than the cost of a missile.

What from the Ukrainian experience is really applicable to Israel

Where Israel is already stronger

Israel has a different starting position. We are smaller in territory, we have denser coverage, a stronger aviation component, experience with multi-level air defense, different intelligence ‘depth’, and technological partnerships.

We can intercept earlier — further from cities, further from infrastructure, still in approach. This is a fundamental difference.

Therefore, the ‘Ukrainian set’ does not need to be copied entirely. It was born out of scarcity: the absence of some systems, lack of time, constant threat to sensors and batteries.

What can add value as a ‘layer’

At the same time, there are elements that can be useful precisely as an addition:

• acoustic sensors and other passive means — as a backup contour, especially on close approach directions

• cheap interceptor drones for pinpoint protection of objects (substations, bases, critical nodes)

• mobile fire groups as a ‘last belt’ if for some reason the target passed the main lines

This does not cancel the ‘Iron Dome’ and does not replace aviation. It’s about closing rare but dangerous gaps.

The main thing to adopt is not a device, but a habit

The most useful export from Ukraine is the organizational habit: quickly collecting data from different sources, not waiting for a perfect picture, but working with probabilities and confirmations; preserving activated means, not ‘shining’ unnecessarily; keeping a reserve on routes and forces.

The Ukrainian system grew on a simple engine: there is no choice. Israel would do well to learn this in advance, while there is still a choice.

As a result, Ukrainian solutions sometimes look ‘homemade’, but they have been tested by the harshest expertise — real raids by Iranian drones in a war where a mistake is measured not by a report, but by lives and electricity in homes. Israel is not obliged to repeat this path.

But it is obliged to take a closer look.