A strike on Iran also hits Moscow: why a war between the US and Israel could weaken Russia’s international support

The war against Iran may turn out to be a much more serious problem for Russia than it seemed in the early days after the start of US and Israeli strikes. At first glance, the Kremlin might have expected that the new Middle Eastern crisis would distract the West from Ukraine, raise oil prices, and give Moscow a bit more strategic breathing room. But such an assessment is too short-sighted. In the longer term, the situation looks noticeably worse for Russia. The weakening of Iran could strike at an entire international network of connections that helped Moscow withstand Western pressure after the invasion of Ukraine.

The basis of the material is a publication by The National Interest from March 23, 2026.

For the Israeli audience, this is especially important. Israel is not conducting a local operation in a vacuum but is fighting against a key regional center of the Iranian military system. And if the pressure on Tehran really begins to destroy its capabilities, it will change not only the balance of power in the Middle East but also the external environment surrounding the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Why Iran is more important to Russia than it seems

Russia is holding on not only at the front. Its ability to continue the war against Ukraine has long depended on what happens beyond the battle lines themselves. Moscow is helped by more than one country and more than one channel. It is about a broader network of political, trade, and military-technical connections through which Russia gains access to markets, technologies, weapons, logistics, and diplomatic platforms.

In this sense, Iran for the Kremlin is not just a partner of convenience. It is part of the entire structure that allowed Russia to bypass sanction pressure, fuel the war, and simultaneously promote the idea of a so-called multipolar world, where the West allegedly can no longer dictate the rules.

What exactly this network gives Moscow

Iran supplied Russia with Shahed drones and related technologies. North Korea provided ammunition and, as believed in the West, more direct military support. China purchased Russian energy resources and ensured critically important dual-use imports. Together, this created an external support for the Kremlin, without which its position would be noticeably weaker.

The problem for Moscow is that such a system works only as long as its key elements remain stable. If one of the most important nodes—Iran—begins to lose military capabilities, internal stability, and the ability to project power through proxy structures, it affects not only Tehran itself. It begins to shake the entire anti-Western framework on which Russia relied after 2022.

And here begins a truly unpleasant scenario for the Kremlin.

How the war in Iran changes the situation around Ukraine and Israel

In the short term, Moscow may still extract some situational bonuses from the Middle Eastern escalation. But then the logic changes. If the US and Israel achieve a serious weakening of the Iranian military infrastructure, Russia may face the fact that one of its most important external partners can no longer play its former role—neither in the military sphere nor in diplomacy.

For Israel, this means more than just military exhaustion of the enemy. It means the weakening of one of the centers through which a broader hostile axis was built, linking Iran, Russia, the North Korean regime, and part of the Global South. For Ukraine, too. Because the war in Ukraine and the war against the Iranian military machine are beginning to intersect more strongly than many thought a year ago.

Ukraine gains a new diplomatic argument

There is also another important point that is often underestimated in Europe but well understood in Israel. Ukraine today is one of the main practical experts in countering Iranian Shaheds. Russia used these drones against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure for so long and so massively that Kyiv gained unique experience in fighting them in real conditions of a large war.

Against this background, Ukraine gains an additional diplomatic resource in the Middle East. Countries in the region facing Iranian threats now view Ukrainian experience not as a foreign war somewhere far away but as practical knowledge that may be useful to them. This strengthens Kyiv’s positions and simultaneously reduces the space for Russian maneuvering in the region.

It is no coincidence that for Israel, the topic of Ukraine is no longer just a European issue. It increasingly becomes part of the overall Middle Eastern security picture.

That is why in such a context, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers the conflict around Iran not as a separate regional storm but as an event that can change the entire strategic landscape—from Lebanon and the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea and the front in Ukraine.

What Russia might lose if Iran weakens

The most dangerous effect for Moscow is not immediate but cumulative.

The weakening of Iran may prompt a reassessment by other states that previously found it advantageous to keep their distance from the West and use Russia as part of an alternative balance. When allies start to look weak, coalitions crack faster than it seems from official statements.

This concerns not only the Middle East. If Washington truly demonstrates a willingness to act harshly and consistently against regimes associated with Russia, the Kremlin will take this into account in the Ukrainian direction. Such a signal changes the perception of American resolve. And this already affects Moscow’s calculations—where it can press, where it can raise stakes, and where it is better not to test the limits of others’ patience.

There is, of course, the flip side.

The Kremlin may decide that what is happening confirms their old thesis that the US ultimately seeks regime change among its opponents. This makes Russia even more suspicious and less inclined to compromise. But even in this case, its freedom space may narrow if the allied environment around it begins to crumble.

For Israel, the conclusion is quite straightforward. The weakening of Iran is not only a matter of missiles, nuclear programs, or proxy groups at the borders. It is also a question of how stable the international network will remain, which for many years helped Russia resist the West and continue the war against Ukraine. If this network cracks, the pressure will be felt not only by Tehran.

And then the war in Iran will indeed become an event that changes not only the Middle East but also the broader global arrangement. Moscow understands this. That is why in Russia, they are watching this front much more closely than they try to show publicly.