Zelensky prepares Ukraine for a long war — why Kyiv already considers 2–3 years a realistic scenario – The Economist

In Ukraine, preparations have begun not for a quick end to the war, but for its prolonged continuation. According to The Economist, Volodymyr Zelensky has ordered to proceed from a scenario in which hostilities may last another two to three years.

For the Israeli audience, this news is important not only as another episode of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It is about one of the largest wars in Europe no longer being perceived in Kyiv as a crisis that can be resolved with a single diplomatic push. Ukraine is transitioning to a long-term calculation — military, economic, political, and diplomatic.

Why Kyiv no longer counts on a quick compromise

As The Economist writes, citing sources in the Ukrainian government, at the beginning of the year, Kyiv still allowed for the possibility that negotiations mediated by the US could lead to at least a temporary agreement. Not to a full-fledged peace, but to a pause that would allow reducing the intensity of the war.

Various options were discussed. According to the publication, Kyiv was ready to talk about the withdrawal of troops from Donbas only on the condition of mutual withdrawal of forces. That is, Ukraine did not consider the scenario of a unilateral concession of territory without reciprocal movement from Russia.

The Kremlin, judging by these reports, took the opposite position. Moscow demanded a unilateral withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and did not agree to security guarantees for Ukraine if they included the deployment of troops from other countries.

This is where the negotiation logic effectively hit a wall. For Kyiv, such an option would mean not peace, but the risk of a new attack after the regrouping of Russian forces. For the Kremlin, any real security guarantees for Ukraine, on the contrary, would deprive Moscow of the opportunity to use military pressure as a tool of policy again.

On May 22, the US announced the cessation of participation in the negotiation process. After this, in Kyiv, according to Western media, the line on preparing for a long war was finally strengthened.

Putin does not change the calculation: the bet is again on exhausting Ukraine

Optimistic Ukrainian and Western sources of The Economist do not rule out that the diplomatic process may resume in the summer. But they consider the continuation of the war until one side finds itself in a noticeably weaker position to be a more likely scenario.

This means that diplomacy has not completely disappeared now, but has become dependent on the situation on the battlefield. Negotiations will be possible not because the parties suddenly want a compromise, but because the military balance will force them to seek a new format.

The Guardian previously wrote, citing sources close to the Kremlin, that Putin’s calculations on the war have not changed. He still intends to continue hostilities and, according to the publication’s interlocutors, expects to fully establish control over Donbas by the end of the year.

One of The Guardian’s sources claimed that Putin is focused specifically on Donbas and does not intend to stop until he achieves this goal. This logic is well known to Ukraine and countries that closely follow Russian military strategy: Moscow is trying to turn time into a weapon.

What lies behind the Kremlin’s optimism

According to The Guardian, Putin believes in the possibility of a military breakthrough in favor of Russia. However, one of the sources close to the Kremlin described this belief as the result of a system in which officials and the military present the president with a picture better than reality.

“They lie to him,” the publication’s interlocutor explained the decision-making mechanism in Moscow.

For Israel, this element is especially understandable: when political leadership lives within a closed system of reports and self-deception, the risk of strategic mistakes sharply increases. But for Ukraine, such a mistake by Moscow does not mean an automatic victory. On the contrary, it may prolong the war because the Kremlin will continue to advance even if the cost for Russia becomes ever higher.

Why Trump did not become a quick solution for Moscow

A separate line in Western publications concerns Donald Trump. Sources of The Guardian claimed that Putin lost faith in Trump’s ability to achieve territorial concessions from Kyiv within the framework of a peace agreement.

In Moscow, according to one of the publication’s interlocutors, there was optimism after Trump’s election: it was expected that the new American political reality would help push through agreements on Donbas. But over time, these expectations disappeared.

This is an important turning point. The Kremlin, judging by such assessments, no longer relies solely on external pressure on Kyiv. This means the bet is again shifted to the front, strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, depletion of resources, and an attempt to break the resilience of Ukrainian society.

In this context, Nikk.Agency — News from Israel | Nikk.Agency views the Ukrainian war not as a distant European topic, but as a process that affects the entire security system — from Eastern Europe to the Middle East. The Israeli audience well understands that a protracted war changes not only the front line but also diplomacy, trade, migration, military aid, and the behavior of allies.

The ultimate goal of the Kremlin remains the same

Reuters, citing a representative of one of the intelligence services, reported that the ultimate goal of the Kremlin is not just the capture of individual territories. According to this data, Moscow wants the removal of Zelensky from power and the transformation of Ukraine into a neutral buffer zone between Russia and the West.

That is why talks about “peace at any cost” seem dangerous to Kyiv. If Russia’s goal is not only Donbas but also changing Ukraine’s political future, then any weak agreement may become not the end of the war, but preparation for the next stage.

For Ukraine, the order to prepare for another two to three years of war is not an admission of defeat and not a refusal of diplomacy. It is an attempt to soberly assess the reality in which the Kremlin is not ready for a real compromise, and Western mediation has not yet been able to create a working security mechanism.

Ukraine, in essence, is restructuring expectations: instead of hoping for a quick resolution — a calculation for resilience. This means more attention to mobilization, the defense industry, international support, economic endurance, and internal political stability.

For Israel, there is a separate conclusion in this story. Wars that begin with the illusion of quick pressure often turn into long conflicts of attrition. And the longer the aggressor believes that time is on their side, the harder it becomes for diplomacy to bring reality back to the negotiating table.