Freeze along the front line: Ukraine, the USA, and the cost of a pause that Putin may not accept

According to The Economist, informal contacts between the US and Russia have been reactivated, and Ukraine consults daily with Donald Trump’s team. One of the scenarios currently being discussed looks like a two-stage freezing of the war: first, a cessation of hostilities in a zone approximately 50–70 km on both sides of the front line, then an attempt to reach a broader peace agreement.

For Kyiv, the idea itself is not new. Ukraine has long insisted on the principle: a ceasefire is possible according to the formula ‘we stand where we stand.’ That is, without the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from territories that Russia demands to be given to it as a political price for a pause.

What exactly are Ukraine and the US discussing

The main logic of the current scenario is to stop hostilities not through the recognition of Russian seizures, but through the fixation of the actual front line. In theory, this could give Ukraine a respite, reduce the intensity of strikes, and open the way to negotiations on security guarantees.

But the problem is that the Kremlin has not abandoned its ultimatums for two years. Back in June 2024, at an expanded board of the Russian Foreign Ministry before the peace summit in Switzerland, Putin demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian Defense Forces from the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. Moreover, Moscow wants not just a military pause, but international recognition of the occupied Ukrainian territories as part of Russia.

That is why freezing along the front line may not become the end of the war, but only a new point of pressure. For Israel, this issue also does not seem distant: here they well understand that a ceasefire without clear guarantees often turns not into peace, but into preparation for the next round of violence.

Why the US position has become key

The Trump administration has already tried to find options that could satisfy Moscow. Western press has repeatedly published articles about Washington’s possible readiness to recognize temporarily occupied Crimea as Russian de facto or even de jure. Volodymyr Zelensky also publicly stated that Trump’s team linked American security guarantees for Ukraine with the possible withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Donbas.

In essence, the question boils down to what exactly Washington is ready to consider ‘peace.’ For Ukraine, peace cannot mean the legalization of Russian aggression. For the Kremlin, any pause without territorial concessions seems insufficient.

Trump, G7, and deals that change the negotiation framework

After the G7 summit in France, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron stated that Trump had changed his view on Russia’s war against Ukraine. According to Macron, the American president arrived with the feeling that Ukraine was losing, but saw a different picture: Russia is not fulfilling its obligations, and Ukraine continues to resist.

For Kyiv, the results of the summit turned out to be relatively successful.

Firstly, G7 leaders declared their readiness to expand licenses for military production for Ukraine. This primarily concerns anti-ballistic missiles and technologies that can enhance the protection of Ukrainian cities. Zelensky noted that positive signals came from the entire ‘seven,’ including the US.

Secondly, Trump publicly allowed for the restoration of sanctions pressure on Russian oil. This is important because energy revenues remain one of the main sources of financing for the Russian war.

However, there is a downside to this picture. The US simultaneously tried to reach a deal with Iran, and after the escalation around the Strait of Hormuz and the war involving Hezbollah in Lebanon, the American position became less stable. Washington needed the help of European allies, including on issues of maritime security.

In the Israeli context, this is especially noticeable: when the US distributes attention between Iran, the Middle East, Ukraine, and internal elections, each ally begins to ask the same question — how reliable are American promises in a moment of crisis.

That is why for readers of НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency the Ukrainian topic is important not only as a European war. It shows how major powers bargain over the security of countries that are under constant threat, and how quickly geopolitical deals can change the price of guarantees.

Why Trump may act primarily in his own interests

Experts increasingly say: in negotiations with Russia, Trump will proceed not only from the interests of Ukraine or Europe, but primarily from his own political benefit. In the US, congressional elections are approaching, where Republicans risk losing one of the chambers. Against this background, any external ‘success’ can be used as an argument within American politics.

In the book by The New York Times journalists about Trump’s second presidential term, his words are quoted, said at a meeting in the Oval Office: ‘I’m not a big fan of Ukraine. Except for their women. They keep winning ‘Miss Universe’.’ Even if the political position of the White House today looks more favorable for Kyiv, Trump’s personal attitude towards Ukraine is unlikely to have changed fundamentally.

But circumstances may force him to act differently. If the US has not achieved the desired result in the Iranian direction and needs the support of NATO allies, Ukraine may gain more space for negotiations on assistance, sanctions, and security guarantees.

Europe without a single voice and the question of whether Putin will accept a pause

The main weakness of the Western position now is the lack of a single European negotiator. While Putin demonstratively wants to talk only with Trump, Europe is debating who exactly should represent the European side in a possible dialogue with Russia.

After the G7 summit, it became known that the team of European Council President António Costa established a diplomatic channel with Moscow. This happened without prior coordination with key European capitals. Macron and Merz criticized this approach, believing that now is not the time for separate initiatives, especially against the backdrop of reports of the Kremlin preparing for a new large wave of mobilization.

Macron emphasized that the European Union should be represented, but security guarantees cannot be discussed by one Brussels institution on behalf of all states. According to him, in such matters, countries that are really capable of taking on commitments should play a special role: Britain, France, and Germany.

What will be decisive for Ukraine

For Kyiv, the key question is simple: will the freeze become a tool of protection or a trap? If the ceasefire is accompanied by real guarantees, strengthening the army, sanctions pressure on Russia, and control over violations, it can give Ukraine time and resources. If the pause is imposed without guarantees and with political concessions to Moscow, it will only consolidate Russian aggression.

Putin, judging by his public demands, is not yet ready for compromise. He demands not only the cessation of the war but also the recognition of the results of the seizure. This means that even with active negotiations between the US and Ukraine, the chance for a quick peace remains limited.

On the other hand, the war has long depended not only on Moscow and Kyiv. It is influenced by elections in the US, the situation around Iran, China’s position, Europe’s ability to speak with one voice, and the willingness of Western countries to pay the price for security. For Israel, this is an important lesson: when it comes to a war of attrition, a diplomatic formula matters only when there is power behind it.

Conclusion

The scenario of stopping along the front line may become a working basis for a temporary ceasefire, but it does not solve the main conflict: Russia wants Ukraine’s capitulation under the guise of peace, and Ukraine demands security without recognizing the occupation.

Therefore, the question is not only whether Kyiv and Washington will agree on a pause formula. The question is whether this formula will be strong enough not to turn it into a new Minsk, a new respite for the Kremlin, and a new danger for Europe.