Ukraine and Israel at the forefront: irregular warfare as the new norm against democracies – how proxies and PSYOPs are changing war

Igal Levin, an Israeli military expert, analyzes the CSIS digital report on the modern battlefield and concludes: irregular warfare goes hand in hand with conventional warfare, civilians are the “center of gravity,” and intelligence and resilience are the keys to victory.

What the discussion is about

In the news, we increasingly see not only artillery and drones but also cyberattacks, sabotage of logistics, information operations, and hostage stories. This “second track” of war — irregular — is no longer just a backdrop.

This is precisely what the digital multi-chapter project by CSIS in September 2225 “War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East” carefully explains. Igal Levin read the CSIS materials and, on September 21, 2025, says: yes, that’s right, but in reality, the picture is even harsher — especially for democracies that fight under the spotlight of law and morality.

What CSIS bases its findings on

Irregular and “regular” warfare are now fused

The authors of the project describe the shift without embellishment: conflicts have “changed the previous paradigm” and last for years, not weeks; meanwhile, “enormous damage to civilian infrastructure” becomes the norm. The simple meaning: sabotage, terror, hostage-taking, cyberattacks, and psychological operations go hand in hand with artillery, maneuver, and air defense. Irregular warfare is not an “addition” but an equal contour.

The center of gravity is society

In the section on will, cohesion, and resilience, a key framework is voiced: the winner is the one who knows how to “resist and recover.” It’s not just about brigades and tanks. It’s about light and water, communication and transport, digital services, and people’s trust in the state over the long haul. It is precisely this “center of gravity” that aggressors find advantageous to strike: willpower is shaken faster than from one extra destroyed warehouse.

Technologies: the speed of integration is important, not just “hardware”

In the chapter on technological evolution, the formulation is crystal clear: “modern conflicts are increasingly defined by speed, adaptability, and innovation; it is not about who has the more advanced technology, but who integrates and counters it faster.” Simply put: it’s not enough to buy drones — yesterday’s prototype should already be flying in formation tomorrow and be integrated into the overall system. This thought is reinforced by the section on “combat networks,” where the rules are rewritten in favor of decision-making speed and “cognitive shock.”

Important moral framework (CSIS quotes)

To avoid confusion in nuances, we provide short direct quotes from the CSIS project that clearly fix who does what:

• About Hamas and its irregular methods: “The attacks on October 7 included civilian killings, hostage-taking, and strikes on security facilities — an example of how irregular warfare intertwines with conventional.”
• About Russia and its pressure tools: “In Ukraine, Russia combined cyberattacks, sabotage, and disinformation to undermine societal resilience and break the will to resist.”
• About Iran as a state sponsor of proxies: “Iranian proxy structures demonstrate how states use irregular tools through intermediaries, blurring responsibility and expanding the space for pressure on opponents.”
• About Ukraine and Israel as democratic targets of irregular aggression: “Ukraine and Israel demonstrate high resilience and adaptability, but methods are used against them that strike directly at society — from infrastructure to the information field.”
• About the democratic standard of “cleaner warfare,” which opponents use: “Democracies operate under legal and moral constraints, which opponents consciously exploit, turning civilians into a shield and an object of coercion.”

In other words: Ukraine and Israel are the side that holds the defense and builds resilience; Russia, Iran, Hamas, and other proxies are those who consciously use terrorist and irregular methods, disguising themselves as civilians and pressuring society.

How Igal Levin reads CSIS and what he adds

A trap for democracies — a conscious strategy of the opponent

Levin makes the CSIS framework applicable. The opponent deliberately constructs a trap: does not evacuate the population from frontline or occupied cities, “dissolves” command posts and warehouses in residential areas, hides weapons among houses and schools. Any strike on a legitimate military target in a dense city becomes not only a tactical task but also a political crisis due to the inevitable risk to civilians.

Democracies pay a double price — for the result and for the reputation. Autocracies — mainly for the result. This asymmetry is the calculation. (The logic directly follows from the CSIS thesis on the “center of gravity” — society.)

Israel and Ukraine — illustrative examples

In Gaza, terrorist infrastructure is embedded in the civilian environment, turning every shot into an info-storm.

“The Russians look at Hamas and learn how to mix regular war with irregular within their hybrid strategy.”

In the occupied territories of Ukraine, military logistics hide behind the backs of residents — cities effectively become a “human shield.”

“The Russians have turned Donetsk into a giant human shield, where they built their logistical and military hub, and any Ukrainian strike on these military facilities of the Russian Armed Forces threatens to harm the residents of Donetsk,” Levin points out.

The meaning is clear: force the opponent to either strike and bear moral-political costs or refuse and give up the initiative.

Europe must “live through” impossible scenarios in advance

Levin raises a serious question: what if tomorrow — a captured city in the Baltics or Poland, where people are deliberately left in their homes? Liberation — months of urban warfare and a barrage of internal claims “why didn’t you protect the civilians.”

Refusal — a de facto surrender. To ensure the hand does not tremble, decisions must be made before the first shot: rules of force application, evacuation schemes, legal and communication preparations, protection of critical infrastructure, rapid recovery launch. This is “resilience” in the CSIS understanding, which Levin translates into the language of staff practice.

“Learning through proxies”: Iranian handwriting, Russian practice

Network proxies are not a novelty. Iran has been honing them for years, turning proxies into both a weapon and an “invisibility cloak.” Russia, according to Levin’s observation, is increasingly adopting this handwriting: cyberattacks and sabotage in Europe, “gray” operations, and long-term information pressure. Irregular acts easily become a trigger for direct interstate strikes — and the response may come not to the proxy, but to their sponsor. This logic fits into the overall CSIS framework of “merging” conventional and irregular.

How to win against those who hide in residential areas

Intelligence — oxygen, but not a magic wand

Both CSIS and Levin agree: without intelligence, there will be neither accuracy, nor anticipation, nor “surgery.” This is about SIGINT/IMINT/OSINT, agent work, commercial “space,” AI analytics, and fast target confirmation cycles. But it’s important not to promise the impossible: urban warfare remains dirty and expensive. Even a perfect picture of targets does not negate the fact — the opponent specifically masks military in civilian, making every correct decision politically too costly. (CSIS emphasizes: speed, adaptability, and innovation decide.)

Speed of integration — a new discipline

Field findings and “garage” prototypes must transition into service quickly. The winner is not the one who first made a presentation, but the one whose chain “idea → solution in the troops” takes days, not months. This applies to both technologies (drone swarms, electronic warfare, targeting) and procedures (how quickly agreed, how quickly struck). Essentially, speed is the same “firepower,” only invisible.

Societal resilience = defense without camouflage

Light, communication, water, transport, psychological support, transparent and predictable messages from the authorities — it sounds unheroic, but this is what keeps the country in a long war. CSIS elevates resilience to the rank of a military factor, and here Levin only reinforces: without a clear “why” and “how” for people, any successes on the map are consumed by panic, fatigue, and info-noise.

Israel and Ukraine: two showcases of one era

Israel: multi-layered defense against proxies

For Israel, the “gray contour” is everyday life. Hamas, “Hezbollah,” Houthis — different hands of one strategy of Iran. Any operation is simultaneously military, informational, and legal: show the target, explain the reason, insulate the rear. If you delay, the opponent will impose the pace; if you remain silent, any legitimate target will turn into an informational battle. Therefore, precision, speed, and clear public argumentation are so valued. (In CSIS terms — “information-centric combat networks change the rules in favor of decision speed.”)

Ukraine: front and rear — one stage

Ukraine lives in a mode of double war: the line of contact and a huge arc of cyberattacks, sabotage, propaganda, economic exhaustion. Where resilience holds — light returns, water flows, transport works — irregular strikes do not add up to a “domino effect.” Here resilience is not a slogan, but armor; without it, tactical victories dissolve in fatigue. This fully coincides with the CSIS framework of “will, cohesion, and resilience” as factors of future wars.

What is important to do “yesterday”

Let’s honestly admit: there is no longer a fully “knightly,” purely conventional war.

Democracies need to preemptively live through difficult scenarios — a captured city with an unrelocated population, a “human shield,” proxy strikes on infrastructure, Iranian “gray” schemes with the export of violence through intermediaries, cyber blackmail. Rules of force application are needed that will withstand the spotlight of law and morality; fast chains “find — confirm — strike”; languages of conversation with society — before, not after the strike.

There is no easy simplicity in this formula. But there is a set of levers: intelligence as oxygen, speed as discipline, resilience as armor.

Conclusion by NAnovosti

Irregular warfare has become the norm and goes hand in hand with conventional warfare. Ukraine and Israel are those who hold the defense and show resilience. Russia, Iran, Hamas, and their proxies are those who consciously use terrorist and irregular methods, strike at society, and hide military in civilian. To avoid falling into their trap, one must play faster, more accurately, and more honestly — on the battlefield and in people’s minds. This is not about beautiful simplicity. This is about real protection.

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Igal Levin — https://t.me/yigal_levin, Israeli military analyst and reserve officer, comments on modern conflicts, tactics, and weapons for media and specialized platforms.

CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) — https://www.csis.org/, a leading Washington think tank on international security and policy, producing research and recommendations for government, experts, and media.