How Moscow promoted the Russian language in Ukraine: what the investigation into the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law revealed

Language law as a tool of Russian influence

On April 23, 2026, journalists from ‘Schemes’ published an investigation claiming that Russia financed the promotion of the so-called Kivalov-Kolesnichenko language law. This refers to the law that in 2012 granted the Russian language regional status in several regions and other territorial units of Ukraine.

Now this story no longer looks like an old political dispute about humanitarian policy.

It looks like part of a broader Russian strategy of influencing the Ukrainian state long before the full-scale war. This is what makes the ‘Schemes’ publication so important: it shows not only the fact of possible financing but also the mechanism through which Moscow tried to establish its presence inside Ukraine not only through media but also through legislation.

Journalists reportedly analyzed leaked documents from ‘Pravfond’ — a Russian state organization officially engaged in supporting ‘compatriots abroad.’ According to the investigation’s findings, it was through this fund that money was channeled for activities related to supporting the language law and its further promotion.

For the Israeli audience, the broader context is important here. History shows how the Kremlin used the language issue for years not as a cultural question but as a political lever. This is especially noticeable today when it is already clear that Russia waged a struggle against Ukraine not only by military means but also through soft, bureaucratic, and seemingly ‘legal’ tools.

What was this law and why did it cause so much controversy

The Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law was adopted in 2012. Its co-authors were deputies from the ‘Party of Regions’ Vadim Kolesnichenko and Sergey Kivalov. After its adoption, the Russian language received regional status in 13 out of 27 territorial units of Ukraine.

Formally, this was presented as an expansion of language rights.

But critics of the law argued from the very beginning that its real effect was quite different. According to language policy researcher Vladimir Kulyk, quoted by ‘Schemes,’ the law was written in such a way that the Russian language could be used not alongside Ukrainian, but effectively instead of it. In other words, it was not just about bilingualism, but about a mechanism for displacing the state language from entire spheres of public life.

This is especially important if you look at the topic not emotionally, but institutionally. When the language of one state begins to be entrenched in the courts, record-keeping, education, and official communication of another country, it is no longer just a matter of culture but of sovereignty.

In 2018, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine declared this law unconstitutional. However, by that time it had already played its role and become one of the most notable symbols of the era when Russian influence in Ukraine was promoted under the guise of internal policy.

What money and documents did journalists find

According to the investigation, Vadim Kolesnichenko received funding from ‘Pravfond’ both before the law was adopted and after the vote in parliament.

Before the law was adopted, he was reportedly transferred 1.2 million rubles. The publication specifies that this amounted to almost 41 thousand dollars at the exchange rate at the time. After the law was adopted, according to ‘Schemes,’ another 2 million rubles were sent, which is about 65 thousand dollars.

These sums are important not only in themselves.

They show that, according to the investigation, it was not about Moscow’s accidental sympathy for a convenient bill, but about direct financial support for the campaign. In other words, the law was not just politically supported — it was allegedly supported with money.

According to journalists, the funds were directed to the publication of a special brochure for ‘Russian compatriots’ in Ukraine. It explained how to apply the language law in practice. Separately, it reportedly clarified how to use the Russian language in record-keeping, courts, and education instead of Ukrainian.

This no longer looks like a neutral legal instruction.

It looks like an attempt to consolidate a political result through everyday administrative practice. That is, not just to adopt a law, but to integrate it into the work of institutions and make it part of normal bureaucratic life.

According to the investigation materials, the brochure was planned to be distributed among Ukrainian government bodies, international organizations, and the general public. It was also intended to be presented in Kyiv with the participation of the second co-author of the law — Sergey Kivalov.

Later, the event was postponed. Eventually, Kivalov was replaced by Mikhail Tovt, a former people’s deputy and then an employee of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

What other names are mentioned in this story

‘Schemes’ also established that Mikhail Tovt and Stepan Chernichko were co-authors of the mentioned brochure.

Today, Chernichko is the rector of the Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute and a deputy of the Transcarpathian Regional Council. Both stated in comments to journalists that they did not know who exactly financed the publication.

This is where the story becomes even more interesting. Because it shows not only the presence of alleged Russian funding but also how widely such projects could penetrate the Ukrainian expert, academic, and administrative environment.

In the middle of this picture, a more general conclusion is especially clear, which is important for NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency: Moscow, judging by the published data, acted not only through public propaganda or party statements. It worked through documents, instructions, legal formulas, organizational connections, and targeted financing. That is, through the infrastructure of influence that at first glance seems dry and secondary, but in fact changes the rules of the game within the state.

Why this story is especially important in 2026

Today, after all the stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the story of the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law is read quite differently than ten years ago.

Now it is clear that language for the Kremlin was not a humanitarian topic in itself, but a convenient channel for political penetration. Through such laws, it was possible to weaken the positions of the Ukrainian state, change administrative practices, and create additional supports for the idea of the ‘Russian world’ within Ukraine.

For Israel, this is also an understandable lesson. When an external force begins to systematically invest in the language, cultural, or identification policy of another country, it is almost never just about culture. Very quickly, it becomes a matter of security, stability, and control over the internal space.

Therefore, the ‘Schemes’ publication of April 23, 2026, is important not only as an investigation of the past. It helps to understand how Russia for years built a network of influence in Ukraine, which was later supplemented by direct military aggression. First came money, brochures, laws, and political allies. Then came occupation, war, and open violence.

This is how a humanitarian topic becomes part of a large strategy to undermine the state.