“One authority, one law, one army” — Mladenov’s plan for Gaza hit an old problem

The CEO of the ‘Peace Council’, Nikolay Mladenov, after the UN Security Council meeting, published on May 21, 2026, in X a 15-point roadmap, which he called a mechanism for implementing the comprehensive peace plan of US President Donald Trump for the Gaza Strip.

The document appeared against the backdrop of an apparent deadlock around the second stage of the ceasefire. Hamas refuses to disarm, Israel does not withdraw troops, and the import of goods and humanitarian logistics remain subjects of political pressure, mutual accusations, and constant inspections.

For Israel, this is not just another diplomatic scheme. It is about trying to answer the main question after the war: who will govern Gaza, who will hold weapons, who will be responsible for security, and can a civilian authority emerge in the sector without a parallel army inside.

What is behind Mladenov’s plan

Mladenov builds the roadmap around the formula: ‘one authority, one law, one army’. Essentially, this means dismantling the model where civilian structures, armed factions, party power apparatuses, and separate command verticals simultaneously operate in Gaza.

The published plan is not about maintaining a ceasefire for the sake of the ceasefire itself. The task is formulated more broadly: to lead Gaza out of the constant cycle of war, humanitarian collapse, and destruction towards recovery, reconstruction, civilian governance, and future Palestinian self-determination.

Point 1. Commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 2803 and the comprehensive plan

The first point sets the meaning of the entire scheme. Mladenov emphasizes that the goal of the process is not just to maintain the ceasefire but to create a clear transition from war to recovery.

It is about resuming civilian life, restoring Gaza’s economy, rebuilding institutions, and creating a political route to Palestinian self-governance and statehood. According to the document’s logic, Palestinians should understand where this process is leading, rather than living within an endless temporary structure.

For Israel, this point is important not only for the Palestinian perspective but also for the security issue. Any path to self-governance in Gaza will only matter if it does not preserve the old armed system under a new name.

Point 2. Fulfillment of already taken ceasefire commitments

The second point concerns what is necessary for the process to move to the next stage. Mladenov talks about the need to fulfill commitments that have already been made within the framework of the ceasefire.

This includes humanitarian aid, fuel, checkpoint operations, shelters, and measures provided for in the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements. The logic is simple: a new stage cannot be built if the old one is not fulfilled.

It is here that Mladenov previously pointed out daily violations and said that what is happening does not correspond to what was promised to the Palestinians and will not bring security to Israel. In the new plan, Israel is not directly named in this point, but the emphasis on unfulfilled commitments is obvious.

Point 3. Verification before moving further

The third point is based on the recognition of an unpleasant reality: there is practically no trust between Israelis and Palestinians.

Therefore, Mladenov proposes to build the process not on promises but on independent verification. Each commitment of one side should trigger the commitment of the other, but the next stage begins only after confirmation of the previous one.

For this, a Committee for Implementation Verification is introduced. Its task is to make reciprocity not a slogan but a measurable mechanism: step by step, area by area, commitment by commitment.

Who should govern Gaza and what will happen to Hamas

The central idea of the plan is to separate armed factions from civilian governance. This means that Hamas and other groups must cease to be simultaneously a political power, a military structure, and the de facto street controller.

For Israel, this block is key. If the civilian administration is only a facade, and weapons and power verticals remain with the former structures, no real change will occur.

Point 4. The role of the ‘Peace Council’, the Office of the High Representative, and the National Committee for Gaza Governance

The fourth point explains the transitional architecture. The National Committee for Gaza Governance should become the Palestinian civilian administration for the transitional period.

The Office of the High Representative should link the ‘Peace Council’ with this committee and coordinate civilian governance, recovery, and security. The ‘Peace Council’ itself and international mechanisms are described as a temporary structure, not a permanent replacement for Palestinian governance.

That is, the plan does not propose eternal external governance of Gaza. It proposes international support for the period while stabilization, reconstruction, and preparation for the return of the reformed Palestinian administration to its duties are underway.

Point 5. Hamas and governance

The fifth point directly separates armed organizations from government institutions. In Mladenov’s logic, Gaza cannot recover while armed groups continue to simultaneously govern the territory.

At the same time, the document does not propose collective punishment for civil servants. Ordinary workers of the administration, hospitals, schools, and municipal structures should receive lawful, fair, and dignified treatment.

In other words, the plan is not directed against people who ensured daily life but against the model of governance through weapons. This is an important difference because without preserving the civilian apparatus, Gaza risks not getting reform but an administrative collapse.

Point 6. One authority, one law, one weapon

The sixth point is the core of the entire roadmap. Only authorized Palestinian institutions should have the right to ensure security within Gaza.

This means that only authorized personnel can carry weapons, armed groups cease military activities, and security and civilian governance structures are united under one civilian authority.

In the middle of this discussion NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views Mladenov’s plan as an attempt to establish the basic condition of any post-war scheme: the restoration of Gaza is impossible if an independent armed force, uncontrolled by a unified administration, continues to exist alongside civilian institutions.

Disarmament, police, international forces, and IDF withdrawal

The most explosive part of the plan is disarmament. Mladenov does not propose an instantaneous surrender of weapons and does not say that the collected weapons should be handed over to Israel.

On the contrary, the weapons should be transferred to Palestinian structures operating under the National Committee for Gaza Governance, under international supervision. The process is proposed to be conducted gradually, by areas, along with the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the expansion of recovery.

Point 7. Police reform and integration

The seventh point is dedicated to the civilian police. The plan provides for the verification of police personnel, the integration of trained staff into new structures, the transfer of some people to non-armed positions, or compensation where necessary.

Police weapons should come under the control of the National Committee for Gaza Governance immediately after its entry into the sector.

The task here is clear: to prevent a security vacuum. If the old power structures disappear faster than a new police force appears, Gaza may fall into chaos, crime, revenge, and factional struggle.

Point 8. Gradual cessation of armed structures’ activities

The eighth point explains the disarmament process itself. It is not described as an immediate capitulation or unilateral surrender of weapons.

Mladenov proposes a phased, Palestinian-led and internationally verified mechanism. Weapons are not transferred to Israel. They should be transferred to Palestinians operating under the control of the National Committee, under international monitoring.

The process should proceed sector by sector, in parallel with mutual steps: the gradual withdrawal of Israel, the expansion of civilian governance, and the launch of reconstruction.

Point 9. Personal weapons under Palestinian law

The ninth point separates organized military infrastructure and personal weapons.

The National Committee should become the only Palestinian body that registers weapons, issues licenses, revokes licenses, and collects unregistered firearms. For this, buyback programs, reintegration assistance, and social support are proposed.

The point is to transfer weapons regulation into the legal field, rather than leaving it in the hands of individual armed structures.

Point 10. Conditions for surrendering personal weapons

The tenth point is needed to alleviate people’s fears for personal safety. According to the roadmap, no one should be obliged to surrender personal weapons until the necessary security conditions are met and verified.

This is an important caveat. If immediate disarmament is demanded in conditions of instability, it can have the opposite effect: increased fear, hidden armament, chaos, and a new wave of internal violence.

Therefore, the process of surrendering personal weapons should proceed alongside the emergence of functioning security forces, not before them.

Point 11. Social peace agreement

The eleventh point concerns internal Palestinian violence. Factions must sign a social peace agreement.

It is supposed to prohibit internal killings, reprisals, armed demonstrations, and public displays of force on the streets. The goal is to prevent the transitional period from turning into a war of revenge and factional struggle.

For Gaza residents, this is a matter of survival. For Israel, it is a test of whether any manageable system can emerge within the sector, rather than another round of armed chaos.

Point 12. International stabilization forces

The twelfth point introduces the role of International Stabilization Forces.

These forces should be a temporary buffer between Israeli and Palestinian zones, protect humanitarian operations, and support the disarmament process. At the same time, they should not govern Gaza and should not replace the police.

Civilian governance and police responsibility remain with the National Committee for Gaza Governance. International forces are needed to reduce friction during the transitional period while Palestinian structures gradually take responsibility on the ground.

Point 13. Phased withdrawal of Israel

The thirteenth point links the withdrawal of the IDF with verified progress in disarmament and the deployment of International Stabilization Forces.

Israel should withdraw according to an agreed schedule, but not just under promises. Each stage of withdrawal should be linked to specific verifiable actions: cessation of armed structures’ activities, transfer of areas to civilian authority, emergence of buffer forces, and the start of reconstruction.

This is the principle of reciprocity in practical form: Israel withdraws, the Palestinian civilian administration takes responsibility, the international mechanism verifies, reconstruction expands.

Point 14. Palestinian responsibility in certified areas

The fourteenth point talks about transferring responsibility for security in areas that have already been verified and are considered fully demilitarized.

In such zones, security should be maintained by Palestinian civilian authorities under the National Committee. This should gradually transition Gaza from a military confrontation regime to administrative governance.

But it is here that the main Israeli question arises: who guarantees that a certified area will not become a zone of influence for Hamas or another armed structure again in a few months.

Point 15. Reconstruction

The fifteenth point links large-scale recovery with verified stability.

Funds for hospitals, schools, homes, roads, infrastructure, and economic life should enter areas where there is civilian administration and no active parallel armed structures.

The logic is strict but understandable: it is impossible to sustainably restore an area where an independent army continues to operate alongside civilian authority. The faster the verified implementation of the plan goes, the faster Gaza can transition from emergency humanitarian aid to real recovery.

Why Hamas rejects this scheme

Hamas predictably did not like this plan. A representative of the movement in Gaza, Hazem Qassem, stated that Mladenov’s demands are a continuation of the Israeli vision and an attempt to create a justification for a new Israeli escalation in the sector.

This is not a new position. Hamas has previously refused to disarm, demanding first the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops and guarantees of Palestinian statehood. For the movement, weapons remain not just a military tool but the basis of political power.

Tony Blair, a member of the ‘Peace Council’ executive committee, explained back in February that the international community is counting on ‘voluntary’ disarmament. But voluntariness in conditions where weapons determine power sounds more like a diplomatic formula than a ready mechanism.

Why the plan looks logical but not yet feasible

The publication of these 15 points looks like an attempt to revive Trump’s comprehensive plan, adopted last October. At least in the information field.

Last week, Axios journalist Barak Ravid reported that an alternative plan is being discussed in Washington, written after it became clear that previous options do not work.

Mladenov himself admitted in Jerusalem that meetings with Netanyahu did not yield results. And the entire ‘Peace Council’ is still far from tangible outcomes. Its budget relies on a single large contribution of 100 million dollars from the UAE, intended for the preparation of the Palestinian police.

For large-scale recovery of Gaza, governance reform, security stabilization, and the launch of a new administration, this is clearly insufficient.

The main question for Israel

Mladenov’s plan looks detailed, but its weak point is obvious: it depends on the consent of those who do not want to lose levers of power.

Israel is not ready to leave Gaza just under promises that Hamas will no longer control the territory. Hamas is not ready to give up weapons because without weapons it loses the status of the main force. The Palestinian administration does not yet look like a structure that can quickly and convincingly return to the sector. International players are ready to coordinate and finance but are not eager to take on all the risks.

Therefore, the published roadmap is not a ready solution but a framework for testing intentions.

It fixes the main thing: without a single authority, a single law, and a single control over weapons, there will be no long-term recovery of Gaza. But for Israel, the most important question remains: who exactly will ensure that this formula does not become a new name for the old system.