After the pause, it’s too early to celebrate: what the strikes on Iran, the fall in oil, and the weak reaction of its allies really showed

Euphoria and panic equally hinder understanding what is happening.

Against the backdrop of news about a truce around the war with Iran, two extremes have once again emerged in the Israeli segment of social networks. Some are already writing that everything is lost, Israel has supposedly been ‘betrayed,’ and the US is about to retreat. Others, on the contrary, are throwing around victorious slogans as if the strategic picture has already fully formed. But the reality, as is usually the case in the Middle East, is much harsher and more complex.

First of all, nothing is over yet. Even after the announcement of a two-week pause between the US and Iran, the key contradictions have not disappeared, and the agreement itself looks more like a postponement of a new phase of the conflict rather than its finale.

For the Israeli audience, this is especially important. In our reality, it is too dangerous to confuse a temporary respite with a sustainable result. If the opponent has not abandoned their basic goals, then the pause is not the end of the threat, but only a window in which all sides recount resources, losses, and next steps.

Why now you should neither panic nor fall into ecstasy

The main mistake in such situations is to evaluate everything based on one morning headline. The war with Iran has already changed part of the regional balance but has not automatically solved all the problems of Israel, Ukraine, the US, and their allies.

That is why it is more useful to look not at emotions but at several practical consequences. What happened to the Iranian economy. How much have Tehran’s proxy structures weakened. What happened to the oil market. And how all this can hit Russia, which for years has used Iran as one of its most important partners in military and anti-Western lines.

What really weakens the Iranian regime

Blows to the economy are a blow not only to the wallet but also to the stability of the regime

One of the most important outcomes of recent weeks is that not only military targets but also sensitive economic nodes for the regime have been hit. If major petrochemical, port logistics, and energy facilities are indeed seriously damaged, this affects not only export revenue but also the internal stability of the regime.

This is important not only in an accounting sense. In authoritarian systems, the power apparatus is not held together by ideology alone. It is also held together by resources, income distribution, social ties, privileges, and the ability to feed its own repression machine. When the economic circuit cracks, it sooner or later affects the regime’s ability to maintain discipline within.

But even here, one should not slip into fantasies. It is too early to talk about the instant collapse of the regime. Rather, it is about the fact that the blows increase internal tension and the cost of further holding onto power.

Iran as a full-fledged military partner of Russia already looks weaker

The loud assertion that Iran as an ally of Russia ‘ceased to exist’ still sounds too categorical. The Moscow-Tehran link has not disappeared, and completely writing it off would be a mistake.

But there is also another side. If major Iranian industrial, port logistics, and energy facilities are indeed seriously damaged, it will be harder for Iran to maintain external military projects and supply partners at the previous pace. Especially if the regime is forced to leave more resources inside the country — for defense, repair, repression, and basic governance.

From this point of view, it can be cautiously said: Iran has not disappeared as a partner of Russia, but its usefulness for the Kremlin already looks noticeably more limited than before the current phase of the war. For Ukraine and Israel, this is an important factor, although its real scale will become clear not from slogans but from events in the coming weeks.

Why oil, the Houthis, and Lebanon say more than loud posts

The oil collapse hit Moscow’s expectations

After the announcement of the truce, the oil market indeed sharply went down. For Russia, this is bad news. The Kremlin traditionally benefits from oil price spikes, especially during periods of great international turbulence. If the market turns downward, part of the potential windfall disappears.

And if at the same time Ukrainian strikes simultaneously complicate Russian export logistics, the effect for Moscow becomes even more unpleasant. Let them keep their oil, but the ability to export and sell in full also matters. And it is precisely in this place that Moscow’s joy from the Middle Eastern crisis may turn out to be much more modest than it would like.

However, sobriety is needed here too. A price drop is not yet a strategic collapse of the entire Russian model. The market remains nervous, and any new strikes, shipping disruptions, or negotiation failures can turn the situation around again.

The Houthis and Hezbollah showed not strength, but the limits of possibilities

Another important conclusion concerns the entire proxy system of Iran. The Houthis entered the story more symbolically than as a force capable of radically changing the course of events. There were many loud statements, but the large-scale effect that would truly break regional logistics and cause serious systemic damage is not yet visible.

The situation with Lebanon is also indicative. If Hezbollah continues the war but acts under conditions of weakened Iranian support and without broad internal consensus in Lebanon itself, its capabilities as a long-term military force also begin to look less impressive.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in this regard draws attention: it is important for Israeli society today not to succumb to either hysteria or complacency. Yes, the Iranian bloc has received heavy blows. Yes, the oil market and proxy behavior show that Tehran and its allies no longer look untouchable. But this does not yet mean that the threat has disappeared. It only means that the opponent is weakened, disorganized, and possibly entering a more nervous and dangerous phase.

Hence the main conclusion. It is possible to rejoice at the weakening of the Iranian regime. Pretending that everything is already decided is not. Because the real test will begin not at the moment of loud statements about a truce, but when it becomes clear whether Iran is capable of restoring resources, maintaining internal control, and once again gathering its proxies into a single fist.