The eighth general conference of Fatah, the largest Palestinian movement, which remains the political backbone of the Palestine Liberation Organization and effectively dominates the structures of the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank, has concluded in Ramallah.
The eighth general conference of Fatah was held from May 14 to 16, 2026, in Ramallah, at the presidential headquarters of the Palestinian Authority. Parallel sessions were organized in Gaza, Cairo, and Beirut to connect delegates from different parts of the Palestinian political space. The conference concluded on May 16 with the announcement of the election results for the Fatah Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council.
Formally, these were internal elections: delegates elected the Fatah Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council. But in essence, the conference became a showcase of forces ahead of the main question of Palestinian politics: who will manage the system after Mahmoud Abbas.
For Israel, this is not an internal Palestinian bureaucracy. The composition of Fatah’s leadership affects the security of the West Bank, the PNA’s relations with Israel, the future of security coordination, and the possible scenario of the PNA’s return to the Gaza Strip, where the terrorist group Hamas has held power since 2007.
The first congress in a decade and the re-election of Abbas
The Fatah conference was held for the first time in almost ten years. According to the Palestinian agency WAFA, about 2,580 members of the movement participated, and work was conducted not only in Ramallah but also through parallel platforms in Gaza, Cairo, and Beirut. Voter turnout in the leadership elections, according to the organizers, was 94.64%.
Mahmoud Abbas was unanimously re-elected as the chairman of Fatah. He also remains the head of the PLO and the Palestinian National Authority. This decision was not a surprise: there was no real competition for the top post at the conference, and the procedure rather consolidated the existing power vertical.
But behind the external unity, another process was hidden. Delegates voted for people who could become part of the transitional structure after Abbas leaves the political scene.
That is why the main result of the conference was not the re-election of Abbas himself, but the layout in the Fatah Central Committee.
Why this is important now
The Palestinian system has long been in a state of political pause. Presidential elections have not been held for many years, parliamentary life is effectively frozen, and the PNA is experiencing a crisis of trust, financial pressure, and competition with Hamas.
Against this background, any internal Fatah congress turns into more than a party event.
For the Israeli audience, the practical question is important: who will make decisions in Ramallah tomorrow if the current model of power stops working. This could affect security in Judea and Samaria, contacts with Israel, and international negotiations around the future of Gaza.
Who gained strength: Barghouti, Faraj, Rajoub, and al-Sheikh
The main intrigue of the conference was related to Hussein al-Sheikh. Many considered him one of the most likely successors to Abbas — at least in the PLO and PNA system. In April last year, Abbas appointed al-Sheikh as vice president of the PNA and deputy chairman of the PLO executive committee, effectively making him one of the key figures of the transitional period.
However, the voting results showed that within Fatah, his positions do not look unconditional.
According to data cited in Palestinian and regional reports, al-Sheikh received 1,570 votes and was only fourth on the list of those elected to the Central Committee. For a person considered a systemic successor, this is not a defeat, but also not a triumph.
In first place was Marwan Barghouti — one of the most popular Fatah leaders among Palestinians. He has been in an Israeli prison since 2002, serving five life sentences for the murder of Israelis, as well as an additional term for involvement in preparing terrorist attacks.
His result — 1,877 votes — became a political signal.
Barghouti remains a symbol for a significant part of Palestinian society, despite his imprisonment. For Israel, his figure has a completely different meaning: he is not an abstract politician, but a person convicted of terror and murder. Therefore, any talks about his possible release will inevitably be perceived in Israel as extremely painful.
Faraj and Rajoub: the power center within Fatah
The second result was achieved by Majed Faraj — the head of Palestinian intelligence. His election to the Central Committee for the first time elevates him to a new level of party legitimacy. Reuters also separately noted that Faraj was among the new members of Fatah’s leadership.
Faraj is important not as a public speaker, but as a person of the security system. He has been associated with the PNA’s intelligence apparatus, contacts with external players, and the practical side of managing the West Bank for many years.
Third was Jibril Rajoub — the secretary-general of the Fatah Central Committee and former head of the Palestinian security service. This is an old, recognizable, and tough figure, well known to the Israeli side.
Such a layout shows that the power bloc within Fatah retains significant weight. Barghouti is a symbol of the street and ‘resistance,’ Faraj is the security apparatus, Rajoub is an experienced political-military player, al-Sheikh is the official successor along Abbas’s line. Together they form not a unified team, but a field of future struggle.
New faces and old questions about the future of the PNA
Among the notable new figures was Yasser Abbas — the son of Mahmoud Abbas, a businessman who has not held official positions in Fatah or the PNA until now. His election to the Central Committee has already sparked discussions about whether the president’s entourage is trying to prepare a political role for him. Reuters writes that the appearance of Yasser Abbas in the party leadership has intensified speculation about the struggle for succession in the PNA.
This is a sensitive topic.
Palestinian politics has long faced accusations of closedness, corruption, and family-clan logic. Abbas himself and his entourage reject such accusations, but the appearance of the president’s son in the highest party body will inevitably be perceived as part of the struggle for control over the future system.
Zakaria Zubeidi, a former commander of the ‘Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ in Jenin, also joined the Central Committee. He spent many years in Israeli prisons, escaped from Gilboa prison through a tunnel in 2021, was caught a few days later, and released in January 2025 as part of a deal to release Israeli hostages.
Another notable figure is Taysir al-Bardini. He was convicted for activities related to Fatah’s armed wing and involvement in the murder of an Israeli, and then released in 2011 as part of the Gilad Shalit exchange deal.
There is also a civilian face: Dr. Laila Ghannam, the first female governor of Ramallah. Her presence on the list shows that Fatah is trying to maintain at least a partial balance between power figures, former militants, bureaucrats, and managers.
The main conclusion for Israel
The results of the elections in Fatah show: after Abbas, there is no clear successor. There are several centers of power, and each relies on its legitimacy — bureaucratic, power, family, street, or symbolic.
For Israel, this means uncertainty.
On one hand, Fatah remains the main counterbalance to Hamas in Palestinian politics. On the other hand, its new leadership includes figures associated with armed struggle, prison pasts, and harsh anti-Israeli symbolism. This will affect any future negotiations, exchange deals, and scenarios for managing Gaza after the war.
In this sense, NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency views the Fatah conference not as an internal Palestinian news event, but as an event that directly concerns Israeli security and regional politics.
The strongest signal of the congress is the result of Marwan Barghouti. His first place makes him a factor that the new Fatah leadership will no longer be able to ignore. Even if he remains in an Israeli prison, his name will resonate in future Palestinian arrangements, in discussions about Abbas’s successor, and in possible attempts to pressure Israel for his release.
Al-Sheikh retained his place at the top, but did not achieve the result that would make him an obvious successor. Faraj gained strength. Rajoub remained in the game. Yasser Abbas entered formal politics.
This is not the end of the power struggle.
This is only its official beginning.
