Iraq after the elections — how Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds are piecing power together again

Iraq once again shows the Middle East what a state looks like where power is not so much won in elections as it is gathered through long bargaining between communities, parties, clans, and external centers of influence.

After the 2025 parliamentary elections, the country entered another stage of negotiations on the balance of power. The new Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi was sworn in in May 2026, but his cabinet was only partially approved: the parliament supported 14 ministers, while there was no agreement on a number of key positions, including the security bloc. This was not a technical delay but a political diagnosis of the entire Iraqi system.

Iraq remains a parliamentary republic, but the real logic of governance there has long been built around ethno-confessional balance. According to an unwritten formula, the post of prime minister is held by a Shiite, the president becomes a Kurd, and the position of speaker of parliament goes to a Sunni. This model was supposed to keep the country from falling apart again after 2003, but over time it turned into a mechanism for distributing ministries, budgets, power levers, and access to resources.

Muhasasa: a compromise that became a system of dependency

In Iraqi politics, this is called ‘muhasasa’ — a system of quotas and agreements in which key positions are divided among the main communities and parties.

On paper, such an architecture looks like a way to prevent one group from monopolizing power. For a country with a heavy legacy of dictatorship, war, American invasion, the fight against ISIS, and constant pressure from neighbors, it was an attempt to maintain a minimal balance.

But in practice, muhasasa often works differently.

Ministries turn into political assets, not just governing bodies. A party receives a department — and with it influence over contracts, appointments, budgets, personnel hierarchy, and loyal networks. Therefore, the struggle for the cabinet of ministers in Iraq is often more important than public programs, and post-election negotiations can be tougher than the campaign itself.

That is why the partially approved al-Zaidi government looks symbolic. The new power formally appeared, but the main disputes have not disappeared. The question is not only who took the seats, but which forces gained access to state levers and which players were dissatisfied.

Why this matters for Israel

For Israel, Iraqi politics is not a distant internal story. Iraq is at the center of a regional arc where the interests of Iran, the USA, Turkey, the Gulf countries, and local armed groups intersect.

Any crisis in Baghdad can affect the entire security system of the Middle East: from the supply routes of pro-Iranian groups to the balance of power around Syria, Jordan, the Persian Gulf, and the eastern Mediterranean.

Therefore, the question ‘who governs Iraq’ actually means something else: who controls weapons, money, borders, oil, transport corridors, and the political decision on how far Baghdad is willing to move away from Tehran’s influence.

Three communities — but not three monoliths

Iraq is often described too simply: Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. This scheme is convenient, but it no longer explains the whole reality.

Shiites make up the majority of the country’s population. According to research databases on religious structure, Shiite Muslims in Iraq make up about 60–65% of the population, while Sunni Muslims are about a third, including Sunni Arabs, Sunni Kurds, and other groups.

However, the Shiite community is not united. Within it, parties, religious authorities, armed structures, clans, business groups, and protest movements compete. After the 2025 elections, the Shiite Coordination Council once again became a central player in forming power, but this does not mean full control over the entire Shiite street. The Sadrist movement of Muqtada al-Sadr remains a powerful mobilizing force, even when using a boycott as a political weapon.

The Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has a separate role. His influence on Iraqi Shiites is enormous, but he does not promote a model of direct clerical rule in the Iranian style. For Iraq, this is a fundamental difference: the Najaf religious school retains weight but does not turn into a copy of Tehran’s ‘velayat-e faqih’ system.

The Sunni community also does not look like a single block. After 2003, it went through marginalization, war, radicalization of some regions, the ISIS catastrophe, and a painful return to legal politics. The ‘Taqaddum’ party of Mohammed al-Halbousi remains one of the notable Sunni projects; after the elections, the new parliament elected a representative of this party, Haibat al-Halbousi, as speaker. But the presence of a strong party does not mean that the Sunnis have one recognized leader for the entire community.

The Kurdish factor: autonomy no longer guarantees calm

Kurds have long been considered the most stable element of the Iraqi mosaic. The Kurdistan region in the north had autonomous institutions, its own political system, and special relations with external partners.

But even there, the balance is becoming more complex.

The main rivalry remains between two centers of power — the Kurdistan Democratic Party, associated with the Barzani family, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, historically linked to the Talabani family. This is not just party competition. Behind it are different territories of influence, power structures, economic interests, and approaches to relations with Baghdad, Turkey, Iran, and the USA.

Baghdad has increased pressure on Erbil’s financial autonomy in recent years, especially around oil revenues, the budget, and exports. Therefore, Kurdish parties are forced not only to argue among themselves but also to seek a new formula for relations with the central government.

External players and the main question: who controls the weapons

Iraqi politics does not exist separately from external pressure.

Iran has been building influence for many years through Shiite parties, armed structures, and a network of allies within the Iraqi system. For Tehran, Iraq is not just a neighbor but a strategic depth, a corridor of influence, and part of the regional infrastructure of pressure.

The USA, on the other hand, demands the limitation of pro-Iranian groups and the strengthening of the state’s monopoly on weapons. The new Prime Minister al-Zaidi is already facing this dilemma: Washington expects steps to disarm or at least restrain groups linked to Iran, but within Iraq, these forces have long been integrated into politics and the security landscape. Reuters and the Financial Times directly pointed out that among the main challenges for the al-Zaidi government are the fight against corruption, the balance between Washington and Tehran, and the issue of pro-Iranian armed formations.

Turkey acts differently. Ankara is increasing its military, economic, and infrastructure presence in northern Iraq, while simultaneously promoting the ‘Development Road’ project with Baghdad. This transport corridor is supposed to connect the Grand Fao port in southern Iraq with Turkey and further with Europe, turning the country into a transit bridge between the Persian Gulf and European markets.

In the middle of this picture for NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, the regional conclusion is especially important: Iraq remains a country where internal compromise is almost always linked to external interests. The composition of the government in Baghdad affects not only Iraqi cities but also the security of the entire Middle East.

Why the al-Zaidi government is not the end, but the beginning of bargaining

The partially approved al-Zaidi cabinet shows that the Iraqi system has once again chosen not a sharp break, but a temporary assembly of balance.

This is not the victory of one program. It is the result of a complex bargain where each major group tries to secure departments, financial flows, power positions, and political guarantees.

For Shiite parties, it is important to maintain control over the core of power. For Sunni forces — not to return to the state of political periphery. For Kurds — to retain autonomy, money, and the right to negotiate with Baghdad as a separate center. For the USA — to limit Iran’s influence. For Iran — not to lose the depth of influence. For Turkey — to secure the northern direction and transport corridors.

Such an Iraq can function, but it is difficult to reform.

Its weakness is not only in the division between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. The main problem is deeper: within each community, there are their own fault lines, and the state is constantly forced to buy stability through the distribution of positions and resources.

Therefore, the question of Iraq’s future does not sound like this: will the three communities agree among themselves. The question is more complex — can Baghdad build a state where ministries cease to be trophies, armed groups stop competing with official power, and politics becomes something more than another division of influence.

For now, the answer remains open.

But it is already clear: the new al-Zaidi cabinet is not the end of the crisis, but another level of the very architecture of compromise on which modern Iraq rests.