- November 25, 2025
- 5:26 pm
- Israel
“In recent months, Russian agents, posing as political opponents of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have launched a manipulative campaign on Israeli social media, calling for his resignation. So far, its impact seems limited, but it reflects an intention to interfere in Israel’s internal affairs and should be seen as a call to action ahead of the election year”.
Internal disputes around Benjamin Netanyahu are part of Israel’s political life. Some see him as a guarantor of security. Others see him as a source of crisis. Coalitions, reforms, cabinet decisions — all of this provokes reactions, and as many analysts emphasize, only Israeli citizens should deal with these issues.
This is why the conclusions of Daniel Rakov, published on November 24, 2024 by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), should be seen not as internal criticism but as a warning signal: in recent months, Russian agents, posing as political opponents of the prime minister, have launched a manipulative campaign on Israeli social media, calling for his resignation.
Rakov notes: while its impact is limited, it reflects an intention to interfere in Israel’s internal affairs and should be seen as a call to action ahead of the election year. Elections in Israel are to be held by October 27, 2026, meaning the window of opportunity for foreign actors is open.
Russia strengthens dialogue — and simultaneously conducts attacks
The paradox pointed out by the researcher: while Israel intensifies dialogue with Moscow, Russia simultaneously conducts an online campaign in Hebrew, calling for the resignation of the prime minister. The posts are crafted as if written by real Israeli users opposing Netanyahu.
The materials appear as if created by opposition members. Photos, style, emotional formulations — all imitate a lively political debate. But this debate is artificial. Rakov writes:
“This activity may be part of Moscow’s preparation to influence the 2026 elections or a continuation of its routine attempts to sow discord in Western countries”.
Direct goal: Russia’s strategic interests
The author of the study lists what Moscow aims to achieve. The campaign’s activities are aimed at promoting Russian interests in Israel:
- preventing Israeli military or political assistance to Ukraine;
- distancing Israel from Western partners;
- improving Russia’s image in the eyes of the Israeli public and decision-makers.
From the beginning, Russian operator groups assumed that Netanyahu’s government might be more favorable to Moscow. Therefore, messages were disguised as publications by supporters of “Likud” and “HaBayit HaYehudi”. Such disguise creates a false picture of the political landscape, where “their own” supposedly promote Russia’s interests.
Disinformation and the American factor
The campaign worked not only against Netanyahu. It also acted against the Biden administration, which was especially noticeable during the American election cycle of 2024. Posts expressed expectations of change if Donald Trump were elected, spread disinformation about Ukraine, and called to “focus on their own problems” and not support Kyiv.
Simultaneously, the rhetoric emphasized Russia’s “positive role” in Israel’s security — a thesis that intentionally contrasts with reality.
July 31, 2025: the moment the campaign shifted focus to Netanyahu
Rakov provides a specific date: July 31, 2025. By this point, the Doppelgänger campaign on Israeli Facebook underwent significant changes. Previously, the network imitated supporters of right-wing parties, but now it began to pose as opponents of Netanyahu.
The statistics are as follows:
- 80% of the campaign’s publications (56 out of 70), available to the author, were directed specifically against the prime minister.
- The number of publications increased by 70% compared to the period before July 31 (41 publications).
- The messages became significantly more aggressive.
The rhetoric included accusations of “treason,” “abandoning hostages,” “prolonging the war to stay in power,” “isolating Israel,” responsibility for “war crimes” in Gaza, economic crisis, and even “imposing a second Holocaust.”
All this is not an internal dispute — it is a pattern written outside of Israel.
The key demand is the immediate resignation of Netanyahu and a change in leadership.
“Deterrent reminder”: Russia shows it can interfere more deeply
Rakov formulates the thought clearly: the campaign serves as a deterrent reminder to Israeli politicians that Russia is capable of increasing interference in Israel’s internal affairs, as it does in other countries. And this is not an empty threat.
In the Doppelgänger document leak, data was found that agents were preparing from the start to interfere in Israel’s elections. Moreover, the idea of creating a political party capable of changing the balance between camps was even discussed.
Russia’s information warfare: multiple channels, one vector
According to the author, Russian information warfare operates in two directions:
- political interference in Israel’s internal affairs — the subject of the current analysis;
- influence operations on audiences outside of Israel — a separate area beyond the scope of the work.
The campaign against Netanyahu is just one tool. There are more channels in total, and their combination can lead to changes in public opinion.
Among them:
- activity of official Russian missions, sometimes coordinating their actions with fake networks;
- Israel’s open media environment, allowing Russian media to freely spread content;
- influence on the Russian-speaking community in Israel, numbering several hundred thousand people;
- spreading Russian narratives through Western conservative media and marginal groups within Israel;
- attacks on Ukraine and attempts to portray it as a “Nazi state”;
- expansion of new channels of influence, including large groups with “positive” emotional content (IDF heroes, soldier stories — sometimes fictional).
2022–2023: evolution of Russian rhetoric
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and condemnation of the war by some ministers of the Bennett-Lapid government, Russian rhetoric changed. Inciting messages appeared in Israel, directed against migrants from Russia and against Israel itself.
Anti-Semitic motifs began to be woven into Russian messages. The rise of Russian nationalism, xenophobia, and marginal far-right blurred the line between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel theses. This intensified after October 7, 2023, but later Moscow realized that direct anti-Israel incitement harmed its interests and partially softened the line.
Nevertheless, Russian authorities continued to tolerate the spread of such discourse.
What SHABAK should do
Rakov proposes clear steps:
- raise the counteraction to foreign political interference to a higher level of the national agenda;
- cooperate with Europe and the USA, which have accumulated vast experience in countering information wars;
- do not ask Russia to stop the campaign — this will be perceived as recognition of its effectiveness;
- focus on blocking IT infrastructure, as well as individuals and legal entities providing influence operations;
- expand the powers of Shin Bet and the Cyber Directorate, but without provoking public outrage.
Who are JISS and Daniel Rakov: context without which the importance of the report cannot be understood
To assess the conclusions of the study, it is necessary to understand what the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) represents and why Daniel Rakov’s opinion carries weight. This is not a formality. It is part of the picture.
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
JISS is an independent Israeli think tank established in 2017 in Jerusalem. The original name was Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies. In 2019, the institute received its current name. It is not related to government structures but works in the area of national security and foreign policy.
The institute conducts research on strategic threats, regional dynamics, major power competition, and Israeli interests in the global environment. JISS includes former military personnel, intelligence officers, diplomats, and researchers with experience in government structures. This makes the institute a point of intersection between expert knowledge and practical experience.
An important detail: JISS often publishes assessments that become part of professional discussions in security structures. Not always publicly. Not always directly. But they are read. They are quoted. Their conclusions are used in relevant departments.
JISS is not an “opposition” or “government” institute — it positions itself as a realistic center. This means focusing on practical comparison of threats and interests, not ideology.
Who is Daniel Rakov
Daniel Rakov (דניאל ראקוב) is a senior researcher at JISS. A former officer of the Military Intelligence Directorate AMAN with over 20 years of experience in analyzing Russia, Middle Eastern countries, and major power competition. He worked in units that studied Moscow’s strategic behavior, its military campaigns, limitations, and opportunities.
From 2019 to 2021, Rakov was a research fellow at INSS — Institute for National Security Studies, one of the most renowned think tanks in Israel. He then moved to JISS. He regularly speaks at international forums — for example, the Vilnius Security Forum — where he analyzes Russian policy and its impact on the region.
His texts contain no political rhetoric. The line is simple: assessment of facts, behavior patterns, and risks. This is why the publication of November 24, 2024 is significant. It is not presented as a sensation. But it contains something that causes concern: the connection between the Russian operation Doppelgänger and attempts to influence the perception of the Prime Minister of Israel.
Rakov writes in a research style, avoiding loud formulations. And in this, according to many experts, lies its value. His analysis is perceived as a professional assessment, not as part of an internal political struggle.
He does not claim that Russia is changing Israeli politics. But he notes the intention — and intention in the field of intelligence activity is always more important than volume.
Conclusion: attack on Netanyahu from outside is an attack on Israelis’ right to choose their path
One can argue about government actions. One can criticize the coalition. One can support the opposition. All this is part of a normal democratic process. But when a foreign entity uses these disputes as a weapon, the attack ceases to be political.
It becomes an attack on all of Israel.
In this regard, the discussion should go beyond the expert environment, and platforms like NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency play an important role in ensuring that Israelis understand: what looks like an internal dispute is sometimes written thousands of kilometers away from Israel.
Publication by Daniel Rakov (Hebrew) from November 24, 2024 Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) – https://jiss.org.il/rakov-russian-political-interference-in-israel/
