Russian propaganda urged to learn from Iran amid fuel problems in the Russian Federation

The Russian propaganda TV channel ‘Tsargrad’, amid fuel problems in the Russian Federation, called for learning from Iran how to provide the population with gasoline even during wartime.

At first glance, the thesis seems simple: fuel prices are rising in Russia, reports of ‘dry’ gas stations and sales restrictions are appearing, while in Iran gasoline is allegedly the cheapest in the world due to strict state control, limits, and subsidies.

But if you look at the dates, figures, and military context, the comparison becomes much less favorable for Moscow. The Iranian model is not based on an economic miracle, but on forced regulation, huge subsidies, limits, combating smuggling, and social fear of a new fuel explosion within the country.

Most importantly, Russia is facing not just a market problem. The Ukrainian army is methodically attacking precisely the oil refining, oil depots, logistics, and energy infrastructure, that is, the nodes without which no administrative prices turn into real gasoline at gas stations.

What ‘Tsargrad’ wrote

The ‘Tsargrad’ article was published on June 22, 2026, under a characteristic headline about the ‘gasoline fig’, empty gas stations in Russia, and gasoline in Iran ‘for 2 rubles per liter’.

The text claims that the shutdown of the Moscow Oil Refinery should not be a reason for price increases but should be a signal to the state. The authors explicitly state that during wartime, fuel prices should be frozen because gasoline, diesel, and gas are embedded in the cost of almost all goods — from essentials to medicines.

According to ‘Tsargrad’, there are already enough ‘dry’ gas stations in Russia: somewhere there is no AI-92, somewhere there is no AI-95, and at some gas stations, a liter of high-octane gasoline can cost up to 100 rubles.

Separately, the TV channel refers to the period from June 9 to 15: during this week, as stated in the article, gasoline prices rose in 78 regions of Russia. Among the leaders are Tuva with a growth of 9.4% and Chechnya with a growth of 8%. It is also mentioned that sales restrictions were introduced in more than 50 regions.

After this, ‘Tsargrad’ draws the main propaganda thesis: if in Iran gasoline costs about 2.5 rubles per liter, then Russia should also follow the path of strict price limits, quotas, and direct state intervention.

How the Iranian scheme actually works

Iran has indeed kept gasoline at an artificially low price for decades. But the low price at the pump is not proof of economic stability. It is the result of subsidies, a card system, limits, and a political decision to hold back social discontent.

In December 2025, an updated three-tier system was introduced in Iran. Ordinary drivers can buy up to 60 liters of gasoline per month at 15,000 rials per liter. Another 100 liters are available at 30,000 rials per liter. After the 160-liter mark, an increased rate of 50,000 rials per liter applies.

It is these 160 liters that became the basis for the Russian propaganda comparison. ‘Tsargrad’ claims that about 80% of Iranian drivers fit into the basic monthly quota. But in such a presentation, the main thing is lost: the Iranian system was created not because there are no fuel problems in the country, but because the problems are too sensitive for the authorities.

Iran is an oil country, but the domestic fuel market there has long been associated with several painful factors: high consumption, an outdated vehicle fleet, gasoline smuggling to neighboring countries, budget strain, and fear of protests. In 2019, the rise in fuel prices was one of the reasons for mass protests, which were harshly suppressed.

Therefore, cheap gasoline in Iran is not a free market and not a ‘management victory’. It is a political insurance of the regime.

Why the Iranian example does not work for Russia

The main problem with the Russian comparison is that Moscow is trying to present the fuel crisis as a matter of prices and speculation. But in 2026, it’s not just about prices anymore.

Ukraine is delivering long-range strikes on Russian oil infrastructure precisely because oil and petroleum products remain one of the key sources of war funding. Strikes on refineries, oil depots, pipeline nodes, and logistics hit not the ‘abstract economy’, but Russia’s ability to process raw materials, supply the army, maintain the domestic market, and simultaneously earn from exports.

In June 2026, reports emerged of new strikes on facilities in Crimea, including an oil storage facility near the Kerch TPP and infrastructure related to the supply of the occupied peninsula. Russian occupation authorities in Crimea imposed restrictions, including a ban on fuel sales to non-state users. This is no longer ordinary market volatility, but military pressure on the supply system.

Russian authorities also discussed the possibility of additional restrictions on diesel fuel exports to protect the domestic market. This is an important detail: if an oil power is forced to limit fuel exports, then the problem already goes beyond the propaganda explanation about ‘speculators’ and the ‘buckwheat effect’.

The Iranian experience shows not strength, but the vulnerability of an oil country

For the Russian audience, ‘Tsargrad’ tries to make Iran an example of resilience. But for Israel, Ukraine, and the entire region, this example is read differently.

Iran can keep cheap gasoline as long as it maintains control over production, distribution, and internal limits. But as soon as the oil infrastructure becomes a military target, the picture changes.

On the night of March 7-8, 2026, Israeli strikes hit fuel depots and oil refining facilities in the Tehran area and the neighboring Alborz province. Massive fires broke out, toxic emissions rose into the air, and authorities warned residents of health risks.

This is an important clarification to the widespread thesis that Iranian oil infrastructure was not hit at all. It was. But the difference is in another: against Iran, such strikes did not look like a prolonged, systematic campaign to completely disable all oil refining and internal fuel logistics.

In the case of Russia, the Ukrainian strategy looks precisely like methodical pressure. The goal is not a one-time fire, but constant vulnerability: so that each new strike forces Moscow to choose between the front, exports, the domestic market, and social stability.

Why this is important for Israel

For Israel, this story is important not only as a Russian internal problem. Here, three directions intersect: the Russian war against Ukraine, the Iranian model of a military economy, and Middle East security.

Iran has long become not just an ‘example’ in propaganda texts for Russia. Tehran helps Moscow with military technologies, drones, experience in circumventing sanctions, and the logic of a besieged fortress economy. Therefore, when a Russian propaganda channel calls for learning from Iran, it is not a random economic remark. It is a recognition of the political kinship of the two regimes.

Both regimes try to explain to citizens that war requires patience, control, restrictions, and submission. Both talk about an external enemy. Both want to maintain the military machine, even if it means suppressing the domestic market and lowering the quality of life for the population.

But there is a difference. Iran has lived in a sanctions model for decades and is used to distributing shortages. Russia has long sold its citizens the image of an ‘energy superpower’ that cannot have fuel problems. Now this picture is beginning to crack.

NAnews — Israel News considers it important to view such signals not as separate economic news, but as signs of a change in the entire war. When Russia’s oil infrastructure becomes a weak point, it affects not only prices within the Russian Federation but also Moscow’s ability to continue aggression against Ukraine.

Conclusions

‘Tsargrad’ wanted to show Iran as an example for Russia, but in fact showed something else: even an oil country during war can come to limits, card logic, manual price management, and fear of social irritation.

Russian propaganda talks about 2.5 rubles per liter in Iran but does not talk about the cost of this system for society. It talks about a quota of 160 liters but does not say that quotas appear not from abundance, but from the need to control shortages and consumption.

It proposes freezing prices in Russia but cannot answer the main question: what to do if refineries, oil depots, bridges, energy facilities, and logistics are under attack?

That is why the Iranian example for Russia is not saving, but alarming. It shows where a state is heading that tries to wage a long war, keep the population with cheap promises, and simultaneously hide the real cost of aggression.

For Ukraine, strikes on Russia’s oil infrastructure have become one of the ways to bring the war back to where it started. For Israel, it is a reminder: the Russian-Iranian connection is not only military but also political. It is about regimes learning from each other not development, but survival under the pressure of war, sanctions, and their own aggressive policies.

NAnews — Israel News will continue to monitor how Russian propaganda explains the internal consequences of the war and why Moscow increasingly looks to Iran not as an exception, but as a model for the future.