The Gulf does not sever ties with Tehran: why even in the fourth week of the war, Arab monarchies maintain diplomatic channels with Iran

March 21, 2026 Saudi Arabia declared the Iranian military attaché, his assistant, and three other embassy staff as persona non grata, demanding that they leave the country within 24 hours. March 18, 2026 saw a similar move by Qatar: Doha expelled the Iranian military and security attaché and their office staff. However, in both cases, this is not yet a complete severance of diplomatic relations, but a targeted, tough, yet still limited measure.

This is an important signal for Israel as well. Against the backdrop of the war, which, according to Reuters, began on February 28, 2026 and by March 22 had entered its fourth week, the Gulf countries are suffering direct damage from Iranian strikes on their territory, energy, and logistics. However, even now, they are trying not to burn all bridges at once. For Jerusalem, this means a simple thing: even those Arab states that objectively fear Iran are not yet willing to become a full-fledged party to a large regional war.

What the Gulf countries are doing now, and what they are not doing yet

Saudi Arabia and Qatar are tightening the pressure but are not closing the entire diplomatic framework

The Saudi decision on March 21, 2026 was the toughest step taken by Riyadh since the start of the current war, but even in this statement, it was specifically about expelling part of the Iranian diplomatic mission, not about severing relations entirely. Reuters separately reminds us: back in March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia restored relations after a long break with China’s mediation. So the current step is a serious escalation, but not yet the dismantling of the entire structure restored three years ago.

With Qatar, the picture is similar, although Doha’s tone has also sharply hardened. In an official statement from the Qatari Foreign Ministry on March 18, 2026, it was stated that the Iranian military and security attaché, as well as the staff of these structures, were declared persona non grata and must leave within a day. At the same time, the Qatari authorities formulate their position as if they are still leaving room for further decisions: they warn of possible additional measures but do not announce a complete break and do not report the closure of diplomatic missions.

Another noteworthy point. On March 16, 2026, the official representative of the Qatari Foreign Ministry, Majed Al-Ansari, stated that Doha supports contacts to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, but emphasized that at that time, Qatar was not aware of any official active mediation between Iran and the US. In other words, Qatar has not completely abandoned diplomatic logic, but also does not want to pretend that mediation is possible while missiles and drones are flying over the Gulf countries.

The UAE went further than the others, but there the form is as important as the toughness

The most decisive step so far has been taken by the United Arab Emirates. On March 1, 2026, the UAE Foreign Ministry officially announced the closure of its embassy in Tehran, the recall of its ambassador, and the withdrawal of the entire diplomatic mission. This statement was directly linked to Iranian missile strikes on the country’s territory and the threat to sovereignty, security, and economic stability.

But even against this backdrop, Abu Dhabi’s reaction does not look like an emotional breakdown, but rather a very calculated tightening. Already on March 20, 2026, Reuters reported that the UAE authorities announced the dismantling of a network that Emirati services associate with Iran and Hezbollah. Thus, the Emirates’ line is now dual: outwardly — a tough diplomatic signal, inwardly — a cleanup of Iranian influence infrastructure at home. In this context, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views the current turn of the Gulf countries not as an immediate break, but as a transition to a model of ‘containment plus maintaining manageability’.

Why the Gulf monarchies are not rushing to completely sever relations

They are already under attack but still fear the worst-case scenario

The most important fact here is that diplomatic restraint is maintained not in peaceful times, but after direct attacks. Reuters reported that on March 18, 2026, Iranian strikes on energy infrastructure affected Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait. In Qatar, Ras Laffan was affected, in Saudi Arabia, facilities in Yanbu were hit, and in the UAE, the operation of gas infrastructure was disrupted. This is no longer an abstract geopolitical rivalry but a direct hit on income, exports, the reputation of safe hubs, and the internal sense of security.

And yet, even after this, Riyadh has not reached the formula of 2016. Yes, on March 18, 2026, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan stated that the kingdom reserves the right to a military response and that trust in Tehran is effectively destroyed. But in the same logic, Reuters noted: Saudi Arabia would still prefer a diplomatic solution if Iran stops the attacks. This is a fairly accurate description of the entire current Gulf dilemma: the response is toughening, but bridges are not completely burned.

This is also indicated by Tehran’s own line. On March 15, 2026, the Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia told Reuters that Iran’s relations with the Gulf countries need a ‘serious review’, but at the same time emphasized the importance of regional interaction and ongoing contacts. This is not the language of peace, but also not the language of a final break. Rather, it is the language of bargaining under fire.

For Israel, this is both bad and good news

Bad because it should not be expected that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or even the tougher UAE will automatically turn into an open anti-Iranian coalition of the Israeli type. Good because the depth of their irritation with Iran is already obvious, and some Gulf countries are increasingly moving towards closer coordination with the US and internal risk cleanup. Even without a complete diplomatic break, this already means that the previous model of ‘balancing but not touching’ is collapsing.

What the experience of 2016 shows and why the current reaction looks more cautious

Back then, ties were severed faster and more demonstratively

After the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr and the attack on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, Saudi Arabia January 4, 2016 severed diplomatic relations with Tehran and gave Iranian diplomats 48 hours to leave. During the same period, Bahrain also severed relations with Iran, while the UAE did not go for a complete break but downgraded the level of representation to chargé d’affaires and reduced the number of Iranian diplomats. This was a completely different style of reaction — quick, frontal, and publicly demonstrative.

Then there was the Kuwaiti episode. In July 2017, Kuwait expelled the Iranian ambassador and 14 other diplomats over a case involving a cell allegedly linked to Iran and Hezbollah. But even then, the story was more complex than a complete break: a few days later, the Iranian side stated that the embassy in Kuwait continued to operate at the ambassador level. This is an important detail because it shows the old Gulf logic: even in crises, they often leave at least a minimal diplomatic framework.

That is why the current reaction looks so indicative. In the fourth week of the war, after attacks on energy facilities, threats to ports, airports, and sea routes, and the crisis around Hormuz, the Gulf countries still act more cautiously than might be expected given the scale of the damage. They no longer trust Iran, but they are even more afraid of a scenario in which diplomatic channels disappear completely, and the war ceases to be ‘foreign but dangerous’ and finally becomes their own. For Israel, this is perhaps the main conclusion on March 22, 2026.