On Sunday, October 19, 2026, Donald Trump addressed the Israelis and promised to “soon finish the job” with Iran if Tehran does not change its behavior. At the same time, he urged the re-election of Benjamin Netanyahu, calling him the main partner of the United States in confronting the Islamic Republic. And on Monday, October 19, negotiations are scheduled for Russian Minister Sergey Lavrov in Tehran. He is going to the leadership of the state, which Russia officially considers a strategic partner.
Author: Victoria Katsman
What does this mean for Israel? Not that Moscow will enter the war on Iran’s side tomorrow. The question is more unpleasant: why is Russia still being portrayed as a friendly country to Israel when its state policy is increasingly linked with one of Israel’s main adversaries?
Trump is betting on Netanyahu
In an address from October 18, Trump wrote that Iran’s military and financial capabilities have already been seriously undermined. According to him, if Tehran does not quickly change course, the US will “finish the job.” But he linked this threat to the Israeli elections on October 27. If Netanyahu does not win, Trump claims, America will have to do the work against Iran itself, which he does not want.
This is political pressure on Israeli voters and an unambiguous signal to Netanyahu: Washington expects him to continue the joint line. However, Trump did not order Israel to strike. Moreover, Axios reports that the possibility of a new operation was discussed, but the decision was postponed.
Thus, Trump suggests that Israelis consider the American strategy against Iran when choosing their own leadership. However, the final word remains with Israeli voters: on October 27, they will determine the composition of the Knesset, and the government will be formed through a parliamentary coalition.
Moscow has already decided on a partner
Lavrov’s visit was announced on October 16, that is, even before Trump’s publication. Therefore, the trip cannot be presented as the Kremlin’s response to the American address. But the essence of the negotiations does not change: Moscow intends to discuss the regional situation and the implementation of bilateral agreements with Iranian Minister Abbas Araghchi.
On January 17, 2025, Russia and Iran signed a strategic partnership treaty. Its provisions cover military cooperation, joint exercises, and intelligence interaction. At the same time, the treaty does not contain an obligation to automatically enter a war for a partner. For assessing relations, this is a fundamental difference: Russia is not an ally of Iran in the manner of a mutual defense agreement, but it cannot be called an outside observer either.
On September 25, after a meeting between Lavrov and Araghchi, the Russian Foreign Ministry placed responsibility for the crisis around Iran on the “illegal actions” of the US and Israel. This is no longer speculation about Moscow’s sympathies, but its own public position.
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The Ukrainian experience worth hearing in Israel
In Ukraine, the price of Russian-Iranian cooperation is known from drone strikes. Shahed is an Iranian development; Russian “Geran” uses the same technological base. These devices carry a warhead and are used for attacks on cities and infrastructure.
For the Israeli audience, it is important that this is not about distant diplomacy: the technologies that Tehran helped Moscow use in the war against Ukraine belong to the same class of threats from which Israel protects its skies.
On October 6, Zelensky received Israeli Minister Zeev Elkin in Kyiv, a native of Kharkiv. They talked, among other things, about Iranian drones and joint threats. Earlier, the Ukrainian ambassador to Israel called for joint efforts. A quite specific topic for such a dialogue is the protection of civilian objects from mass drone attacks; no joint project has been announced yet.
Trump’s statement on October 13 adds additional sharpness. He said he does not believe in significant Russian assistance to Iran. Meanwhile, Reuters, citing sources familiar with US intelligence assessments, reported on the provision of satellite images and weapons components to Iran.
These are journalists’ data on intelligence assessments, not publicly presented evidence of each specific delivery. But ignoring them when discussing Israel’s security would be strange.
If Moscow is a friend, why cooperate with Israel’s adversary?
Russia maintains diplomatic relations with Israel. Communicating with Moscow is possible and sometimes necessary. But a diplomatic channel does not turn a country into a friend when it strengthens defense ties with your adversary and accuses you of unleashing a regional crisis.
Therefore, the answer to the question “who is Russia to Israel?” does not boil down to the label “enemy.” Russia is a strategic partner of Iran, whose interests in this conflict diverge from those of Israel.
In the upcoming negotiations with Lavrov, it is important to watch not for words about peace, but for whether new agreements on weapons, technologies, and intelligence exchange will appear.
For Israel, it is more useful to recognize this divergence now than to one day discover it as a new threat to its own cities.