Zelensky in the Persian Gulf without Israel — how Arab and Western media interpreted this route

Vladimir Zelensky’s tour of the Persian Gulf countries turned out to be much more important than a usual series of protocol visits. At the end of March, Ukraine entered the region not with abstract statements of friendship, but with a concrete proposal: combat experience against Iranian drones, interception technologies, military expertise, and long-term security cooperation. This is how Zelensky’s trip was described by both Arab and Western media, linking it primarily to the war around Iran and the growing vulnerability of the Gulf countries’ infrastructure.

For the Israeli audience, one detail in this story is particularly noticeable: Israel was not included in Zelensky’s itinerary. This absence itself became a political signal, which different media interpret differently — from a technical mismatch in contacts to a sign of new competition for American attention, weapons, and air defense systems against the backdrop of the US and Israel’s war against Iran.

What Ukraine gained in the Gulf countries and why it interested the region

According to Reuters, during the trip, Ukraine signed or agreed on long-term defense cooperation agreements with a number of Persian Gulf states.

The publications talk about 10-year frameworks of interaction with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and further with Jordan, with an emphasis on countering missile and drone threats, technology exchange, and the participation of Ukrainian specialists in relevant projects.

Arab and international publications read this quite pragmatically. After the attacks of Iranian drones on facilities in the region, it was Ukrainian experience that was in demand not at the theoretical level, but as a set of solutions already tested in war. AP directly writes that Kyiv offers the Gulf countries its battle-tested technologies and expertise in the field of cheap and effective means of intercepting drones, and The Guardian notes that Ukraine is trying to turn this experience into a sustainable system of defense partnership.

Why this visit cannot be reduced to just diplomacy

There was a second layer to this trip — economic. Reuters separately emphasizes that Kyiv is trying to use the demand for drone combat systems to develop its own defense sector and enter new markets, primarily in the Middle East. This is no longer just a line of ‘help Ukraine,’ but an attempt to secure a new role: not only as a recipient of external support but also as an exporter of security.

That is why Zelensky’s tour looks like the beginning of a broader restructuring of Ukraine’s image in the world. Ukraine offers not only political loyalty to the West and not only the moral argument of a victim of aggression, but also a concrete product — knowledge, technologies, military solutions that are needed by other states today. Nikk.Agency sees this as an important turning point: Kyiv is increasingly trying to transition from the role of a supplicant to the role of a partner who has something to sell besides its own pain.

Why Zelensky did not go to Israel and how the media explain it

Zelensky himself explained the absence of a visit rather dryly: there were no pre-prepared contacts with the Israeli side at either the leadership or expert level. Ukrinform conveyed his words that the route was formed around already agreed meetings, not around symbolic gestures.

But Western media saw a much broader context in this. Axios writes that the war around Iran objectively shifts Washington’s focus away from Ukraine, and with it the distribution of limited resources — primarily air defense systems and interceptors, which are needed by both Israel and Ukraine. In this reading, the absence of Israel in the itinerary is not just a diplomatic oversight, but a reflection of a new configuration of competition among US allies.

Why this story looks sensitive for Israel

For the Israeli reader, there is an unpleasant but real subtext here. Jerusalem and Kyiv are formally on the same strategic line against the Iranian threat and the Russian-Iranian rapprochement, but at the same time find themselves in a position where both are looking at the same American arsenal. When the Middle East is burning, and Ukraine remains in a war of attrition, mutual sympathy no longer cancels out the harsh logic of scarcity.

There is also another reason why Kyiv might have consciously not included Israel in this tour. According to reports from Reuters and AP, Ukraine in the Persian Gulf primarily offered defense solutions and assistance in protecting infrastructure, rather than participation in direct military actions against Iran. This format is convenient for the Gulf monarchies themselves, who do not want to appear as a full-fledged party to the war. For Kyiv, this is also important: to enter the region as a supplier of technologies and expertise, but not as a participant in the Middle Eastern war.

How the war around Iran turns the Persian Gulf into a new field of competition between Ukraine and Russia

The most interesting framework here is provided by the Council on Foreign Relations, which wrote back in March that the technological logic of war, first massively manifested in Ukraine, is now increasingly evident in the Iranian direction. It is about cheap drones, mass application, overloading air defenses, and a new war economy where the cost of attack and the cost of defense are increasingly incomparable.

Against this backdrop, Russia is trying to extract direct benefits from the Middle Eastern crisis. Axios quotes Zelensky as saying that the war around Iran helps Moscow: oil prices rise, part of the US’s attention and resources shift away from the Ukrainian direction, and Kyiv faces an additional risk of under-deliveries of important defense systems. The Guardian in its summary draws a similar conclusion: Russia turns out to be one of the unexpected beneficiaries of the Iranian war, while Ukraine is forced to seek new external supports.

Why the Gulf becomes an arena not of direct confrontation, but of competition of models

Ukraine enters this region through drone counteraction technologies, training, and joint defense projects. Russia — through increased oil revenues, expanded room for maneuver, and deepened ties with Iran. AP and Guardian separately wrote about reports that Moscow may be strengthening military support for Tehran, including drone technologies, making the region also an indirect continuation of the war between Kyiv and the Kremlin.

That is why Zelensky’s trip to the Persian Gulf countries looks much more serious than a usual diplomatic chronicle. It is no longer just a visit of the Ukrainian president to the Middle East, but an attempt to secure a new geopolitical position for Kyiv: a country that not only asks for protection but also enters regional security systems as a supplier of experience, technologies, and military adaptation. For Israel, this means that the Ukrainian factor in the Middle East can no longer be perceived as a secondary plot. It becomes part of the new architecture where Iran, Russia, Ukraine, the Gulf countries, and the US are increasingly connected by one war, albeit in its different sectors.