Not only ‘Galicia’: Russian national formations in the service of the Third Reich and the uncomfortable memory of World War II

Russian propaganda has been using World War II as a political weapon for decades.

When it needs to attack Ukraine, it repeatedly recalls the SS Division ‘Galicia’, the battalions ‘Nachtigall’ and ‘Roland’, Ukrainian nationalism, individual episodes of collaborationism, and wartime crimes.

But as soon as it comes to Russian formations that served the Third Reich, the tone changes dramatically.

There, they no longer speak of a ‘Russian trace.’

They speak of ‘traitors,’ ‘Vlasovites,’ ‘renegades,’ ‘anti-Soviets,’ as if these people existed outside of Russian history, outside of Russian society, and outside of Soviet reality.

In fact, on the side of Nazi Germany, there were numerous Russian, Cossack, and broader Soviet collaborationist structures: Vlasov’s ROA, Kaminsky’s RONA, Russian Corps in Serbia, Cossack units, Russian units in German service, auxiliary police, Hiwi, and eastern battalions.

But this topic requires not slogans, but precision.

Because not all Soviet collaborators were ethnic Russians.

And not all Russian collaborators can be hidden under the general phrase ‘Soviet citizens.’

Why this topic is important today

Talking about Russian formations in the service of the Third Reich is not an attempt to absolve other nations of responsibility.

Ukrainian, Belarusian, Baltic, Caucasian, and other collaborationism existed.

This is part of the tragic and complex history of World War II.

But Russian collaborationism also existed.

Moreover, it was not a marginal legend, but a significant historical phenomenon: from the Vlasov movement to the Lokot Autonomy, from White émigré units in the Balkans to Cossack formations, from individual Russian units to the broad mass of Soviet prisoners of war and defectors who found themselves in the German system.

Historian Mark Edele in his book Stalin’s Defectors: How Red Army Soldiers became Hitler’s Collaborators, 1941–1945 emphasizes that among Soviet prisoners of war, the proportion of defectors was unusually high compared to other Allied armies, but simultaneously warns: the desire to survive, dissatisfaction with the Stalinist regime, and the willingness to actually fight for Hitler are different things.

This is what is important for honest memory.

History does not become true if inconvenient Russian pages are cut out of it.

Vlasov’s ROA: the main symbol of Russian collaborationism

The most famous Russian formation in the service of the Third Reich is the Russian Liberation Army (ROA), associated with the name of General Andrey Vlasov.

Vlasov was born in 1901, was a Soviet general, participated in the Battle of Moscow and the defense of Leningrad, was captured by the Germans, and then switched to the side of the Third Reich. The Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University describes Vlasov as a Soviet general who, after being captured, created the Russian Liberation Committee with the support of Nazi propaganda, and then the associated Russian Liberation Army. It is also emphasized that at an early stage, it was a structure of several hundred officers and several thousand soldiers who switched from the USSR to the German side.

This is an important detail.

In mass memory, the ROA is often presented as an immediately huge army.

In reality, the Vlasov movement developed gradually, and real large formations appeared very late — already in the final phase of the war.

At the end of 1944, the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR) was created. It was a political umbrella under which various anti-Soviet forces were attempted to be gathered.

Therefore, the ROA, KONR, 600th Division, 650th Division, aviation units, and other related units cannot be considered as completely independent masses of people.

Here, a double count easily arises.

In a broad late count, the number of structures associated with the ROA / Armed Forces of KONR is often estimated at about 120–130 thousand people. But this figure requires clarification: it does not refer to the early ROA as a real combat army, but to the later and broader Vlasov framework.

The fate of Vlasov himself is known.

He was arrested by Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, convicted of treason, and executed by Soviet authorities in 1946. In 2015, Russian archival institutions released three volumes of documents on the ‘Vlasov case,’ collected from the archives of Russia, Belarus, Germany, and the USA.

Kaminsky’s RONA: Lokot, punitive operations, and Warsaw

The second major example is RONA, or the Russian Liberation People’s Army of Bronislav Kaminsky.

This structure grew out of the Lokot district, which came under German control in October 1941. A collaborationist administration was created in the region, known as the Lokot Autonomy or Bryansk-Lokot Republic. After the death of Konstantin Voskoboinik in January 1942, Kaminsky became its leader.

Based on the local militia, he created an armed brigade. According to Warsaw Uprising data, its number reached about 10–15 thousand people. In the middle of 1942, about 85% of the composition were local residents, mainly Russian volunteers; the rest came from deserters of the Red Army and Soviet prisoners of war.

RONA participated in anti-partisan operations in the Oryol region in May 1943, then in Belarus in April–May 1944, and later was transferred to Poland. In July 1944, RONA was reorganized into a Waffen-SS brigade.

The darkest episode of its history is participation in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.

In early August 1944, about 1700 RONA fighters under the command of Major Yuri Frolov were sent to the group of SS General Heinz Reinefarth. They operated in the districts of Ochota and Wola from August 3 to 27, 1944, and then in the Kampinos Forest from August 27 to September 4, 1944. During the battles, RONA lost about 400 people — about 40% of the sent contingent.

After Warsaw, Kaminsky was arrested and executed by the Germans. In November 1944, RONA was effectively disbanded, and the remaining 3000–4000 fighters were sent to Münsingen to be included in the forming Vlasov army.

This is another example of why numbers cannot be automatically summed up.

RONA and the later 29th Waffen-SS Grenadier Division RONA are not two completely separate armies, but related stages of one structure.

Russian Corps in Serbia: White emigration against the USSR

Separately stands the Russian Corps in Serbia.

This formation was not part of the ROA in the original sense. It arose in occupied Yugoslavia and consisted primarily of Russian White émigrés who perceived Germany’s war against the USSR as a continuation of their struggle against Bolshevism.

The American military work German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941–1944) indicates that in 1941 in Serbia, the Russian Guard Corps was formed under the command of General Steifon. It had three regiments and about 4000 people, was included in the Wehrmacht, and consisted mainly of anti-Soviet émigrés who had served in the armies of Tsarist Russia. The Germans used the corps mainly for security, including protecting the Belgrade-Nis railway line.

Later estimates give higher numbers: up to about 11,197 people at maximum strength and about 17,090 who passed through the corps during its existence.

There is no contradiction here.

These are just different ways of counting: current strength, peak strength, and the total number of people who passed through the formation over the years of the war.

The Russian Corps shows that Russian collaborationism was not only Soviet.

It was also émigré.

Cossack formations: an important but complex category

Cossack formations occupy a special place.

There were indeed Don, Kuban, Terek, and other Cossack units in German service. But they cannot be automatically and completely recorded as ‘ethnic Russians.’

Some Cossacks considered themselves Russian.

Some perceived Cossackdom as a separate historical community.

Some were connected with the White émigré tradition, some with Soviet prisoners of war, some with anti-Soviet sentiments after the policies of dekulakization, decossackization, and repression.

American researcher Samuel Newland in his work Cossacks in the German Army, 1941–1945 provides several important numbers.

In the spring of 1944, there were about 25,000 Cossacks in the Novogrudok self-governing area.

When these groups were transferred to Northern Italy in July 1944, the composition was mixed: 9000 Cossack soldiers, 6000 senior Cossacks, 4000 civilians, 3000 children, as well as 2000 Caucasian soldiers and 2000 Caucasian civilians.

This is fundamentally important.

If you count only the fighters — one number.

If you count together with families, the train, the elderly, and children — another.

If you then separately add the XV Cossack Corps, the Don Army, the Kuban Army, and the Cossack Camp, it is easy to get an overestimation.

For the XV SS Cossack Cavalry Corps, an estimate of about 50,000 people is often given. Newland writes that the corps numbered about 50,000 people, but emphasizes: this number did not represent all Cossacks in general.

Therefore, the correct formula is this: Cossack formations were a large part of the anti-Soviet collaborationist field, but their numbers cannot be mechanically added to ‘ethnic Russians’ without explanations.

Hiwi, Schutzmannschaft, and eastern battalions: a large gray area

The most complex part of the counts is not the ROA and not the RONA, but the broad categories of German service that included former Soviet citizens.

First of all, we are talking about Hilfswillige, or Hiwi.

This is not an ethnic formation and not a separate Russian division.

Hiwi could be translators, drivers, kitchen workers, guards, camp assistants, porters, informants, auxiliary personnel with Wehrmacht or SS units.

USHMM notes that due to German losses and a shortage of personnel, the Third Reich authorities began recruiting collaborators among Soviet prisoners of war. Some cooperated for survival, others out of support for the Nazi movement, and others out of opposition to Soviet power. According to USHMM, hundreds of thousands of Soviet prisoners of war collaborated with the Germans in one form or another — often as informants, translators, or camp guards.

This also includes Schutzmannschaft — auxiliary police in the occupied territories.

Research reviews on the topic emphasize: this was a multinational category, not a ‘Russian army.’ Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Tatars, Caucasians, and representatives of other groups could serve in it. Therefore, the huge numbers of auxiliary police and Hiwi cannot be automatically turned into the number of ethnic Russians.

The same applies to Ostbataillonen — eastern battalions.

They were also multinational.

Former Soviet citizens of different nationalities served in them, and only some of them were Russians.

How many Russians served the Third Reich

There is no single exact number.

And there cannot be if the methodology is not explained.

Historians and researchers count different things:

• some count only combat units;
• some add the police;
• some include all Hiwi;
• some count all who passed through formations over the years of the war;
• some take peak numbers;
• some talk about ethnic Russians;
• some — about all former Soviet citizens.

In old broad estimates, a range of 600 thousand — 1.4 million former Soviet citizens included in the German military and auxiliary system is encountered. But such estimates refer specifically to Soviet citizens and broad categories of service, not to ethnic Russians as a separate group. RAND research by Alex Alexiev is dedicated to Soviet nationalities in German military strategy and considers a very wide range of military cooperation with Germany.

There are also more cautious approaches.

Mark Edele shows that mass surrenders, defections, and cooperation cannot be explained by a single motive. Many sought to survive, many hated the Stalinist regime, but this does not mean that the majority wanted to fight for Hitler.

Ukrainian historian Andriy Bolyanovsky in a public presentation of his research spoke of more than 400 thousand Russians who fought in the armed forces of Germany, and at least half a million Russians who passed through various armed formations of the Third Reich. This is a high estimate, but it is still more cautious than the slogan of ‘more than a million ethnic Russians.’

Therefore, the most accurate formula looks like this:

we are talking about hundreds of thousands of Russians and other Soviet citizens who in various forms served the military, police, and auxiliary structures of the Third Reich.

Main structures and estimates of numbers

What is confirmed, what is disputed, what is incorrect

Why Russian propaganda is silent about this

Soviet post-war memory was built around the image of a united victorious people.

In this image, there was no place for millions of Soviet prisoners of war, complex stories of occupation, anti-Soviet sentiments, local collaborationist administrations, and even more so for Russian formations in the service of Germany.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russian state memory went even further.

It turned the victory in World War II into a political religion.

And in this religion, the Russian people can only be victors, liberators, and victims.

But not participants in collaborationism.

Therefore, Ukrainian collaborationism in Russian propaganda is always emphasized as ‘national’.

And Russian — dissolves in the words ‘traitors’ and ‘Vlasovites’.

For NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency this topic is important not as archival polemics, but as part of the modern information war. The Israeli audience understands well that the memory of World War II and the Holocaust cannot be turned into a tool of selective political revenge.

If we talk about collaborationism — it means talking about everyone.

If we remember crimes — it means remembering not only others’.

If we demand historical honesty — it means not hiding the Russian pages of World War II.

Conclusion

Russian formations in the service of the Third Reich are a historical fact.

Vlasov’s ROA, Kaminsky’s RONA, Russian Corps in Serbia, Cossack units, separate Russian structures in the German system, Hiwis, auxiliary police, and eastern battalions show: Soviet war history was much more complex than the official myth of a united victorious people.

But numbers require caution.

You cannot turn all Soviet collaborators into ethnic Russians.

You cannot add up structures that were part of each other.

You cannot consider the political committee as a separate army.

You cannot present Hiwis and Schutzmannschaft as purely Russian formations.

The most honest formula is:

on the side of the Third Reich served numerous Russian, Cossack, and other Soviet collaborationist formations; it was about hundreds of thousands of people in different service categories, but the exact number of ethnic Russians remains a matter of dispute and depends on the counting methodology.

The history of World War II does not become more honest if inconvenient facts are cut out.

And if Russian propaganda demands remembering others’ collaborationism, it will have to acknowledge its own.