How Israeli RADA RPS-42 radars help protect the skies in Ukraine from 2023

Israel, from the very beginning of the full-scale war, took a cautious position regarding military assistance to Ukraine. Officially, Jerusalem refused to supply Kyiv with lethal weapons, fearing deterioration of relations with Moscow for a number of reasons — which are not the subject of this article.

Nevertheless, under pressure from Western allies and against the backdrop of the Iranian Shahed drone threat, Israel gradually softened its stance on “defense-related equipment”.

Export Licenses

In February 2023, according to Walla and Times of Israel, Defense Minister Yoav Galant and Foreign Minister Eli Cohen for the first time approved export licenses for two Israeli companies to supply Ukraine with electronic warfare systems against drones with a range of up to ~40 km. Officials emphasized that this was not a change in policy, but a one-time permit for “non-lethal, purely defensive systems that do not kill Russian soldiers”.

It is known that one of these systems was a multi-purpose radar produced by the Israeli company RADA (now part of the American Leonardo DRS). When making this decision, Israeli officials also considered their own interest: to obtain data on how their technology would perform against Iranian drones on the Ukrainian front.

Moscow reacted painfully to such plans: already in early February 2023, the Russian Foreign Ministry publicly warned Israel against supplying weapons to Ukraine. That is probably why Israel chose an indirect path of assistance.

It was announced that Israel would help Ukraine create an early warning system for missile and drone attacks (an analogue of the Israeli “Tzeva Adom”), which formally pertains to civil defense and not the transfer of weapons. In March 2023, meetings were reported between representatives of Israel’s Home Front Command and Ukrainian officers in Poland to implement this warning system. In May 2023, testing of the Israeli warning system began in Kyiv: it was supposed to start in the capital and then expand to other cities. Thus, Israel demonstrated its readiness to help protect Ukraine’s population from attacks, but not by supplying weapons directly.

As already known, “צבע אדום‎” — in the Kyiv region on July 24, 2025, the Israeli-provided alert system was activated for the first time against missile attacks.

At the same time, there were behind-the-scenes negotiations on supplying anti-drone systems via third countries. Already at the beginning of 2023, a group of Lithuanian NGOs (Blue/Yellow, Laisvės TV, and others) launched a campaign Radarom! to raise funds for tactical radars for Ukraine.

Lithuanian journalist Andrius Tapinas stated that they “reached an agreement with Israeli manufacturers, the radars are ready – only money is needed”. In fact, Israel’s Ministry of Defense did not object to such radars being sold to Ukraine at the expense of Lithuanian donors. This unofficial supply channel allowed Jerusalem to formally maintain neutrality while responding to US calls to help Ukraine close its skies. The Israeli press noted that the deal became possible under allied pressure and was presented as an exception for humanitarian purposes — to protect civilians from shelling.

RADA RPS‑42: Technology and Capabilities

RADA RPS‑42 is a mobile multifunctional radar station with an active phased array antenna (AESA), designed to detect small UAVs, missiles, artillery shells, and other aerial targets at short and medium ranges. It has been produced by the Israeli company RADA Electronic Industries Ltd. since the early 2010s.
Since 2022, RADA has been part of the American defense holding Leonardo DRS. The station is widely used to protect military facilities and critical infrastructure in various countries, including Ukraine since 2023.

Technical specifications:

• Detection range for drones and artillery shells: up to 10–30 km (depending on target type)
• Detection of aerial targets (aircraft, helicopters): up to 100 km
• Weight of one radar panel: about 23 kg
• Deployment time: several minutes, can be installed on a vehicle, tripod, or stationary
• Technology: active phased array antenna (AESA), operates in the X-band
• Coverage: up to 360° (with four panels)
• Operating mode: stand-alone or integrated into complex defense systems

Purpose and applications:

• Detection and tracking of small and medium aerial targets: kamikaze drones, UAVs, rockets, and artillery shells, mortar bombs, missiles
• Protection of assets and troops from aerial threats: early warning of raids and missile attacks
• Integration into air defense and C-RAM systems (protection from artillery strikes)
• Application flexibility: suitable for protecting military convoys and bases as well as urban objects, infrastructure, and critical communications

RADA RPS‑42 is used in many armies around the world as part of modern anti-drone and counter-artillery complexes.

“Mobility, compactness, and multifunctionality — that’s why the RPS‑42 is so in demand in modern conflicts,” write analysts at Israel Defense (Israel Defense, July 2024).

Logistics and Supply Channels

The main channel through which Israeli RADA RPS-42 radars reached Ukraine was via Lithuania. On January 30, 2023, a large-scale fundraising campaign “RADAROM!” (“To the Radar!”) was launched in Vilnius to purchase tactical air target detection radars.

Within just a few weeks, Lithuanians raised about €14 million, enough to acquire 16 new-generation radar stations. The Israeli company RADA Electronic Industries (headquartered in Netanya) agreed to sell these radars. Officially, the transactions were processed through the American corporation Leonardo DRS, with which RADA merged in 2022.

This legally simplified re-export: in fact, the radars were supplied as products of the American branch (DRS RADA Technologies), and not directly from Israel. However, as Israel Defense emphasized, such transfers still required approval from Israel’s Ministry of Defense — which was obtained.

The Lithuanian side handled all the logistics.

In February–March 2023, Ukrainian military crews arrived for training on operating these radars: first in Lithuania, at ranges in Kaunas, and then part of the preparation took place in Poland together with Israeli specialists.

At the beginning of May 2023, the first stations arrived on Ukrainian soil.

On May 4, 2023, volunteers reported the delivery of the first three out of 16 radars to Ukraine.

The remaining sets were delivered as documents and equipment were prepared throughout May–June. Lithuanian TV channel LRT published footage of radar unloading and a joint photo of Ukrainian military and Radarom project volunteers in front of one of the stations. Ukrainian officials did not publicly disclose details of these deliveries (likely at Israel’s request), but Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda openly declared on February 24, 2023 that:

“Lithuania, to mark the anniversary of resistance, is buying modern radars for Ukraine.”

Thus, the delivery of RADA radars was carried out not directly by Israel, but through the acquisition by a third party (a NATO country) and transfer as a donation to Ukraine.

It is important to note that RADA RPS-42 radars are an integral part of the Israeli anti-drone system Drone Dome (by Rafael). The Drone Dome system uses up to four such radars for 360° coverage, electro-optical cameras, and electronic warfare equipment to suppress drones.

However, according to available information, Ukraine received specifically radar modules (RPS-42 and some newer ieMHR), without electronic warfare modules. They are integrated with other components of Ukrainian air defense.

According to reports, the company “Systems of Electronic Export” (SEE) — the Ukrainian radar integrator — together with Leonardo DRS representatives at the MSPO-2023 exhibition discussed equipping these radars with additional devices and integrating them into the national air defense system. Interestingly, SEE’s report noted: the delivered RPS-42s were regarded as “material and technical aid provided by the US government.”

Apparently, after the radar was purchased from Israel with Lithuanian money, their delivery and integration were coordinated with the US (possibly through the International Support Fund for Ukraine or directly via the Ukrainian Armed Forces command). In any case, by summer 2023 all 16 Israeli radars were in service with Ukraine.

Neither Israel nor Ukraine officially commented on this topic, but the presence of these advanced Israeli radars at the front became public knowledge thanks to volunteer reports and media publications. For example, the newspaper Haaretz on May 8, 2023 reported that “for the first time, Israeli anti-drone radars were deployed in Ukraine”, highlighting Lithuania’s role in their purchase. Walla reported that 16 units of RADA radars were acquired for Ukraine with Lithuanian funds to give citizens timely warnings of Russian attacks and provide the military with a chance to intercept threats.

Use of RPS-42 on the Ukrainian Front

After receiving the new Israeli radars, Ukrainian air defense forces quickly put them into service. According to the Lithuanian Blue/Yellow fund, the first RPS-42 units were “already deployed in their operational sectors” as of early May 2023.

According to open data, these radars are used both to cover major cities and strategic rear facilities, as well as directly on the front line. Their main function is detecting short-range air targets and issuing target designations. The multifunctional RADA radars can detect a wide spectrum of threats: from artillery mines and rockets to UAVs and aircraft. Under Ukrainian conditions, the main threats were Russian cruise missiles and Iranian Shahed kamikaze drones.

The RPS-42 stations were integrated into a unified air defense network for early detection of launches and flybys of such targets. The radar data allow operators to quickly calculate the trajectory and probable impact point of a missile, after which the warning system activates sirens precisely in those areas threatened by the attack. This sharply increases the effectiveness of civil defense: people get several extra minutes to seek shelter, and air defense units can better allocate resources.

There are photos showing Ukrainian crews training in Lithuania: a mobile RPS-42 radar on a tripod, soldiers learning to use the station interface. After training, these crews deployed radars in Ukraine.

According to OSINT observers, the first systems were installed in central regions of Ukraine in May 2023—likely to protect the capital region and energy infrastructure. Their geography later expanded.

RPS-42 radars are mobile: they can be towed on trailers, mounted on armored vehicles, or installed stationary on towers. Israeli sources note that these ground-based tactical radars can operate on the move and are adapted for field use (resistant to interference and portable). Walla reported that RADA radars can be quickly redeployed and used to protect maneuvering units on the front line. It is likely that some of the 16 systems were transferred specifically to the air defense units of ground brigades in key sectors—to detect enemy UAVs (recon and loitering munitions) as well as for counter-battery operations (detecting artillery fire).

RADA radars can detect mortar bombs and MLRS rockets at ranges up to 20–25 km, enabling rapid warning of their own units about incoming fire. Unsurprisingly, in official Ukrainian materials, these stations are referred to as “air and artillery reconnaissance radars”.

There is evidence that several RPS-42/ieMHR radars were integrated into some of Ukraine’s mobile anti-aircraft systems. For example, social networks discussed a mysterious Ukrainian counter-drone system based on a vehicle, using the Israeli radar together with Ukrainian or Western electronic warfare equipment. Details were not publicly disclosed, but logically, the targets detected by radar could be automatically handed off to fire or jamming assets (anti-aircraft guns, EW).

Ukrainian military and volunteers have repeatedly published photos and videos of RPS-42 in use.

In particular, on May 5, 2023, OSINT analyst OSINTdefender published images from central Ukraine showing the Israeli radar deployed and a Ukrainian soldier beside it. These images also appeared on Reddit and attracted wide attention. Lithuanian volunteers proudly noted that “all these radars were bought with donations from Lithuanians”, highlighting successful international cooperation.

Mobile radar reconnaissance posts allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to monitor the airspace around the clock: a typical tactic is to place the radar on a hill or forest edge, briefly turn it on to scan the area, and then quickly change position to avoid enemy strikes. The Russian side has confirmed the effectiveness of these measures: according to the ZALA concern, Ukrainians try to minimize radar operating time, “turning them on briefly, camouflaging or placing them on mobile platforms” to make detection harder. However, as will be shown below, Russian intelligence is actively hunting for these Israeli radars.

Israeli radar use at the front was also noted by officials. For example, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Israel Yevgen Korniychuk in June 2023 said that Ukraine had started piloting the Israeli warning system and “the same ‘Red Alert’ system that has protected Israel for years has been adapted to our realities”.

This system, being implemented in Kyiv, is based on a network of short-range radars (including RADA) and electro-optical sensors to detect missile and drone launches. Korniychuk stressed that Israeli technology allows for local activation of sirens, saving air defense resources. Thus, on the front line, the RPS-42 fulfills a dual mission—military (detecting and tracking targets for engagement) and humanitarian (warning civilians about incoming attacks).

Effectiveness and Role of RPS-42 in Air Defense

The appearance of Israeli radars significantly enhanced Ukraine’s ability to counter drones and missile strikes. These radars belong to the class of multifunctional 4D AESA radars with electronic scanning, capable of simultaneously tracking dozens of targets. Here are the key advantages noted in various sources:

• Detection of small targets. The RPS-42 can detect objects with a very low RCS—such as quadcopters or loitering munitions—at ranges around 10 km. Larger drones (the size of “Orlan”) are detected at 40–45 km, and airplanes or helicopters up to 100–150 km (in some cases up to 200 km in ideal conditions). Previously, Ukraine lacked such small tactical radars, so many enemy drones could approach at low altitude undetected. Now, a radar “cocoon” of RPS-42 units surrounds critical assets, covering the blind spots of larger radars.
• Integration with air defense systems. Data from RPS-42 feeds into the unified information space of Ukraine’s air defense. The stations work in real time, instantly relaying coordinates and trajectory data of detected targets. This allows anti-aircraft crews (MANPADS, ZU-23-2, Gepard, Hawk, etc.) to get advance targeting and prepare to engage the target on approach. According to Israel Hayom, RADA radars “are not intended for interception, but serve as targeting systems for short-range air defense”. In effect, RPS-42 became the “eyes” of anti-aircraft complexes, increasing their effectiveness.
• Reduction in expensive missile expenditure. Israeli experts note that an early warning system based on these radars helps conserve expensive munitions. For example, knowing the exact course and target of a missile, there’s no need to use a surface-to-air missile if the forecast shows it will fall in an uninhabited area. Israel’s “Iron Dome” operates similarly, ignoring rockets heading for empty spaces. Now, Ukraine’s air defense can manage ammunition more wisely, intercepting only truly dangerous targets. Amid Russia’s mass drone and missile barrages, this is a vital factor for air defense survivability.
• Increased survivability of forces and assets. As mentioned, RPS-42 units are integrated with local alert systems. They allow the impact point of an enemy missile or UAV to be determined in seconds, activating sirens only in the specific locality at risk. Previously, lack of such data meant that air raids would be declared across multiple regions (covering huge areas), even if the real threat was to a single city. Now, the warning zone is narrower, support services can respond more efficiently, and people don’t spend unnecessary hours in shelters. Estimates suggest that the Israeli system (including RADA radars and Israeli algorithms) has already saved many lives by giving timely warnings of missile attacks in autumn 2023. For example, during a massive strike on power infrastructure in October 2023, sirens and mobile alerts in Kyiv were triggered precisely and in advance—thanks to the new detection system.

Ukrainian military personnel highly value the Israeli radars they’ve received. At a meeting with Leonardo DRS representatives in September 2023, the Ukrainian side presented a detailed report on combat experience with RPS-42. This feedback, according to SEE, will help improve the systems to suit Ukraine’s specifics.

Discussions covered further equipping the radars (possibly with power supplies, anti-UAV protection, compatibility with national IFF systems, etc.). The parties also agreed to organize expanded overseas instructor training so more radar crews could be trained in Ukraine. All this demonstrates that RADA radars have been successfully integrated into Ukraine’s air defense and will be used for the long term. Moreover, further acquisitions of similar systems are being considered: for example, in July 2023, the Lithuanian government decided to purchase additional mobile radars for Ukraine worth €13.5 million under a pan-European air defense initiative. Some of these funds may go to new Israeli ieMHR (upgraded RPS-42 with extended range).

The RADA company itself (Leonardo DRS ISR Division) has indirectly confirmed a surge in demand due to the war in Ukraine. Its 2022–23 financial reports record a sharp rise in tactical radar orders. Israeli press noted that “RADA shares soared 30% on expectations that the war in Ukraine would bring the company major orders”. While there was no direct report of deliveries to Ukraine, investors clearly associated RADA’s success with this situation.

Russian Claims of Destruction: Truth or PR?

Russian military forces quickly perceived the threat posed by Israeli radars in the hands of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

From summer 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense and pro-government media began regularly claiming to have destroyed Israeli RADA RPS‑42 radar stations (or their export ieMHR variants) in the combat zone in Ukraine.

What exactly did the Russian side publish (some examples):

• July 14, 2024: The Russian Ministry of Defense press service announced the destruction of a RADA radar complex in the Zaporizhzhia sector. The official summary mentioned the strike location and claimed the station was hit by Russian artillery or a missile (TASS, 14.07.2024). No details—such as photos, videos, or coordinates—were provided.
• August 24, 2024: The ZALA media group published a video allegedly showing a Russian “Lancet” kamikaze drone striking an ieMHR radar complex. The video description did not include precise coordinates, and the clip lasts only a few seconds, making it impossible to clearly identify the object.
  The very next day, Israeli outlet Israel Defense published a review that explicitly pointed out: the video contains no convincing evidence, no characteristic details of the RADA casing, no geolocation, and it’s impossible to say whether an Israeli radar was really destroyed (Israel Defense, 25.08.2024).
• August 2, 2025: The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed in its daily briefing to have destroyed two Israeli RADA complexes—one in Donbas, the other in Sumy region. As before, there were no photos, videos, serial numbers, or geolocation (Russian MoD, 02.08.2025; direct link unavailable, only reported through internal briefings and Russian-language MoD Telegram channels).

How did Western and Ukrainian sources react?

• All of these statements were rapidly spread across Russian and Belarusian Telegram channels, as well as various military blogs, where the mention of Israeli-made equipment was presented as proof of direct military cooperation between Israel and Ukraine.
• However, not a single independent source—neither Western OSINT analysts (such as OSINTdefender, Ukraine Weapons Tracker, GeoConfirmed) nor Ukrainian specialized media—has confirmed any of these alleged losses.
• According to widely accepted standards for military verification, confirming the destruction of equipment should include:
  1. geolocation of the strike site;
  2. photos or videos with clearly identifiable equipment details;
  3. time-stamped evidence;
  4. ideally—independent analysis from multiple experts.

In the case of RADA RPS‑42/ieMHR, none of this was published:

• OSINT groups either did not attempt to analyze the Russian-reported footage due to low quality and impossibility of identification,
• or stated outright that they found no confirming materials (OSINTdefender, August 2025).

Why does this situation stand out compared to other battlefield losses?

• For Russian systems—such as S-300, S-400, etc.—in every high-profile case of destruction, Ukrainian forces and the OSINT community post photos and videos from the strike site, as well as satellite images and expert analysis of debris.
• Typically, such publications appear within a day of the incident, complete with geolocation, casing details, expert commentary, and wide discussion in open sources.
• With Israeli radars, this has never happened—all reports of RADA RPS‑42/ieMHR losses exist only at the level of official Russian statements, without real proof.

Conclusion:
As of August 2025, none of Russia’s claimed losses of RADA RPS‑42 or ieMHR have been confirmed by independent analysts, OSINT groups, or Western media. Therefore, any such claims should be treated with maximum skepticism—unlike truly verified cases of Russian equipment losses, for which details and evidence are always available.

Overview of Sources and Media Coverage

The topic of Israeli radar deliveries to Ukraine attracted significant attention both in the West and in Israel, Russia, and Ukraine itself. English-language sources provided detailed coverage of the appearance of RPS-42s in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. For example, The Kyiv Independent and Euromaidan Press reported on May 5, 2023, about the arrival of the first three radars, noting that the Radarom campaign had raised €14 million for 16 Israeli radars to protect Ukraine’s skies. Industry media (Army Recognition, Israel Defense) described technical details: what the system is, how the Israeli Red Alert works in Ukraine, what types of threats it can detect. Israeli press also actively covered the issue. Even before the delivery, Haaretz published an article, “For the First Time, Israeli Anti-Drone Radars Deployed in Ukraine”, describing the purchase of 16 systems through a Lithuanian organization. Popular publications like Israel Hayom and the site Walla ran stories on how Israel’s Defense Ministry approved the deal and how this affected the IAI state conglomerate’s radar monopoly. After reports of Israeli radar losses in Ukraine, Israeli media responded: for example, Israel Hayom in August 2024 wrote about the “Lancet” drone strike video on a RADA radar and mentioned the 16 radar deliveries to Ukraine in 2023. Thus, Israeli society was aware of these supplies, even if the government did not publicize them.

Russian media made the RPS-42 issue a part of their propaganda narrative.

Major agencies (RIA Novosti, TASS) regularly include phrases about the destruction of the “Israeli RADA radar” in their dispatches, sometimes to emphasize: look, Israel is secretly helping Kyiv, but we are destroying these “Western deliveries.” In October 2024, when the Russian army first “struck” an ieMHR radar, RIA “Novosti Krym” published a separate piece, “Israeli Radar Complex Destroyed for the First Time in the SVO Zone.” It described the radar’s characteristics in detail and even noted that RADA’s headquarters is in Israel with branches in the US.

This indicates an attempt by Russia to use the episode for diplomatic pressure—to signal to Israel that its equipment in Ukraine “will burn.”

In addition, pro-Kremlin military bloggers (Telegram channels) enthusiastically picked up the story: they posted footage of strikes on RPS-42s, called them “hunters of our drones and aircraft”, and praised “Lancets” for scoring a new high-profile target. Some of these videos later made it into Western platforms (Twitter/X, Reddit), adding to the overall picture.

Ukrainian officials do not directly comment on the Israeli radars in the media—likely due to the sensitivity for Israel. However, Ukrainian military regularly thank partners for strengthening air defenses. In Ukrainian Air Force briefings, mentions of “new tactical radars” appeared without details. Volunteers and journalists in Ukraine cover the subject more openly. For example, the Militarnyi portal reported in May 2023: “RADA ieMHR radars are on combat duty in Ukraine”, citing a report by Israeli volunteer N. Flyer. Ukrainian news sites (UP, Novoye Vremya) republished information from Haaretz and Lithuanian sources, explaining to readers what radars were received and why it matters.

Overall, the international reaction to the RPS-42 supply was positive. These radars were seen as “purely defensive assistance”, not causing direct harm to Russia, but saving Ukrainian lives. The US and allies approved Israel’s step.

Meanwhile, Israel tried to keep a balance: helping Ukraine within limits, while assuring Moscow that lethal weapons (such as missiles or the “Iron Dome”) would not be provided to Kyiv.

Nevertheless, a precedent was set—Israeli military technology on the Ukrainian front.

Their combat experience showed that RADA RPS-42/ieMHR radars have substantially strengthened Ukraine’s air defense, though they themselves have become a target in the high-tech duel of “radar versus drone.”

Ukraine received a much-needed tool for early threat detection, while Israel gained valuable experience and a real-world test for its systems amid modern drone and missile warfare.

Conclusion: Summary of the RADA RPS‑42 Issue

• Ukraine received 16 RADA RPS‑42 radars—all delivered via Lithuania with funding from Lithuanian citizens and companies, and with Israel’s formal approval.
• The complexes protect cities, infrastructure, and frontline positions, and are integrated into the national early warning system.
• No new deliveries have been recorded for 2025.
• Reports of radar losses come only from Russian sources and have not received any independent Western verification so far.

As of August 2025, despite some damage, at least eight to ten of the original sixteen radars remain in service with Ukrainian air defense, according to open sources. The remaining units continue to perform core missions—early detection of kamikaze drones, missiles, and artillery—minimizing civilian casualties and preserving critical infrastructure.

At the same time, international experts emphasize that Ukraine’s experience operating the RADA RPS‑42 has been valuable for the Israeli defense industry. Israel, despite isolated incidents, continues to adhere to a policy of limited defensive support for Ukraine and does not transfer offensive weapons.

NAnews — Israel News will continue to monitor this topic and publish only data that can be genuinely confirmed by open sources.