Khamenei’s funeral became not the end of the regime, but its new demonstration against Israel

In Iran, it’s not just the funeral of Ali Khamenei.

It’s a major political production aimed at several audiences at once: the Iranian society, the Shiite world, Tehran’s allies, Israel, and Washington.

From July 3 to 9, 2026, the body of the former supreme leader of Iran passes through a whole geography of power and religious symbolism: Tehran, Qom, Najaf, Karbala, and Mashhad. The seven-day series of state ceremonies began in Tehran, where foreign delegations from more than 100 countries arrived. Reuters separately reported that the public farewell took place at the Imam Khomeini Grand Mosalla complex in Tehran, and the burial was scheduled for July 9 in Mashhad.

Iranian authorities and state media are trying to present these days as an event of historical scale. It is said that millions of participants, foreign delegations are arriving in Tehran, and the funeral route itself has been turned into a map of the Islamic Republic’s influence—from the capital to the main Shiite shrines outside Iran.

But for Israel, the main question is not the scale of the ceremonies.

The main question is different: what exactly is Iran showing the world after Khamenei’s death?

The answer is unpleasant but obvious.

It shows that the regime has survived.

Funerals as a political parade of the regime

Ali Khamenei was killed on February 28, 2026, as a result of Israeli-American strikes on Iran. Al Jazeera writes that the 86-year-old leader died in his complex on the first day of the joint US-Israel war against Iran; coffins of his family members, also killed in the strike, were displayed next to his coffin.

Initially, the funeral was supposed to take place earlier but was postponed due to the war. According to Reuters, the official announcement of the new dates appeared on June 13: ceremonies in Tehran were to begin on July 4, and the burial was scheduled for July 9 in Mashhad, Khamenei’s hometown and one of Iran’s main religious centers.

Now the funeral has become the first major public test for the new power structure.

Footage from Tehran shows coffins, portraits, religious symbols, clergy representatives, officials, security forces, families of the deceased, and huge crowds. Reuters reported that tens of thousands of people gathered at the Grand Mosalla, where the coffins of Khamenei and his family members were displayed.

But it’s not just mourning.

It’s a demonstration of manageability.

The regime wants to prove that the blow to the top did not destroy the system, that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps retained control, that the spiritual vertical did not collapse, and that the continuity of power is not in doubt.

That is why the portraits of Mojtaba Khamenei next to the image of Ali Khamenei and the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini, are so important. The visual message is simple: the revolution continues, power has been transferred, the doctrine has not been revised.

At the same time, Mojtaba himself remains almost invisible. Reuters reported that Khamenei’s son and successor has not appeared publicly since he was injured in the same strike, and The Wall Street Journal notes that his absence has become one of the intrigues of the funeral.

This creates a strange duality: there are portraits of the new leader, but there is almost no living political figure in front of the public.

Old slogans after a new war

At the funeral, slogans that Israel has heard for decades are heard again.

“Death to America.”

“Death to Israel.”

“Revenge.”

The Times of Israel reported that ceremony participants chanted calls for revenge, and slogans against the US and Israel were heard in the crowd. Reuters also wrote about the chanting of “Death to America” during mourning events in Tehran.

This is more important than it seems.

Because after the war, after the strikes, after Khamenei’s death and part of his entourage, the regime is not trying to show the world moderation. It does not speak of revising the course. It does not abandon the ideological war against Israel. It does not remove the language of destruction from the public space.

On the contrary.

It brings this language to the streets at a time when the whole world is watching Tehran.

For the Israeli audience, this should be the central conclusion. The death of the leader does not mean the death of the doctrine. A blow to the top does not mean the disappearance of ideology. Even if Iran is weakened militarily, its state machine continues to reproduce the same meaning: Israel remains an enemy, the US remains an enemy, and “resistance” remains the main language of power.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees in these frames not only an Iranian internal drama but also a warning for Israel: military success should not be confused with a political result.

A strike can destroy a figure.

But the system, if not forced to change behavior, turns the death of this figure into a new myth.

Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, and a signal to the region

A separate detail is foreign delegations.

Among the participants and declared representatives are Russia, China, countries of the region, and the Muslim world. Reuters reported that China sent a high-ranking representative to the ceremonies—He Wei, deputy chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

The participation of Saudi Arabia is especially indicative. Al Jazeera reported that Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Walid al-Khuraiji arrived in Tehran and expressed condolences at the ceremony.

This does not mean that Riyadh has become an ally of Tehran.

But it means that the region is already restructuring under the new reality.

Saudi Arabia does not want to be left out of the process. China does not want to lose influence. Russia, for which Iran has long been an important anti-Western partner, also uses the funeral as a diplomatic stage. For all these players, the ceremony became not only a farewell to Khamenei but also a way to show: Iran remains part of the regional and global game.

For Israel, this is an unpleasant signal.

Even after the war, even after the strikes, even after huge losses, the regime is not as isolated as it might have seemed in the early days. It is weakened but not thrown out of politics. It is damaged but not excluded from diplomacy.

And this is where the main paradox begins.

Military superiority exists. Political will is lacking

The US and Israel have proven that they can strike at the highest levels of the Iranian system.

But it turned out that military power alone does not guarantee a political result.

While funerals with slogans against Israel and the US are taking place in Tehran, Washington continues to seek a format of agreements with Iran. Reuters reported that the US agreed to a 60-day easing of some sanctions, allowing Iran to sell oil and petroleum products and receive payments for them.

The issue of frozen assets also remains part of the negotiations. According to Reuters, about $12 billion of Iranian assets are to be unfrozen as part of the initial agreement, with Washington and Tehran describing differently who will control the use of these funds.

On July 1, 2026, the US and Iran completed another round of indirect technical negotiations in Doha. Reuters wrote that the main topics were the movement through the Strait of Hormuz and the unfreezing of Iranian funds, rather than the broader issue of the Iranian nuclear program.

This is where the danger lies.

The Iranian regime has not changed its slogans.

It has not abandoned hostility towards Israel.

It has not stopped using proxy networks.

It has not become a transparent and peaceful state.

But it is once again getting what it has sought for decades: the status of a party with which Washington is forced to negotiate, discuss sanctions, assets, oil, the nuclear program, and regional security.

Yes, Iran received a heavy blow.

Yes, Khamenei is dead.

Yes, the new power looks more closed, vulnerable, and nervous.

But if the outcome of the war is not a change in the regime’s behavior but a new deal, then Tehran can present this as survival. And in the logic of dictatorships, survival after a blow is often sold to the population as a victory.

Israel cannot afford self-deception

For Israel, the main lesson of these funerals should be extremely sober.

Do not rejoice at the picture of a destroyed enemy if this enemy is already building a new political legend.

Do not assume that the elimination of the old leader automatically changes the course of the state.

Do not believe that negotiations with Washington alone will make Iran less dangerous.

Israel faced not only a specific person named Ali Khamenei. Israel faced a system that for decades has nurtured elites, security structures, religious institutions, and proxy groups in the logic of war against the Jewish state.

This system is burying its leader today.

But along with him, it is not burying its doctrine.

On the contrary, it is turning the funeral into a stage for its continuation.

That is why the slogans on the streets of Tehran are more important than diplomatic smiles behind closed doors. That is why the presence of foreign delegations is more important than official protocol formulas. That is why the absence of Mojtaba Khamenei in public should not be misleading: even if the new leader is weak, the power machine itself continues to work.

The legacy of Trump and Netanyahu

There is another layer in this story—the political legacy of the current leaders of the US and Israel.

Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu can present the war against Iran as proof of strength. And in a military sense, they will have arguments. The strikes on Iran indeed showed that even the most closed and protected regime is vulnerable.

But history will evaluate not only the strength of the strike.

It will evaluate the result.

If after Khamenei’s death Iran retains its anti-Israel doctrine, if the new regime center around Mojtaba and the IRGC consolidates, if sanctions are eased without real change in Tehran’s behavior, if money flows again into a system that has built a threat to Israel for decades, then military success may turn into a political shortcoming.

And this will no longer be just an Iranian story.

It will be a new reality of the Middle East.

A regime that has not publicly abandoned either slogans or the ideology of destroying Israel is once again gaining space for bargaining. It is being buried as a loser, but it is trying to emerge from mourning as a survivor. And it is this difference that should worry Israel the most.

Khamenei’s funeral is not the final point.

It is Tehran’s attempt to put a comma.

And for Israel, the question sounds harsh: will there be enough political will not to allow this comma to turn into a new chapter of the same war?