Ukraine excluded the Russian language from European protection: what does law No. 4699-IX mean

Ukraine legally changed the status of the Russian language within the framework of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. This is not a ban on the language in everyday life, but a refusal to provide the language of the aggressor state with special protection mechanisms created for indigenous peoples and national communities.

Ukraine excluded the Russian language from European protection: what law No. 4699-IX actually changed

On June 12, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed law No. 4699-IX, which excluded the Russian language from the list of languages to which Ukraine applies the provisions of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. This was reported by the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, Ruslan Stefanchuk. Formally, it is a legal norm, but politically it is one of Ukraine’s most notable steps in the decolonization process following the start of full-scale Russian aggression.

It is important to immediately separate fact from manipulation. The law does not prohibit people from speaking Russian, does not make the Russian language ‘illegal,’ and does not regulate the private speech of citizens. The essence of the law is different: Ukraine no longer considers the Russian language as one that should receive special European protection as a minority or regional language. This is a fundamental difference, without which the entire discussion quickly turns into a Russian propaganda scheme.

What exactly did Zelensky sign

The signed document is law No. 4699-IX. Its goal is to bring Ukrainian legislation in line with the updated official translation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine prepared in January 2024. After this, the list of languages covered by the Charter’s provisions was updated in Ukrainian legislation. The Russian language was excluded from this list.

Ruslan Stefanchuk explained the decision very directly:

“The Russian language is excluded from the list of languages to which Ukraine applies the provisions of the Charter. This is a fair and logical decision. The language of the aggressor state cannot use protection tools created to support the languages of indigenous peoples and national communities.”

Another important formulation by Stefanchuk:

“This decision is about dignity, justice, and linguistic security of Ukraine.”

For Ukraine, this is not just a linguistic amendment. It is part of the response to the long-standing practice where Russia used the topic of ‘protecting Russian speakers’ as a tool of pressure, interference, and justification of aggression.

Chronology: how Ukraine came to this decision

The history of the law did not begin on June 12, 2026. This is the final date when the president signed the already adopted document.

November 5, 1992 in Strasbourg, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was opened for signature. In the documents of the Council of Europe, it is referred to as ETS No. 148.

March 1, 1998 the Charter came into force. Its task is to protect and support regional or minority languages that need special guarantees in the fields of education, culture, public life, media, and administrative use.

January 2024 — The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine prepared an updated official translation of the Charter. This became the legal basis for subsequent changes in Ukrainian legislation.

December 3, 2025 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted bill No. 14120. It was voted for by 264 people’s deputies. The document provided for bringing a number of Ukrainian laws in line with the updated translation of the Charter and revising the list of languages to which Ukraine applies its provisions.

June 12, 2026 law No. 4699-IX was returned with the signature of President Volodymyr Zelensky. That is, almost six months after the vote in parliament, the document finally entered the political and legal phase of implementation.

What is the European Charter and why is it important

The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is a document of the Council of Europe. It was created not to protect the languages of empires, but to support languages that are historically in a vulnerable position. It concerns languages that may be disappearing from education, culture, public life, local governance, and media.

That is why the Ukrainian decision has its internal logic. The Russian language in Ukraine has historically not been a weak, disappearing, or marginalized language. On the contrary, it has dominated the urban environment, media, culture, business, part of education, and public space for decades. Therefore, presenting the Russian language as an ‘oppressed minority language’ is not only a political manipulation but also a distortion of Ukrainian history.

Ukraine says: protection is needed for the languages of indigenous peoples and national communities, not the language of a state that is waging war against Ukraine.

Which languages remain under protection

An important point: Ukraine does not refuse to protect linguistic diversity. On the contrary, after the changes, the provisions of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages continue to apply to the languages of national communities and indigenous peoples of Ukraine.

According to the Verkhovna Rada’s message, in Ukraine, the Charter’s provisions, the updated list covers 18 languages: Belarusian, Bulgarian, Gagauz, Crimean Tatar, Modern Greek, German, Polish, Romanian, Slovak, Hungarian, Czech, Hebrew, Urum, Rumeic, Romani, Krymchak, Karaim, and Yiddish.

This means that Ukraine retains the European mechanism for protecting the languages of national communities but removes the Russian language as the language of the aggressor state from it. Separately, the so-called ‘Moldovan’ language is also removed from the list, as the updated logic of the legislation retains Romanian. At the same time, the list was not just shortened: it was also expanded with a number of languages, including Czech, Crimean Tatar, Krymchak, Karaim, Yiddish, and Hebrew.

What the law does not do

The most important part for the reader is to understand what this law does not mean.

It does not prohibit people from speaking Russian at home, on the street, or in private communication.

It does not cancel the existence of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine.

It does not introduce criminal or administrative liability for the mere fact of using the Russian language in everyday life.

It does not make the Russian language illegal.

It does something else: the Russian language no longer receives a special status within the European mechanism for protecting regional or minority languages. That is, the state is no longer obliged to support it as a language that needs special protection from extinction.

This is fundamental. The rights of people and the privileges of the language of the aggressor state are not the same.

Why the Russian language became a security issue

Since 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas, Russian propaganda has constantly used the topic of ‘protecting Russian speakers’ as a justification for interference in Ukraine’s affairs. After February 24, 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion, this argument finally ceased to be cultural and became part of military and political aggression.

The Russian language in the Russian version of the world is not just a means of communication. It is a marker of influence. Through it, a network of cultural dependence, media presence, political myths, and the notion that Ukraine is allegedly not an independent state but belongs to the ‘Russian world’ has been built for decades.

That is why law No. 4699-IX should be considered not in isolation but in the overall process of Ukraine’s exit from the post-imperial space. This is not a fight against people who speak Russian. It is the dismantling of the privileged position of a language that Russia has turned into a political weapon.

Why this is important for Israel

For Israel, this topic is much more understandable than it might seem at first glance. Israel is a multilingual country. Here they speak Hebrew, Arabic, Russian, English, French, Ukrainian, Amharic, and dozens of other languages. But at the same time, the state perfectly understands that language is not just a household tool. It is memory, identity, education, security, and political influence.

Hebrew has become not just the official language of Israel but a symbol of the people’s return to their own statehood. Therefore, it is easier for the Israeli reader to understand the Ukrainian logic: when a state is fighting for its existence, it has the right to protect its own linguistic space.

NANews — Israel News views this decision not as a household conflict between languages but as part of Ukraine’s war for political subjectivity. Ukraine does not tell people what language to think in at home. Ukraine says that the language of the aggressor state should not have European privileges on Ukrainian territory.

European context: Ukraine does not deviate from the rules but clarifies them

Russian propaganda will surely present this law as a ‘violation of European standards.’ But in reality, Ukraine’s position is based on something else: the Charter allows states to independently determine which languages they apply the chosen protection measures to. The document of the Council of Europe is related to regional or minority languages, not to the automatic protection of any language present in the country.

Ukraine does not refuse the Charter. Ukraine clarifies that the Russian language is not the language that should use its mechanisms. This is especially important against the backdrop of Russian aggression, when the language of the aggressor state is used as a tool of ideological pressure.

In essence, Kyiv tells Europe: we maintain protection for the languages of indigenous peoples and national communities but will not turn the European mechanism for protecting minorities into a tool for preserving Russian imperial influence.

The main political formula of the law

This law can be formulated in one phrase:

Ukraine separates the rights of citizens from the privileges of the language of the aggressor state.

This is a very important distinction. A citizen can speak Russian. But the Russian language as a political and historical tool of Russian influence should no longer receive special protection from the Ukrainian state.

In this sense, law No. 4699-IX continues a broader process: Ukraine’s transition from post-Soviet logic to its own national policy. The war only accelerated this process but did not create it from scratch. Ukrainian society has long understood that the language issue is not just about grammar, school, or signs. It is a matter of power, memory, and the future.

Why this decision will cause disputes

Of course, the law will be discussed. It will be criticized by those who believe that any step against the special status of the Russian language automatically infringes on Russian speakers. It will be used by Russian media to once again talk about ‘discrimination.’ Perhaps some European observers will also closely watch how Ukraine explains and applies this norm.

But Kyiv’s key argument is simple: the Russian language in Ukraine does not need protection as a disappearing or weak language. But the Ukrainian state needs protection from Russian influence, which has been covered by the language topic for decades.

And here it is important not to substitute concepts. The protection of minority languages is a European value. But the protection of the language of a state that is waging an aggressive war and uses this language as a political tool is a completely different story.

Conclusion

On June 12, 2026, Ukraine marked an important legal and symbolic milestone. Law No. 4699-IX does not ban the Russian language, does not cancel private speech, and does not erase Russian-speaking citizens from Ukrainian society. It does something else: it deprives the Russian language of special European protection, which was created for the languages of indigenous peoples and national communities.

For Ukraine, this is a matter of dignity, security, and decolonization. For Europe, it is a test of the ability to distinguish between the protection of minorities and the preservation of imperial privileges. For Israel, it is an understandable example of how language can be part of national security, especially when a state lives in conditions of war.

NANews — Israel News sees this decision not as a ban on the language but as a political statement: Ukraine is no longer ready to serve the myth of the ‘Russian world’ at the expense of its own laws, European mechanisms, and the right to an independent future.

What is the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages

The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is an international document of the Council of Europe, created to protect languages that are historically used on the territory of European states but are in a weaker position compared to the state language.

The Charter was opened for signature on November 5, 1992 in Strasbourg and came into force on March 1, 1998. In the system of the Council of Europe, it is referred to as treaty ETS No. 148. Its task is not to replace state languages and not to create a parallel language system, but to preserve the cultural and linguistic heritage of Europe where individual languages may gradually disappear from education, culture, media, local governance, and public life.

Simply put, the Charter protects not ‘any language that someone speaks,’ but specifically regional or minority languages that need support. These can be the languages of indigenous peoples, historical national communities, or small language groups that have long lived on the territory of a specific country.

An important detail: each state independently determines which languages it applies the Charter’s provisions to. That is, the Charter itself does not impose on Ukraine an automatic obligation to protect a particular language. Ukraine, like other countries, specifies the list of languages to which the chosen support measures apply.

These measures can concern different areas: education, culture, judiciary, administrative communication, media, public events, preservation of archives, publishing books, and developing the language environment.

Therefore, in the Ukrainian context, the decision to exclude the Russian language from the list of protected languages does not mean a refusal of European standards. Ukraine continues to apply the Charter’s mechanisms to the languages of indigenous peoples and national communities — for example, Crimean Tatar, Karaim, Krymchak, Yiddish, Hebrew, Gagauz, Romanian, Polish, Hungarian, Czech, and other languages from the updated list.

The main difference here is this: the rights of people to private use of the language are preserved, but the special protection regime for the Russian language within the framework of the European Charter is no longer applied.